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1. SUMMARY: The issue bere is whether the DC 
possessed and should have exercised supervisory power to 
suppress evidence obtained as the result of an illegal ----s earch that did not violate resp's Fourth Amendment rights. 
2 . FACTS & DECISION BELotv : In 1976 , rcsp was 
· indicted in federa 1 collrt on a charge of knowingly and 
wi llfully rnaking a false statement in a matter within t he 




of falsely stating on his 1972 federal income tax return that 
he did not have a foreign bank account. It was alleged that 
petr in fact had such an account at the Castle Bank & Trust Co. 
ln Nassau, Bahamas. 
The principal piece of evidence against resp was a 
loan guarantee agreement in which resp pledged his Castle account 
as security for a loan. The document was produced by a Florida 
bank in response to government subpoenas seeking records concern-
ing dealings with the Castle Bank. Before trial, resp moved to 
suppress the loan agreement and related testimony on the ground 
that the evidence had been obtained as the result of an illegal 
search conducted in Florida in 1973. The search was of a brief-
case belonging to Wolstencroft, an officer of the Castle Bank. 
The person principally responsible for the search was a private 
investigator, Casper, working with the encouragement and assistance 
of Special Agent Jaffe of the IRSo There was evidence tending to 
show that, as part of a gener:al IRS investigation, Casper and 
Jaffe cooperated in a scheme to obtain and photograph lists of 
names of persons having deposits in the Castle Bank. Pursuant to 
the scheme, Wolstencroft was distracted, and the lists were 
clandestinely obtained from his briefcase, photographed, and then 
r eturned. Resp's name appeared on one of the lists. These same 
~ ~nts indicated that the Florida bank was linked to the Castle 
B In the course of an investigation into the improper use of 
secret foreign bank accounts, the records of the Florida bank were 
obtained, and resp's loan agreement was discavered. As a result 
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of this new information, the IRS investigated resp and 
ultimately indicted him. 
In an extensive opinion, the DC ruled that resp 
~-------
lacked standing under the Fourth Amendment to challenge the 
legality of the 1973 search of Wolstencroft's briefcaseo But 
i t held that the loan agreement and related testimony \vere 
tainted by the search's illegality. The court further held 
that the government's conduct in encouraging and performing the 
illegal search demonstrated a "knowing and purposeful bad fa~th 
hostility to [a] person's fundamental constitutional rights." 
Petn. 46a, 48a-50a, 56a. Thus, the court concluded that the 
evidence should be suppressed under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fifth Amendment. Alternatively, the court ruled that "the 
f ederal courts' supervisory powe1:- over federa 1 prosecutions 
s hould be invoked to exclude evidence obtained by Goverr~ental 
conduct which is either purposefully illegal or motivated by an 
i ntentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right. 11 Petn. 
58a-6la . After an initial appeal and decision on -a procedural 
issue, the CA affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion. It held 
t hat " the district court did not err in suppressing the evidence 
in the exercise of its supervisory powers .. . • Since we base our 
decision upon the exercise of supervisory powers, it is not 
necessary to reach. the constitutional questions raised on the ap-
peal ." Petn. 2a . The CA did not address the government's con-
tention that the disputed evidence was not tainted by the illegal 
searcho 
- 4 -
3. CONTENTIONS: The SG maintains that this case 
presents the recurring and substantial question whether or 
to what extent a federal district court has supervisory 
power to suppress relevant and probative evidence when a -
defendant's rights were not violated by its acquisition and 
would not be violated by its introduction at trial. The SG 
contends th f the Federal Rules of.Evidence de-
of such authority. The rule provides: 
All relevant evidence is admissible, 
except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution .•. , by Act of Congress, 
by these rules, or by other rules pre-
scribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to 
statutory authority. Evidence which is 
not relevant is not admissible. 
Even if Rule 402 left courts free to exercise some supervisory 
pm,;rer to suppress evidence, the SG argues, suppression would be 
inappropriate here. The exclusion of relevant evidence should be 
resorted to only when it would advance the remedial objectives 
the rule was designed to serve. This Court has held that the 
prime purpose of the exclusionary rule is the deterrence of future 
unlawful police conduct, and it has held that deterrence is ad-· 
equately served if only those with standing under the Fourth 
Amendment are permitted to request suppressiono See Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-175 (1969) ("we arc not convinced 
that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to 
other defendants would justify further encroachment upon the public 
interest in prosecuting those accused of crime"); Moreover, ~<vhen 
this Court has invoked its supervisory pGwer outside the trial 
- 5 -
context, it has focused on behavior directly affecting the 
person urging the application of an exclusionary remedy. E.g., 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). Finally, says the 
SG, theCA's cryptic opinion provides no effective guidance for 
future cases and thus condones a standardless judicial veto over 
governmental practices. 
Resp maintains that the DC properly excluded all evidence 
obtained as a result of the willful and outrageous illegal con-
duct (in violation of state law and the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
merits) on the part of government agents. In any event, suppression 
was 'Wlrr anted in order to protect resp 1 s Fifth Amendment ·rights. 
See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). Moreover, invocatior 
of the exclusionary rule is necessary where, as here, the government 
demonstrates "bad faith hostility tm.;rard the strictures imposed 
• • 0 by the Constitution." Petn. LJ.9a. As the DC reasoned, since 
at the time of the search the government had no intention of taking 
any action against Wolstencroft, there was no threat of exclusion 
-- and hence no deterrence -- under the Fourth Amendment. 
4. . DISCUSSION: The r uling below is questionable, on the 
view that the government's conduct was not directed against resp. 
But the government was interested in the lists of depositors for 
purposes of investigating the depositors. So it is not unreason-
able to prevent admission of the evidence against resp as a matter 
of the court's supervisory power, and it is arguable that resp's 
own Fifth Amendment rights were implicated by admission of evidence 
obtained as a result of blatently improper govet:nmenta 1 conduct. 
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Still, Wolstencroft) and not petr, suffered the indign i ty 
of the search. And the decision below effectively circumvents 
Fourth Amendment stand.i.ng limitations in cases involving a 
willful violation of the Fourth Amendment rights of someone who 
was not himseli: the target of the investigation. 
The existence and . scope ~fa district court's supervisory 
authority to suppress evidence has been repeatedly called into 
question. See United States v. Jaco~s, 436 U.S. 31 (1978) (dis -
missing cert as improvidently granted); United States v. Caceres. , 
No. 76-1309 (Apr. 2, 1979) . The Court might want to consider 
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Motion of petr to dispense with 
appendix 
CA 6 
SUMMARY: On behalf of the parties, the SG asks to dispense 
with the printing of a separate appendix (Rule 36(8)). 
The case involves questions of law, and the factual setting 
of the case is adequately set out in the DC opinion that 
appears in the cert. petn. 
DISCUSSION: The request appears appropriate. 
10/19/79 Marsel 
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No. 78-1729: United States v. Payner · 
s ~ ~~~~ ~ £:•c..(._,~ 
Question Presented ~d~cc.#4'AZ::J 
~~~-
Did the district court possess--and should it have 
exercised--supervisory power to suppress physical evidence 
obtained as the result of an illegal search that did not violate 
the rights of this respondent? 
Facts 
The Internal Revenue S 
~h~·-'~ 
.. ~- .,£.., a- ..d.C.I--~ 
obtained evfden~e against 
~ ... t' \\ 
resp by stealing a briefcase that belonged to Wolstencroft, an 
officer of a Bahamian bank in which resp kept an account. The 
Service's theft was premeditated and flagrantly illegal under 
both the Fourth Amendment and the Florida criminal law. The 
2. 
district court suppressed the evidence on two grounds. First, 
the court held that Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
required the suppression of evidence obtained by grossly 
improper governmental action that "exhibits [the officers'] 
knowing and purposeful bad faith host ~1 i ty to any person's 
constitutional rights." Pet. App. 46a. Second, the court 
invoked its supervisory power to suppress evidence obtained as 
the result of governmental action that was "purposefully 
illegal" and "motivated by an intentional bad faith hostility to 
Id. at 2a. of supervisory powers." 
two additional grounds for ~ "'( 
affirmance. ~ he argues that the Due Process Claus
requires suppression of the evidence. ~, 
In this Court, resp urges 
resp argues that 
the Fourth Amendment requires suppression because Bahamaian law 
gave him a reasonable expectation of privacy in the bank records 
--------~---~--------------_,_, 
purloined from Wolstencroft~_ s briefcase. The first ground--an 
alternative bas is for the district court's order--is properly 
before this Court, but it probably adds little to the ground 
upon which CA6 acted. The second ground may or may not have 




presented, the district court disposed of it in 
See Pet. App. 38a-39a. 
The procedural history of this case also might raise a 
double jeopardy issue, but that question is not before the 
Court. 
Background 
"Judicial supervision of the administration of 
criminal justice in the federal courts implies the duty of 
establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure 
and evidence." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 
(1943). This Court has recognized that the federal courts have 
supervisory power to suppress evidence secured by overzealous 
law enforcement practices. "A democratic society, in which 
respect for the dignity of all men is central, naturally guards 
against the misuse of the law enforcement process." Id. at 343. 
Thus, in McNabb and Mallory v. United States, 3 54 U.S. 449 
(1957), the Court invoked its supervisory power to suppress 
confessions extracted after over-bearing interrogation that 
violated federal statutes. In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 
21 4, 216-1 7 ( 1 956) , the Court enjoined a federal officer from 
testifying in a state criminal trial about evidence seized under 
a defective search warrant. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206 ( 1960), the Court held that evidence seized by state 
officers in violation of the Fourth Amendment could not be 
admitted in federal criminal trials. 
You recently alluded to this body of law in Hampton v. 
United States, 425 u.s. 484, 491 (1976) (Powell, J. ' 
concurring). In that case, the plurality held that 
predisposition was the only relevant consideration in an 
entrapment case. You disagreed. Were some future case to 
present "outrageous police conduct," you wrote, the conviction 
of a predisposed person might be barred by either the Due 
Process Clause or the supervisory power. Id. at 493. You noted 
that United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973), 
"indicated only that we should be extremely reluctant to invoke 
the supervisory power in cases of this kind because that power 
does not give the 'federal judiciary a "chancellor's foot" veto 
over law enforcement practices of which it [does] not approve.'" 
4 25 U.S. at 49 4. 
Discussion 
~,..'st..~ I. Effect of Fed. R. Evid. 402 ~ ~ ,~--- -t 
The Government's primary argument is 
~-----------------~~ ~ 
suppress otherwise admissible evidence. The Rule says that 
"[a]ll relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of 
Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority." Since no rule, 
. •' 
5 • 
statute, or constitutional provision bars the evidence at issue 
in this case, the Government argues, Rule 402 prevents the 
federal courts from suppressing the evidence. 
This argument should fail. Resp correctly points out 
that the language and the legislative history of the final 
clause in the Rule simply show that Congress intended to prevent 
this Court from amending the evidence rules 
--------------------~---------------
without 
congressional ap~g~~. Brief for Resp 17. And the Government 
conceeds that Rule 402 11 necessarily contemplates a substantial 
degree of judicial latitude in deciding whether relevant 
evidence should be suppressed in particular cases... Brief for 
the U.S. 32. 11 [T]he drafters expected the courts to decide when 
the effective enforcement of a particular constitutional 
provision • requires the suppression of relevant evidence ... 
Indeed, the drafters cited Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 
449 (1957), as an example of the sort of rulings that Rule 402 
would permit. Id. at 32 n.13. 
s~~~ 
II. Enforcement of the Fourth Amendment~~-~ 
 "---,~ ~-...,_. 
The Government argues that whatever superv1sory power 
the federal courts might have to suppress evidence was exercised 
improperly in this case. In the first place, says the 
Government, the supervisory power should not be used to exclude 
evidence admissible under the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, 
goes the argument, the courts should not use their supervisory 
.. 
6 . 
power to regulate investigative activities of the Executive 
Branch in ways not required by rule, statute, or the 
Constitution. These arguments go to the core of the case. (The 
Government's third argument--that CA6 has given the district 
courts no guidance on how to exercise the supervisory power--has 
no merit; the district court's opinion in this case articulates 
a good standard, and this Court can articulate whatever standard 
it thinks proper.) 
Your view of the exclusionary rule as a deterrent to ~ 
~ future violations of the Fourth Amendment would allow you to so 
---------------~-- ~ -either way on the first argument. On the one hand, you could 
say that the balance between deterrence and the social interest 
in admitting all relevant evidence has been struck by the rule 
that excludes ill-gotten evidence only from the trial of the 
person whose rights were injured. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 
u.s. 128 (1978). On the other hand, you could say that the 
federal courts have the power to reweigh the competing interests 
in cases where the unconstitutional search was conducted l}Qth -
purposefully and in bad faith. Certainly in a case like this 
-------~-- -
one, the Internal Revenue Service has little incentive to behave 
itself. Since the Service violates the rights of bank officers 
solely for the purpose of getting evidence against depositors, 
there never will be a case where the Fourth Amendment would 
exclude the fruits of the constitutional violation from a 
criminal trial. 
7. 
In order to accept the Government's second argument, 
you would have to take a position somewhat inconsistent with 
your theory of the exclusionary rule. The Government has tried 
to frame the argument narrowly. But a deterrence theory cannot 
very well distinguish between judicial action to deter searches 
that will violate the rights of third parties and judicial 
action to deter "future violations," Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 
465, 492 (1976). In both cases, the courts act to deter 
violations that will injure persons other than the defendant. 
In both cases, the judicial goal is the regulation of police 
conduct. 
III. A Different View 
For you, the result in this case probably should turn 
on your assessment of the Government's first argument. To me, 
the case appears more difficult. The case--particularly in ---------- __....,_ 
light of the Government's second argument--seems to bring into 
focus a logical lapse in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Well-
._--...__-,. 
established precedent holds that a constitutional provision 
conferring a right on each person should be enforced by a remedy 
that protects the rights of others. See Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. at 482-89, 492. In other words, the remedy does not follow 
from the wrong. United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 443 
(1976). The remedy is a naked assertion of judicial power to 
regulate executive officials in a way that the Framers probably 
'' 
8. 
did not contemplate. The case law then 1 imi ts the deterrence 
theory underlying the remedy by somehow recurring to the notion 
that the right is personal. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 
(1978). 
( 1) I have thought that the rationale for the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule was ill-conceived from the outset, 
'------------------but for reasons that seem to concern no one else. The rule 
originally had a dual rationale. It was designed to preserve 
judicial integrity and to prevent unconstitutional searches. 
Neither of these rationales seems to be the correct one. The 
point of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the "riqht of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects II As Mr. Justice Holmes said, "[t]he essence of 
a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain 
way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used 
before the Court but that it shall not be used at all." 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 u.s. 385, 392 
(1920). When government officers violate a person's 
constitutional right, he suffers a qrave injury for which he 
deserves some remedy. 
the equitable remedy. ..__________ 
The exclusionary rule, as I see it, is 
It attempts to put the injured person 
back into the same position vis-a-vis the Government that he 
would have occupied had the violation never occurred. Indeed, 
in an old case the style of which I have forgotten, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals found that dismissal of the indictment was the 
9 • 
. .. 
equitable remedy for governmental intrusions on the defendant's 
rights. 
This view of the exclusionary rule as an equitable 
remedy often would lead to the same results that the Court has 
reached in its recent cases. Since the rule protects a personal 
right, the remedy would be inappropriate in a case where the 
right violated belonged to someone other than the defendant 
before the court. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). 
On the other hand, the remedy would be appropriate in quite a 
number of situations where the Court has not awarded it. See, 
e.g., United States v. Callandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (grand 
jury) ; Walder v. United States, 347 u.s. 62 (1954) 
(impeachment); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952) (arrest). 
Given the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary 
rule, however, it would seem logical to conclude that the 
federal courts do have supervisory power to invoke the rule in 
' ~----~---------~--------------------------------------cases where its deterrent value is obvious even though the - ~-------~----'----------------particular defendent' s rights have not been violated. Indeed, 
deterrence seems most likely in cases, such as this one, where 
the Government violates Fourth Amendment rights purposefully and 
in bad faith. And the supervisory power has been invoked in 
situations where neither purpose nor bad faith were as clear as 
they are in this case. See, e.g., Mallory v. United States, 354 
U.S. 449 (1957); McNabb v. United States, 318 u.s. 332 (1943). 
(2) It seems to me, however, that the supervisory 
power was overextended by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's decisions in 
Mallory, supra, and McNabb, supra. The power properly has two 
components. The first is the courts' power to uphold the 
quality of justice by regulating their own proceedings. The 
second is the courtflo/ power to preserve their own inteqr i ty by 
regulating the conduct of those who appear before them. The 
first power allows the courts to formulate rules of evidence and 
procedure. The second power allows the courts, for example, to 
regulate lawyers and prosecutors. See generally Hill, The Bill 
of Rights and the Supervisory Power, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 181 
(1969). 
The power claimed in Mallory, McNabb, and this case is 
. 
an odd mix of the two basic powers. The court regulates the ---------
conduct of others through a rule of evidence that profoundly 
affects the quality of justice. Since the law does not require 
the exclusion of the evidence in this case, "justice" is not 
served by the district court's effort to regulate governmental 
conduct. Instead, the regulation reaches out to control 
the l 
The only future conduct of those who are not before the court • ..._..,........ ....-. ....... ~... ---_____ ..., ____ ,__________ _ 
interest in judicial integrity served by the regulation is the 
very interest that this Court has rejected in its Fourth 
Amendment cases. See, e.g. , Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. at 485. 
The regulation may serve a worthy purpose, but it is not I 
supported by either rationale for the supervisory power. 
Instead, the district court's effort to regulate police conduct 
aggravates separation-of-powers problems arising from 
enforcement of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on a 
deterrence theory. But §ee Note, Judicially Required Rulemaking 
as Fourth Amendment Policy: An Applied Analysis of the 
Supervisory Power of Federal Courts, 72 Nw. u. L. Rev. 595, 614-
29 (1977). In other words, I would reject the assertion of 
supervisory power in this case for much the same reason that I 
would reject the deterrence rationale for the Fourth Amendment 
~-----------------~-------------------------------exclusionary rule. 
Conclusion 
Rakus v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978), stands for the 
proposition that the need to deter unconstitutional searches 
outweighs the societal interest in admitting all relevant 
evidence only in those cases where the illegal search violated -
the rights of the defendant himself. Unless the Court is 
willing to exclude at the inner door evidence that can enter at 
the outer door, Rakus probably requires the Court to reverse 
CA6's judgment. The deterrence rationale for the exclusionary 
rule and this Court's decisions under the supervisory power, 
however, will support an affirmance. When governmental 
misconduct is purposeful and in bad faith, an exclusionary rule 
should be at its most effective. 
78-1729 U.S. v. Payner Argued 2/20/80 
1U-c s -~tYf -~k-z~s~ 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Ellen DATE: March 24, 1980 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
78-1729 -Payner 
If you have not done so, you may want to take a 
look at the two cases at the end of the argument list for 
this week: 79-5146 Rawlings · v; - Kentucky, and particularly 
79-244 U;S. - v; - Salvucci. 
These cases were granted for the purpose of 
considering the "automatic standing" rule. The SG's brief in 
79-244 may possibly be of some assistance, although it really 
says nothing new. 
ss 
' .. , 
~r.t. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
~:· 
lfp/ss 3/24/80 
MEMORANDUM '~ -~ '!'.\ 
TO: Ellen j;' DATF.: March 24, 19AO 
FROM: Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
78-1729 Payner 
If you have not done so, you may want to take a 
look at the two cases at the end of the argument list for 
this week: 79-5146 Rawlinqs v. Kentucky, and particularly 
79-244 u.s. v. Salvucci. 
These cases were granted for the purpose of 
considerinq the "automatic standinq" rule. The SG's brief in 
79-244 may possibly be of some assistance, although it really 

















,itqtumt Qtttttd llf tqt ~b .§tzdts 
'IJasJringLtn. ~. Qt. 20,?J!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
April 11, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.iu.pumt Q}mtrl llf tlrt ~~ ,ibtttg 
._ag!p:ngtlltt. ~. <!}. 2ll.;t'!~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE April 11, 1980 
Re: 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
A-
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
~ • t. 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
' .. 
Re: 
Dear Lewis: a I c 
Except for the first sentence of the full paragrap 
on page 8, I think your opinion is fine. I am afraid, 
however, .that I -cannot agree that evidence should never 
be suppressed "without carefully balancing the benefits 
of exclusion against its high societal cost." If that 
were the test, I would suppress the evidence in this 
case. For me, the test is whether the search violated 
the defe-ndant's constitutional rights. If the answer is 
yes, I believe suppression is appropriate; if the answer 
is no, suppression is inappropriate even if the illegality 
is as serious as we find in this case. 
If you can see your way clear to deleti~g the language 
I have quoted, I will be happy to join you. 
Respectfully, 
fL 
Mr. Justice Powell 
.. 
Re: No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, concurring. 
£a: Kr. lustioo Brennan 
Kr. Juetioe Stewart 
lir . · Juetioe Whi to,. 
Xr . Justiee Marshall 
Xr. JustiBe Blaokmun 
Kr. Justioe Powell 
Kr. Justioe Rehnquist 
11r •.. Justioe Stevens 
~m: The Chief Justice 
APR 11 198() 
Circulated: ____________ _ 
llactrnulote'' _ _ _ _ ~ 
I join the Court's opinion because Payner -- whose guilt is 
not in doubt -- cannot take advantage of the Government's 
violation of the constitutional rights of Wolstencroft, who is 
not a party to this case. The Court's opinion makes clear the 
reasons for that sound rule. However, the Internal Revenue 
Service conduct in hiring "private investigators" to secure 
evidence of Payner's criminal acts, in the manner shown by this 
record, is repugnant to fundamental tenets of how our 
Government ought to conduct its affairs. 
Orderly government under our system of separate powers 
should encourage maximum internal self-restraint and discipline 
in each Branch. Although this Court has supervisory authority 
with respect to the federal courts, it has no general authority 
over the Executive Branch. In my view, it is unseemly, to put 
it mildly, for a government to conduct its law enforcement 
investigations in the way this case reveals. 
. . 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
,ju.prtmt <!flturlltf tqt ~nitth ,jtatts 
Jfasfringtltn. ~. <!f. 2ll&i'l-~ 
April 11, 1980 
PERSONAL 
Re: 78-1729 -United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with your resolution of this case, but raise a 
point of concern. I would like to avoid joining any opinion 
that can be misread as giving approval to an absolute 
Exclusionary Rule in any class of cases. For example, on page 
7 the opinion states 
" • . . exclusion is a necessary deterrent to 
unlawful conduct in appropriate cases ... " 
The remainder of the paragraph qualifies this "approval" 
of exclusion, but I would not care to make it easy for 
"leopards" to quote the first sentence of the paragraph 
out of context. 
Your excellent later discussion shows your skepticism 
about an absolute Exclusionary Rule but those parts will 
not be quoted by lovers of exclusion. Perhaps it is not 
always possible to prevent corruption of our opinions, but 
may I suggest that changing "is" to "may be" in the quoted 
sentence may do its part. For my part, I would add cites 
to Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and 
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 (1970), and (immodestly) 
to my dissent in Bivens. 
My proposed chastising of the IRS (attached) is open 
to revision; it is not something best said in a Court 
opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
p.s. As my concurring op1n1on indicates, I am 
prepared to join your opinion if you can see your way to 
the above ideas. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.prrmt <!Jourt o-f t17t ~rittb ~t1dt£1 
2ffia.slpngton. ~. <.q. 2!l,SJ~2 
April 11, 1980 
PERSONAL 
Re: 78-1729 -United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree with your resolution of this case, but raise a 
point of concern. I would like to avoid joining any opinion 
that can be misread as giving approval to 
Exclusionary Rule in any class of cases. 
7 the opinion states 
" . • . exclusion is a necessary deterrent to 
unlawful conduct in appropriate cases ... " 
The remainder of the paragraph qualifies this "approval" 
of exclusion, but I would not care to make it easy for 
"leopards" to quote the first sentence of the paragraph 
out of context. 
Your excellent later discussion shows your skepticism 
about an absolute Exclusionary Rule but those parts will 
not be quoted by lovers of exclusion. Perhaps it is not 
always possible to prevent corruption of our opinions, but 
may I suggest that changing "is" to "may be" in the quoted 
sentence may do its part. For my part, I would add cites 
to Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and 
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665 {1970), and {immodestly) 
to my dissent in Bivens. 
My proposed chastising of the IRS {attached) is open 
to revision; it is not something best said in a Court 
opinion. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
p.s. As my concurring opinion indicates, I am 
prepared to join your opinion if you can see your way to 
the above ideas. 
OF 
~npr~uu <!Jttttrlttf 14~ ~nittb- ~btlt$ 
~a,glrittghtn. !fl. <!J. 2llgt'!~ 
JL STEVENS 
April 11, 1980 
Re: 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
!ar Lewis: 
Except for the first sentence of the full paragraph 
L page 8, I think your opinion is fine. I am afraid, 
>wever, .that I · cannot agree that evidence should never 
' suppressed "without carefully balancing the benefits 
: exclusion against its high societal cost." If that 
ere the test, I would suppress the evidence in this 
tse. For me, the test is whether the search violated 
Le defendant's constitutional rights. If the answer is 
Is, I believe suppression is appropriate; if the answer 
no, suppression is inappropriate even if the illegality 
as serious as we find in this case. 
If you can see your way clear to deleting the language 




r• ·~:t. •. 
States v. Payner 
Thank you for your personal letter of April 
I have eliminated the language in the first full 
paragraph on page 11, that you preferred not to leave in the 
op1n1on. Also, as you suggested, I have added a reference to 
Dallin Oaks' superb article. On balance, I thought it best 
not to refer to your excellent discussion of the Exclusionary 
Rule in your Bivens dissent. Although you and I are fairly 
close together on that rule, I have not yet qone all the way 
with you. More importantly, I did not want to qo too far 
afield in this case. 




~up:rtmt Q):!tllrl of t4t ~tb j\bttts 
'~ihtsfringhnt. !fl. <!):. 2llgi,.$ / CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
April 14, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,/ . 
. Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
;iuprtuu <!Jourl ltf tlyt ~nitt~ ~htttg 
._aglyington. !9. <!J. 2llc?'!$ 
Re : No . 78-1729 - United States v . Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall await the dissent . 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc : The Conference 
April 14, 1980 
I 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
~u:ptmtt Q}ltUrlltf tlrt ~h ;§f:dtg 
'Jfufrhtghtn. ~. <!}. 2!1~'1-~ 
Apri 1 14, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis, 
I am glad to join your opinion for 
the Court. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
'-
,itt.ptttttt arltltrlltf tqt ~b .itatts 
Jfasftinghtn. ~. ar. 2.llgt'k~ 
RE: 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I join. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
April 15, 1980 
j 
~uvumt <!fltUrl llf f4t ~ua ~bdts 
,.as4ittghttt, ~. <If. 2il~'lo.;l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
April 15, 1980 
Re: 78-1729 -United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
Mr. Justice Powell 





















~uvrtntt' <lfcnrl of flrt ~lt ~tatts­
~a,g~ ~. <lJ. 20,?'!-~ 
June 18, 1980 
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Thurgood: 
Please join me in the dissenting opinion you 






.JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
~UVrtm.t ~ou.rt cf tqt ~ttittb ~m:f'ts 
JJ aa: Jrittgtcn. ~. <!f. 2!l.;t'l-.;t 
Re: No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Thurgood: 
Please join me in your dissenting opinion. 
-
Mr. Justice Marshall 
cc: The Conference 
June 18, 1980 
June 18, 1980 
78-1729, United States v. Payner 
MEMORANDUM TO THF. CONFERENCE: 
I propose to add the following to footnote 8 at 
paqe 8 of the proposed opinion in this case: 
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the 
balance of interests un~the supervisory power differs 
from that con~idered in Alderman and like cases, because 
the supervisory power focuses upon the •need to protect 
the integrity of the federal courts.• Although the 
Distri.ct Court in this case relied upon a deterrent 
rationale, we aqree that the supervisory power serves 
the •two-fold" purpose of deterring illegality and 
protecting judicial integrity. See post, at 7. .As the 
dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule serves precisely the same purposes. 
Ibid., citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 u.s. 
~ 218 (1979), and Map~ v. Ohio 367 u.s. 643, 659-660 
(1961). Thus, the Fourt Amendment exclusionary rule, 
like the supervisory power, is applied in part "to 
protect the integrity of the court rather than to 
vindicate the constitutional riqhts of the defendant 
•• • Post, at 10, see generally Stone v. Powell, 428 
u.s. ~ 486 (1976)7 United States v. Calandra, 414 
u.s. 338, 486 (1974). 
In this case, where the illegal conduct did 
not violate the respondent's riqhts, the interest in 
preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such 
conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in 
presenting probative evidence to the trier of fact. See 
sutra7 see also, e.g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-
48 • None of the cases cited by the dissent, host, at 
7-9, supports a contrary view, since none of t ose cases 
involved criminal defendants who were not themselves the 
victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our 
today does not limit the traditional scope of the 
supervisory power in any way7 nor does it render that 
power •superfluous." Post, at 12. We merely reject its 




lfp/ss 6/20/80 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
This criminal case comes to us on certiorari/from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
The respondent was indicted on a charge of falsifyin~n 
income tax retur;lby denying that he had a foreign bank 
account. 
A document critical to the government's case had 
been obtained by an unlawful search of a third party's 
briefcase. The 
reading even if 
/ 1R{ agent. - ---
facts are biz~rr~nd provide 
they reflect~edit on the 
" 
interesting 
conduct of an 
The facts are set forth i~ deta~l in our opinion 
filed today. In briefest summary,}t 
.JJ~ 
was learned that an 
~
officer of a Bahamas bank would be in Miami with~account 
records in his briefcase. The bank officer, not a defendant 
£~Sli "K 
in this case, was enticed to dine with a lady, engaged for 
~~
the purpose. While he was~being entertained~an IRS agent 
arranged for an illegal entry, and the surreptitious 
. -
photographing/of the bank account records. 
The search clearly violated the Fourth Amendment 
rights of the Bahamas bank official,;but no constitutional 
rights of respondent were violated. 
~-
'·' 
The courts below/nevertheless suppressed the 
evidence so obtained, exercising their inherent/supervisory 
powers. 
Although no court would condone the setting up of 
the deliberate invasion of his Fourth __... 
2. 
the bank officia~and 
Amendment rights,/the critical fac~s that he is not ,
1 ~·-~-~!4~~ ¢-~'YLfkf 
involved in this case. /\Ne ~igl'tt ~errdeu~has ~een "(~ 
violated. aRd ~cordingly- under se6tl8~ doct!iAe of our 
cases -~standing under the Fourth Amendment/to 
demand exclusion of the evidence. The supervisory power may 




with its own 
respected. / 
, 
responsibility of the Executive 
, 1by appropriate sanctions, ~compliance 
istence that constitutional rights be 
l ', Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
Mr. Justice Marshall has filed a dissenting opinion 
in which Mr. Justice Brennan and Mr. Justice Blackmun have 
joined. 
> \ 




UNITED STATES v. PA YNER 
In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), 
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960) , the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
" [A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
11eed for untramm.eled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. fl .. at 216. 
Ree also Nardone v. Uuited States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
\Ye conclude that the sup0rvisory power does not ;;ermit 21 
federal c?urt to suppress ('virlt ~~eo~ain~eel 8y 1m tu~tt«!at 
~ 'nthfntt 8? ~N:li;y b:rlancmg of: · 
a~&iHet its high ewi.!tlttl eol!'lte. -Atwt .Qur Fourth Amendment 
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.7 The 
values assign·ed to the competing interests do not change 
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case. the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
cisely the same. 
1 "The drterrrnt vnlur:: of prrventing the incrimination of thosr whose 
rights the police have violatrcl hnve bern ronsiderecl ~uffieient to ju~tify 
11H' supprr::;:;ion of probative r,·idenrr evrn though the ('U~e again:;! tJH• 
r1rfendani i;; weakPnecl or clf',;troyPd. We :tdherf' to that jud11:ment. But 
we· are not. eonvinrPd that the additional benefit» of rxtendmg the rxrlu-
~iomtr~· rul<' t.o other drfendan1 s would justify fmther rnrroarhmrnt tqlon 
(])(' pubhr interr~t in JWO:'Pcuting tho:-:r arcusecl of crime a]l(l having tlwm 
ac·qnitted or convicted on thr ba::;is of all the cvidPncP wlmh rxpo~r,; t hP 




UNITED STATES v. PAYNER 7 
that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
~hough exclusion jsAa necessary deterrent i;o unlawful 
conduct in appropriate case~ the Court has acknowledged 
that the suppression of probativ~ but tainted evidence exacts 1 
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccoli,ni, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan 
v. ~'Pucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 ( 1974); Kaufman v. United 1 Qok.s 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 237- 238 (1969) (Black, J., dissentingC J ' 
Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending apph- )~~~ -!:hg 
cation of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of 
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth- b)(~tGMDI>j 
finding functions of judge and jury. E. g. , Stone v. Powell, Kub. ,·\A S.w ciA 
supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra,"4U. . S. 338, - . 
348 Hm). After all, it is the defendant, and not the con- S.e...t 'Z.W/... 
stable, who stands trial. ~ 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal S7 lA (fA 1 1 L 
defelldant invokes the supervisory power to .suppress evidence ~ b6t; 7)b-7~(, seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. I ' 1 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even #SS-75(, (teO~· [ 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.0 / J -
6 F ederal courts may Ui:ie their supervi~ory power in some circum-
~tances to exclude evidence t<tken from the £lefendant by "willful dii:iobedi-
ence' of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, -!25 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, that the supervisory power authorize~; ~;uppre"'=iion of evi-
denl'e obt.ained from t hird parties in violation of Con~titu tion, ~;tatute or 
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
" the administration of criminal ju:stice" amoug the partie~ before the bar. 
McNab{) v. Unit~d States, supra, !1-t 3'!0. 
'P.J,~~ v. s,~ --\.UAX.~ - ' 
N~+tC.s 
~l s, •to; 
I)}; 1 3%~1 
~~~ ( 111 i) 
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:-<OTE: Where It Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is Issued. 'l'he syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the l'eader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
Syllabus 
UNITED STATES v. PA YNER 
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 78-1729. Argued Frbruary 20, 1980-Decided June 23, 1980 
At respondent's nonjury trial for falsifying a federal income tax return 
by denying that he maintained a foreign bank account, respondent 
moved to suppress a loan guarantee agreement in which he pledged the 
funds in the bank account as security. The District Court found 
respondent guilty on the basis of all the evidence, but then (1) found 
that the Government had discovered the guarantee agreement as the 
result of a flagrantly illegal search of a bank officer's briefcase, (2) sup-
pressed all the Government's evidence except for respondent's tax return 
and 1 eln1 ed testimony, and (3) set aside the conviction for failure to 
demonstrate knowing falsification. The court held, inter alia, that, 
although the illegal search did not violate respondent's Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts 
required it to exclude evidence tainted by the illegal search. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: 
1. Respondent lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to sup-
press thr documents illegally seized from the bank officer. A defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the challenged 
conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that 
of a third party, and respondent possessed no privacy interest in the 
documents seized in this case. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128; 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435. Pp. 4-6. 
2. The supervisory power of the federal courts does not authorize a 
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it 
was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Under 
the Fourth Amendment, the interest in deterring illegal searches does 
not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party 
who was not the victim of the challenged practices. And the values 
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"V , ~ 1980 
Uos Angeles C\rimcs 
WASHINGTON BUREAU 
June 24, 1980 
Dear Justice Powell, 
I thought the Post story today on your 
opinion was a mile off the mark . 
Enclosed is a copy of our own story, which 
I believe puts the issue in much better perspective. 
Jim Mann allowed me to write it since I have covered 
Project Haven from start to finish . 
Best wishes , 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































MORGAN, LEWIS '& BOCKIUS 
COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1800 M STREET, N . W. 
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20036 




ASSOC IATED OFFICE 
DONALD C. ALEXANDER July 1, 1980 
DIAL D I RECT (202) 872·5045 
Hon. Lewis F . Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
? 1nr 
RE : United States v. Payner 
Dear Justice Powell: 
As Cornnissioner of Internal Revenue from May, 1973 to 
March, 1977, I am deeply concerned about certain of the 
statements made in Footnote 5 to your majority opinion in 
the above case. It seems clear that the Court may not have 
been given a fully accurate picture of the facts. These 
statements and my comments follow. 
1. "We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the 
improprieties revealed in this record." 
It is true that in 1976 Congress investigated the 
"briefcase caper", but it is difficult for me to see how a 
person reading the hearings of the two Congressional investi-
gations, that made by Chairman Rosenthal's Subcommittee of 
the House Governn1ent Operations Committee and cited in 
Footnote 5 and the other by Representative Vanik's Oversight 
Subcommittee of the Committee on Ways and Means, could conclude 
that the "improprieties" investigated were those involved in 
the taking of the briefcase. Instead, the primary interest 
of both Subcornnittees was investigating allegations about me. 
Certain members of the law enforcement community (including 
the people who set up the briefcase caper) joined with their 
associates in the media in planting and disseminating the 
contention that I called off Operation Have~ using the brief-
case incident as a pretext, to protect my former law firm and 
its clients. That Congressmen Rosenthal and Vanik were investi-
gating these allegations, and other allegations that I was "soft 
on crime" is obvious from a reading of the records. See, e.g., 
Rosenthal's record at pp. 30, 82-99, 112, 116-7, 992-927 and 
1265-1323 . 
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Page 2 July 1, 1980 
RE: United States v. Payner 
2. "As a result, the Corrunissioner of Internal Revenue 
'called off' Operation Trade Winds." 
Neither Operation Trade Winds nor Operation Haven 
was called off as a result of any Congressional hearing. 
Operation Trade Winds had previously been curtailed when 
the Internal Revenue Service reexamined its policy and 
practices regarding informants. Operation Haven was tempor-
arily suspended after the "briefcase caper" became known to 
the IRS National Office officials, and was resumed, at IRS' 
request, through a grand jury convened by the Department of 
Justice. Congress had nothing to do with any curtailment; 
instead, some in Congress were attacking me for having 
attempted to make law enforcement officers abide by the law. 
3. "Although these measures appear on their face to be 
less positive than one might expect from an agency charged 
with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the 
practices found to have been implemented in this case." 
The first half of this statement is deeply disturbing 
to me. What more "positive" actions could I have taken? I 
find it surprising that anyone aware of the facts in 1975-76, 
or willing to inquire into the facts, could speak so slightingly. 
I attempted, as strongly as I could and with more vigor than 
discretion, to prevent certain overzealous IRS criminal investi-
gators from violating the Constitution and the law. For this 
effort, I was subjected to a continuing (and almost successful) 
campaign of personal harassment in the media and in Congress. 
I was the target of a grand jury investigation in Washington, 
and I also had to testify in my defense before a grand jury 
in Miami. In the end, thanks to the fact that the allegations 
against me were completely false and the fact that Secretary 
Simon, President Ford and Attorney General Levi were honorable 
men, I was cleared and I remained in office. 
Since it appears clear that you and your office were not 
acquainted with these facts, I am enclosing some clippings 
describing the allegations made and the actions taken. 
As I stated i~nediately after the first allegations about 
me were carried on national television, this is the price one 
has to pay for trying to prevent lawless conduct by law enforce-
ment officials. I think that those who head law enforcement 
MORGAN, LEWIS & 80CKIUS 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Page 3 July 1, 1980 
RE: United States v. Payner 
agencies are fully aware of what happened to me and why it 
happened; and it is unrealistic to assume that they will 






I rr>c:Pi vr~d today the' 1?'1closPd 1 ett~':r from Don[lld C. 
Alexander, who was Commissioner of Tn+-.Prnal Rovenuf' nt the 
time of the events in the abovP suit . Mr . Alexander objects 
to the second, third, and fifth sentences (exclusive of 
citations) j n footnote 5 of _ thf' Court ooin ion . Tn 
parti<"ulnr, he r1sserts t.h~t. ' hr-> d 'i id ?~11 hr> \'Ould to r'""quire 
IRS agents to con form to ~h;n 1 ."-\W, and thAt hr> was sever~'? ly 
criticize~ for calling ' off Operation Tr?de Winds when h~ 
learned of thr> improprieties revealad in the ?ayner c~se . 
From newspaper cliooinqs attached to Mr. 
Alexandr>r's lPttPr, T qather that he was falsely accused of 
suspending the Bahamian bank invPstiqation in order to 
protect pr>rsons whom hr> knew . Congress 5nvastigated this and 
similar a~cusations in the hearinqs cited in footnote 5 . In 
the course of the invest iq;)t ion, how~ve>r , the congressional 
C"nmmitti?P delve·d~ at length into the i lleqal acts committed by 
Mr . Jaffe and Mr. Casper in th~ "briefcase caper . " Thus, I 
beliPVP it was ac~urate to state that "in 1976 Conqress 
investigat~~ thP improprieties revealed in this ~cord . " . 
~~~,;-'· IP!. Pt?rhaps the po1i.tici'tl climate orevPnted Hr . 
Alexander from tal< ing more positive measures to discipline 
the aqents responsible for the briE>fcase affair . It 
nevertheless remains true that the measures taken "appear on 
their face to be less positive than one might expP.ct from an 
agency charged with .e.n fore ing the l<;~w . " Therefore , I would 
not change the second or fifth sentences in foo~notP 5. 
·. 
2. 
The thi r.d sentence, however, may be innccuratc in 
its implication . It reans : "~s a result [of the 
congr~ssiona.l investigation 1 , the Commissioner of Intern~ l 
Revenue 'c?lle~ off' Operation Tradewin~s." The information 
submitten by Mr . a.l'-"xand~r shows that l1~ suspr.>nt1<?d th'-" 
operation before any congrPssional invPstiqation began. J+-_ 
therefore appears appropriate to correct the st<'Jteoment th:=tt 
thP Commissioner ' s action was triqa'-"r~~ bv Congress' int~r~st 
in tho matt~r. In fact , it se~ms more likely that Congress' 
interest was prompten in part hy the Comm. issioner's "lct:il")ns. l 
Thus, I propose that the sentence b~ chanqen to read: 
"Moreovf"r, tlJf' Commission~r of Internal Revenue--on his own 
initiative--'called off' Op..,.rntion Trade Winds." 
Unless th'-"re is some obiection 
RPport'-"r to substitute the languAge au 
third sentenc'-" of footnot~ 5. I plan no 
footnot!: . 
L. P'. P . , ,Jr. 
I will {nstruct the 
ted above for the 
~her chanaes in tho 
., 
Don~ld C. AlPxan~~r, Rsquire 
MorqRn L"''r'is & Bocldus 
1800 M Str.PAt, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. ?0016 
July 15, 1qgo 
Thank you for vour letter of July 1. Tt may well 
be (in light of the clippinqs you sent\ that th~ Court was 
not fu 11 y adv isPd of CllJ of thr~ fa~ts surrouno inq th~ events 
mentioned in the opinion. As of rourso you understand, 
however, ~~ normally do not go beyond the facts of record, 
includinq t~e briofs. 
Your Primary ~on~ern r~lat~s to footnote 5. I will 
commPnt briP.fly on my un~erstancHng of thE> ooints that. ynu 
question~ 
1. As you obsGrVP, the congression~l investigation 
undertakPn in 1976 foruson uoon acrusRtions - L1ter. shown to 
be groundloss - th"t IR~ enforcement efforts had b~Pn 
hamoere~ in order to nrotAct highly placed exPcutiveq. The 
hearings rPferre~ to in footnote 5 of the Court's opinion 
~id, however, include lengthy testimony concerninq thP brief 
case t-heft at issll() in the Pi'lyner r.:as(!>. Tt th"'"r~fo'CP se~ms 
accuratP to state thRt th~ imoropriRt-ies involve~ in thP 
litigation bafore us WPre a subject of the congrPssional 
investiqation. 
2. The statemPnt that Operation Trade Winds w~s 
curtailP~ "as ~ result" of the congr~ssional investigation 
was b~sed upon reoresentations made to us by counsel. As the 
inference now appears to be inaccurate, the Court has aqr~c.d ·r 
to chanqe the sentence to read: "Moreover, the Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue - on his own initiative - 'calleo off' 
Operation Trade Winds." 
' .t 
3. I have no doubt that your actions were an 
example of responsible and courageous aoministration in the 
face of unjustified criticism. Yet, the record before the 
Court certainly demonstrated serious improprieties by 
personnel of thP IRS. Nothing in the record indicated that 
appropriet~ measures had been tak~n to discipline or 
discharge the individuals responsible for what was certainly 
a gross and deliberate violation of constitutional rights. 
The rPcord presented to this Court showed, in subst~ncp, only 
thBt thP IRS had discontinued the operation and issued new 
guidelines. The Court thPrefore stated that these m~asures 
"appear on th~ir face to have bePn less positive than one 
miqht E>XP~t>Ct fr.om an aqPnt:'V r.harged with upho) d inq the ] aw' 
" (EmphAsis oodPri). ,~ u 
;. 
I do underst~nd your concern, and wish that the 
cas~ had been pres~nred to us in a way that avoided any 
possiblP i.nferenC'"" of improPri~ty on your p;:>rt-. Tt is fajr 
to say, T think, that none of us hPrP thought in tP~ms of 
such impropriety, exC'ept possibly to thP extent. that the 
disciplina~y action was inadequate. I do hope that the 
change the Court has madP in the one troublesome sentPnce 
wi 11 be he1 pful. .. , ""·~ .. 
As you know, the Court nor~ally ma~PS no 
explanation of an opinion. Yet, in view of 
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A S SOCIATED 0 F F'I CE 
DONALD C. ALEXANDER 
July 28, 1980 
DIAL 01 RECT (202) 872-5045 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
RE: United States v. Payner 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Thank you very much for your letter of July 15. I 
deeply appreciate your interest in this important matter . 
With my letter of July 1, I submitted clippings giving 
some detail of what happened to me by reason of my effort 
to prevent overzealous actions by IRS criminal investigators 
and to impose managerial controls (like those used by the 
FBI) upon IRS criminal investigations. Had I attempted to 
go further than I did, I am absolutely convinced that, at 
a minimum, I would have been removed from office. The 
power of the law enforcement community, investigative report-
ers who work with such community and congressmen (and their 
staffs) who work with both the media and the law enforcement 
community is almost incalculable. I did not realize this 
when I acted to try to bring IRS law enforcement activities 
under control, but I surely realize it now. 
When I took office, I was firmly opposed to the exclu-
sionary rule. I know better now. This rule is essential 
to the protection of American liberties . 
Finally, I regret the language in Footnote 5 "[a]lthough 
these measures appear on their face to be less positive than 
one might expect from an agency charged with upholding the 
law . . . " apparently remains. The Oversight Hearings of 
Congressman Rosenthal's House Government Operations Subcommittee 
were cited immediately above this statement. I would like to 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF ..JUSTICE 
~u.prtmt <!fourl of tqt ~b ~tattg 
.. aglfi:nghtt4 ~. <!f. 2llhiJl.~ 
August 5, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1729, United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
lUG G lSSU 
Your July 3 suggestion re this case is entirely 
acceptable to me. 
cc: The Conference 
I 
Subject: United States v. Payner August 12, 1980 
To: Paul Cane 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
Attached hereto is Mr. Alexander's letter of July 28, 
and a draft of a proposed letter to The Conference. 
You will note my statement that one of my clerks 
has examined the affidavit ref~rred to in the Alexander 
letter. I would appreciate it if one of you would 
undertake this. If the affidavit is not too long, perhaps 
a xerox copy could be obtained. 






Subject: United States v. Paynor September I' 1980 
To: The Conference 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
The enclosed copy of a letter dated July 28th from 
Donald c. Alexander refers to my letter to him of July 15, 
a copy of which I sent to each of you before releasing it. 
You will recall that Mr. Alexander was Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue at the relevant time. Although I 
know Mr. Alexander only casually, he has the reputation 
of being a lawyer of character. In any event, I am sure 
we would not wish to do him an injustice. 
His letters of July 1st (that I believe I also sent 
you), and that of July 28, argue that he took the lead in 
curbing "overzealous actions" by IRS agents, and that the 
new regulations were the most restrictive he could obtain. 
One of my law clerks has reviewed Special Agent Jaffe's 
a&fidavit on pages 232-238 of the Oversight Hearings of the 
House Operations Subcommittee, and it generally is suppor-
tive of Mr. Alexander's position. 
As the portion of Footnote 5 to which he objects is 
gratuitous to some extent, I am willing to delete it from 
our opinion if this meets with your approval. There is no 
urgenc)' about this, and so I am suspending my file until 
September 8th. If I have heard no objection by that date, 
I will advise Mr. Alexander that we are deleting the 
language which distresses him. 
L.F.P., Jr • 
Subject: United States v. Payner August 12, 1980 
To: Paul Cane 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
Attached hereto is Mr. Alexander's letter of July 28, 
and a draft of a proposed letter to The Conference. 
You will note my statement that one of my clerks 
has examined the affidavit referred to in the Alexander 
letter. I would appreciate it if one of you would 
undertake this. If the affidavit is not too long, perhaps 
a xerox copy could be obtained. 
Then, have Sally hold these papers in suspense until 
September 8th. 
L. F. P. , Jr. 
Subject: United States V. Paynor 
To: The Conference 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
The en losed copy 
Donald c. Al ander refe 
a copy of whi I sent to e 
You will re all that Mr. Alex 
of Internal Reven e at the relevant 
know Mr. Alexander only casually, 
of being a lawyer o 
we would not wish to 
His letters of Jul hat I believe I also se 
you), and that of July 2 a 
curbing "overzealous action ' 
new regulations were the m s 
ue that he took the lead i 
by IRS agents, and that the 
restrictive he could obtain. 
One of my law cler 
affidavit on pages 232 
House Operations Subc 
tive of Mr. Alexand 's 
re iewed Special Agent Jaffe's 
the Oversight Hearings of the 
ittee, and 't generally is supper-
position. 
~~~~ 
As the of Footnote 5 he objects ~~ 
gratuitous to sa e extent, I am willing o delete it from 
our opinion if his meets with your appro al. There is no 
this, and so I am suspending y file until 
If I have heard no objectio by that date, 
. Alexander that we are dele 'ng the 
distresses him. 
L.F.P., Jr. 
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
RE: United States v. Payner 
I examined the House Hearings cited by Mr. 
Alexander in his letter to you. The affidavit to which he 
refers does support his assertion that he took the lead in 
curbing overzealous actions by IRS agents, but does not 
mention any new regulations. 
In your memo to the Conference, you 
characterized the affidavit as "generally • • supportive" 
of Mr. Alexander's position. That seems accurate. 




MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS 
COUNSELORS AT LAW 
1800 M STREET, N. w. 
PHILADELPHIA 
NEW YORK 
HARRISBURG WASHINGTON , D . C. 20036 
TELEPHONE " (202) 6 7 2 · 5000 
DONALD C. ALEXANDER 
August 22, 1980 
DIAL DIRECT (202) 872-5045 
Ron. Lewis F. Powell, Jr . 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
l First Street, N.E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
RE: United States v. Payner 




ASSOCIATED OFFI C E 
After sending my letter of July 28 to you, I realized 
that I should have enclosed a copy of the materials to which 
I referred. 
A copy of Special Agent Jaffe's November, 1979 Affidavit 
is attached. Mr. Jaffe states on page 236 that he was the 
subject of a criminal investigation and that he was advised 
that the Federal Grand Jury in Miami would take his testimony. 
This Affidavit was part of the record in the Oversight Hearings 
specifically cited in Footnote 5 discussed in your letter of 
July 15 in response to mine of July l . 
As stated in my prior letters, I don't know what more 
IRS or I could have done. Surely IRS should not be blamed 
for the unwillingness of the Department of Justice to prosecute 
a law enforcement officer. 
I hope that after reviewing this material you will modify 
the statement in Footnote 5 that "these measures appear on their 
face to be less positive that one might expect from an agency 
charged with upholding the law, . . " Mr. Jaffe - and many 
others in the IRS, the Department of Justice, Congress and the 
media - considered these actions to be much too positive. 
Thank you again for your consideration. 




r;J;L .L c. 1\ L...L-,_ .{_ 
Donald C. Alexander 
MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS 
Hon. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Page 2 July 28, 1980 
RE: United States v. Payner 
call your attention to Special Agent Jaffe's affidavit on 
pages 232-238 of these Hearings. This and other material 
in the Subcommittee's Hearings, a part of the record, make 
it clear, I believe, what was done and that what was done 
was as much as was humanly possible to do. 




~u.prttttt <!fltltrl ttf tlft ~ttittb .ifaftg 
-~lslfingbm, ~. <!f. 2ll&f.1.1,;l - ----
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
'~ . 
August 22, 1980 
78-1729 United States v. Payner 
MEMORANDUM TO 
The enclosed opy of a letter 
Donald C. Alexander ref rs to my letter 
copy of which I sent to each of you bef 
a July 28 from 
him of July 15, a 
e releasing it. 
You that Mr. A xander was Commissioner 
of Internal Revenue at t e relevant ime. Although I know 
Mr. Alexander only casual he ha the reputation of being a 
lawyer of character. In , I am sure we would not 
wish to do him an injusti 
His letters of Ju y (that I believe I also sent 
you), and that of July 28, gbe that he took the lead in 
curbing "overzealous actio ' by IRS agents, and that the new 
regulations were the most es rictive he could obtain. He 
objects to the statement 1n fn 5 that implies that the IRS 
did not take appropriat actio 
One of my 1 w clerks h s 
Jaffe's affidavit on pages 232-23 
of the House Opera~ions Subcommitt: 
supportive of Mr. Alexander's posi 
reviewed Special Agent 
of the Oversight Hearings 
e, and it generally is 
ion. 
As ihe portion of fn. 5 to\ which he objects may be 
g atuitous to some extent, I am willing to delete 
it from o opinion if this meets with your approval. There 
is no ur ency about this, and so I am suspending my file 
until ptember 15. If I have heard n~ objection by that 
date, I will advise Mr. Alexander that we are deleting the 





September 5, 1980 
78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Although I can understand your sensitivity, I do 
not feel justified in recommending, on the basis of the 
record before us, a change in the sentence that concerns you. 
Nor do I think that the intelligent reader will think that 
you were responsible personally. Indeed, I did not. I 
regarded the misconduct in the investigation as being wholly 
unauthorized, and the action finally taken as the product of 
departmental compromise - a result not uncommon in 
Washington. 
In sum, after the change already made at your 
request, I am quite hesitant to make a further change in the 
note. If, however, you wish me to submit your correspondence 
to the entire Court, I will be happy to do so. 
I add that I have heard no Justice speak critically 
of you personally. 
Hon. Donald c. Alexander 
Morgan, Lewis & Beckius 
1800 M Street, N.W. 






MORGAN, LEWIS &. BOCKIUS 
CouNSELORS AT LAW 
1800 M STREET, N. w. 
WASHINGTON , D.C. 20036 
TELEPHONE : (202) 872- 5000 
September 15, 1980 
~-
/ Los ANGELES MIAMI 
PARIS 
As s OCIATED OFFIC E 
DONALD C. ALEXANDER 
DIAL DIRECT (202) 872-5045 
Ron. Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street , N. E . 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
RE: 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Thank you for your letter of September 5. I am 
grateful for what you said and I fully accept your 
conclusion, although, of course, I wish that you had 
been willing to change the sentence that concerns me . 
Let me again express my gratitude for your patience 
and your responsiveness. Perhaps the corr espondence 
might be of interest to other members of the Court as an 
example of what may happen when the head of a law enforcement 
agency attempts to curb excesses. However, I am aware of the 
very heavy demands on the Court's time . 





'HE CHIEF JUSTICE 
.iu.puntt <lfo-url of tqt ~ttb .,itattg 
Jlufringht~ ~. <lf. 2llgt"';l 
September 17, 1980 
RE: 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I leave this matter in your hands. 
Regards, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 
.:§u:vr tmt QJou.tt of fire ~Uritt b ,;§tail g 
~ct$lp:ttgton. ~. QJ. ZO,?JI-.;1 
September 17, 1980 
78-1729 United States v. Payner 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
You will recall that last July, responding to a 
request by Donald Alexander (former Commissioner of the IRS), 
we made a small change in footnote 5. 
This did not entirely satisfy his concerns and he 
wrote me twice during the summer. I responded in my letter 
of September 5, copy enclosed . I now have his letter of 
September 15, in which he suggests that other members of the 
Court may be interested in the correspondence. Accordingly, 
I enclose copies of his three letters. In my view, nothing 
further need be done. 
ss 
September 17, 1980 
78-1729 United States v. Payner 
TO THE CONFERENCE: 
You will recall that last July, responding to a 
request by Donald Alexander (former Commissioner of the IRS), 
we made a small change in footnote 5. 
This did not entirely satisfy his concerns and he 
wrote me twice during the summer. I responded in my letter 
of September 5, copy enclosed. I now have his letter of 
September 15, in which he suggests that other members of the 
Court may be interested in the correspondence. Accordingly, 
I enclose copies of his three letters. In my view, nothing 







~u:pr l"lru <q:omt 0 f tlp• ~ttfu~ ~fatt g 
'Jlfaslyhtgfon. IS. <!f. 20~iJ!-~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
September 17, 198 0 
Re: 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis : 
Thanks for sharing copies of your 
correspondence with Donald Alexander . 
Although I am sympathetic with his concern , 
I agree with you that nothing further need 
be done. 
Sincerely yours , 
,'\ -
I _) 5- I 
'. 
/ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
/ 
C HAMBERS Or 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
;§u.prtutt Qf1tud 1tf tlft 'Jilnittb ;itatts 
.a:sfri:ttgbm. ~. <!f. 2llgi~$ 
September 18, 1980 
Re: No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I concur in the views stated in your memorandum of 
September 17th that nothing further need be done in this 
case. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
Sincerely, _ J' 
,;v· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
,jnprtntt Qflturl ttf tift ,-mub ,jtattg 
JI'Mlfingt~ J. Qf. 2llgt,., 
September 18, 1980 
RE: No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
I agree that nothing further need be done. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.h:p-unu ~ourl trf ttr~ ~ttitt~ ~mug 
._-zudtin¢on. ~. ~· 2JJ.;t~' 
Re: No. 78-1729 - United States v. Payner 
Dear Lewis: 
September 23, 1980 
I share your feeling that nothing further need be done. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
'31 
er 3/./80 
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
The question is whether the District vv 
~ 1 
¢~ ~ ::,..· C6urt properly suppressed the fruits of a search 
~)v ~ 
(.~ 'l that violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a 




defendant's own Fourth Amendment rights l .. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in 
September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972 
federal income tax return in violation of 18 u.s.c. 
§ 1001 • ..!J The indictment alleged that respondent 
denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time 
when he knew that he had such an account at the 
Castle Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama 
Islands. The government's case rested heavily on a 
loan guarantee agreement dated April 28, 1972, in 
which respondent pledged the funds in his Castle 
Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan. 
Respondent moved to suppress the 
guarantee agreement and waived his right to jury 
trial. With the consent of the parties, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of 
it-f 
2. 
Illinois took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The 
court found respondent guilty as charged on the 
basis of all the evidence. The court also found, 
however, that the government discovered the 
guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly 
illegal search that occurred on January 15, 1973. 
The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 
introduced in the case by the Government with the 
exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax return 
and the related testimony." 434 F.Supp. 113, 136 
(1978). As the tax return alone was insufficient 
to demonstrate knowing falsification, the District 
Court set~espondent's conviction ~.~/ 
The events leading up to the 1973 search 
are largely undisputed. In 1965, the Internal 
Revenue Service launched an investigation of 
foreign tax havens under the code name "Operation 
Trade Winds." Suspicion focused on the Castle Bank 
in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker named Allan Palmer 
had an account there. Special Agent Richard Jaffe, 
who supervised Operation Trade Winds from the 
3. 
Service's Florida offices, knew that a local banker 
named F. Eugene Poe served on the Castle Bank board 
of directors. Jaffe also knew that Norman Casper, 
a private investigator and occasional informant, 
was friendly with Poe. The agent asked Casper to 
learn what he could about Palmer's account. 
Through Poe, Casper met vice-president Herbert 
Michael Wolstencroft of the Castle Bank. 
Wolstencroft told Casper that the balance in Allan 
Palmer's account was $25,000. 
Casper passed this intelligence along to 
agent Jaffe, who expressed interest in a 
computerized depositor list that Casper had 
observed in Wolstencroft' s office. To obtain the 
list, Casper determined to cultivate his 
relationship with the bank officer. He introduced 
Wolstencroft to several women in the Miami area, 
among them a private investigator named Sybil 
Kennedy. When Casper discovered that Wolstencroft 
intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he went to Jaffe with a plan. The agent 
approved the basic outline of a scheme to qain 
access to Wolstencroft's briefcase, and Casper 
4. 
turned to Kennedy for assistance. 
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 
15 and went directly to Kennedy's apartment. At 
about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key 
Biscayne. Shortly thereafter, Casper entered the 
apartment using a key supplied by Kennedy. He 
removed the briefcase and delivered it to Agent 
Jaffe. While Jaffe supervised the copying of 
~ 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a 
"lookout" observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at 
dinner. This observer notified Casper as the pair 
left the restaurant, and the briefcase was swiftly 
replaced. Casper received $8,000 in cash for these 
services. 
The District Court found that the United 
a<.~ 
States1 ~ through Jaffe ) "knowingly and willfully 
participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael 
Wolstencroft's briefcase • " 434 F. Supp., at 
120 • ..v According to that court, "the Government 
affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth 
Amendment standing limitation permits them to 
purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and 
seizure of one individual in order to obtain 
5. 
evidence against third parties " Id., at 
132-133. The loan guarantee agreement was, in the 
District Court's view, a product of this 
intentional violation of Wolstencroft's 
constitutional rights. Id., at 123. The District 
Court believed that this sort of behavior must be 
deterred -- even where, as here, the search did not 
impinge upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. The court concluded that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the inherent 
supervisory power of the federal courts required 
the exclusion of evidence obtained from a search 
motivated by a "knowing and purposeful bad faith 
hostility to any person's fundamental 
constitutional rights." Id., at 129 (emphasis in 
original); see id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in a brief order endorsing the 
District Court's use of its supervisory power. 590 
F.2d 206 (1979). The Court of Appeals did not 
decide the Due Process question. We granted 
certiorari, and we now reverse. 
6. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of 
"standing to invoke the exclusionary rule" in some 
detail last term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 
138 (1979). We reaffirmed the established rule 
that a court may not exclude evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful 
search or seizure violated the defendant's own 
constitutional rights. Id., at 133-140~ See, 
e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 229-230 
(1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 u.s. 165, 
171-172 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 
377, 389 ( 1968 0 The question in each case is 
I (t 
challenged search invaded 
the J 
privacy. 1 legitimate expectation of 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 
(POWELL, J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 
408 u.s. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 
u.s. 364, 369-370 (1968). 
These principles were applied to bank 
records in United States v. Miller, 425 u.s. 435 
(1976). Miller rejected a depositor's challenge to 
the use at trial of information that his bank had 
lfp/ss 4/1/80 Rider -Ai - p: - 6 - (Payner) 
And whether a defendant's Fourth Amendment rights have been 
violated depends upon whether the challenged search or 
seizure invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather - . 
than that of a third party. 
' ' ' 
7. 
surrendered under an allegedly defective subpoena. 
We held that the depositor had no "protectable 
Fourth Amendment interest," because he lacked -e----
~~~ation of privacy in the copies of 
"\ 
his checks and deposit slips retained by the bank. 
Id., at 437; see id., at 442. The Fourth Amendment 
simply "does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed 
by him to Government authorities, even if the 
information is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a 1 imi ted purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be 
betrayed." Id. at 435. 
_JThese authorities entirely dispose 
--------
of 
respondent's Fourth Amendment claim, as the 
District Court recognized. ..._ The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion 
that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest in 
the Castle Bank documents that were seized from 
Wolstencroft." 434 F.Supp., at 126. Nor do we. 4! 
Both courts believed, however, that a federal 
court's inherent supervisory power permits it to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities 
lfp/ss 4/1/80 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the 
District Court recognized) that respondent lacked standing to 
urge suppression of the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 
Ellen: 
I have suggested a revision of this ,sentence to 
emphasize that Alderman and like cases have spoken in terms 
of "standing". We should not lose sight of this in our 
opinion. This is one place we can refer back to "standing". 
You may find other places. 
8. 
that do not infringe the rights or interests of any 
party to the litigation. The government argues 
that this novel doctrine improperly expands the 
reach of the supervisory power in a manner 
calculated to upset the careful balancing of 
interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment 
decisions of this Court. We agree. 
A 
The District Court held that its decision 
to suppress the disputed evidence was dictated by 
the need to deter deliberate intrusions into the 
privacy of persons who are unlikely to become 
defendants in a criminal prosecution. 434 F. 
S u pp. , at 1 3 5 ; see i d • at 1 3 4 -1 3 5 n . 7 5 , 1 2 9 & n . 
~
65, 131-133. _J we share that court's ~desire to deter 
~~ 
the sort of ~ SRkk~ mrconduct that occurred in 
this case. No court should condone the 
~ unconstitutional and possibly criminal 
~ 
behavior of those who planned and executed ~ the 
"briefcase caper."~/ Indeed, the decisions of this 
Court are replete with denunciations of 
J-- J::~re:fe-wltdl:y · de::rl:nrt.."""::-iv~. eff~ct!! ef sue.fl~ lawless 
~~ ~.ul. u.v ~ ~ u7 ~ ~"""~~..u.-ur.d-. 
ef~ert~ t s- ~'f'se tRe l!aw. E.g., Jackson · v. 
1\ -
lfp/ss 4/1/80 Rider - Aj - p: - 8 - (Payner) 
We share the Court's commendable desire to deter the 








Denno, 378 u.s. 368, 386 (1964); see Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 u.s. 438, 485 (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). But sweeping pronouncements of 
principle cannot decide the question presented 
today, for the principle is not in dispute. The 
issue is whether this respondent~ he 
The suppression of probative but tainted 
evidence exacts a costly toll upon the -eettr ts-+ 
~~ ~~~ 
ability'\ to ascertain the tnlth .;_~dA eo f't:tl'\ioh the 
~~A-~~-
gullt;y. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-
138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435 u.s. 268, 275-
279 (1978). Our cases recognize that an unbending 
insistence upon the ideal of governmental rectitude 
would impede to an unacceptable degree the 
~ 
performance of these v ~te:i ~ funct ionsl\ Thus, the 
require the suppression 
of "anythinq which deters illegal searches ••.• " 
Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. Our 
abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor 
permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in 
all proceedings or against all persons." United 
1 0. 
States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that 
weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary 
~~~J....Q._ 
rule in a given situation against its costs. 
"\ 
Ibid.; see United States v. Ceccol ini, supra, at 
275-279; United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 443, 448, 
454-454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 
464, 485-489 (1976); United States v. Peltier, 422 
u.s. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
The rule that bars a defendant from 
asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers 
rests explicitly on just such a balance. 
"The deterrent values of preventing 
the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have 
been considered sufficient to justify 
the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgment. But we 
are not convinced that the additional 
benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment 
upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime 
and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." 
11. 
Alderman - v; -united -states, supra, at 174-175. The 
Court has applied this principle consistently. 
E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. United 
States v. Calandra, supra at 348. have never 
rawn a distinction between deliberate misconduct 
faith misjudgment in order to expand the 
class of defendants who may invoke the exclusionary 
B 
The balance does not change when 
' 
~~ 




~ J~~~-~..L~ . ~~ ~-
power ~ To be sure, a court may employ that powe~  
to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by 
"willful disobedience of law" .. t.hat; 9oee fl_:.l: :s.t.io~ate 
McNabb v. United States, 
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); see Elkins v. United 
States, 364 u.s. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United 
States, 350 u.s. 214, 216-217 ( 1956); cf. Hampton 
v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment) .2_/ But the Court has 
never suggested that the supervisory power 
authorizes a court ~~ely to suppress all evidence 
obtained in viol at ion of Constitution, statute or 
1 2. 
rule. In United States v. Caceres, 440 u.s. 741, 
754-757 (1979), we refused to apply a uniform rule 
of exclusion as a remedy for violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for 
a restrained application of the supervisory power 
in terms that foreshadowed the language that would 
later appear in Alderman v. United States, supra: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the 
process of discovering truth in a 
federal trial ought to be imposed 
only upon the basis of considerations 
which outweigh the general need for 
untrammeled disclosure of competent 
and relevant evidence in a court of 
justice." 364 U.S., at 216. 
Thus, the District Court's decision to 
proceed under its supervisory power did not 
eliminate the requirement that it balance the 
benefits and burdens of applying the exclusionary 
rule. Nor does a change in legal theory alter the 
weight to be assigned the elements of the balance. 
The need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
cost of excluding the evidence are the same under 
the supervisory power as they are under the Fourth 
Amendment. And our Fourth Amendment decisions have 
1 3. 
established beyond any doubt that the social 
interest in deterring illegal searches is not 
sufficient to justify the exclusion of tainted 
evidence at the instance of a party who was not 
victimized by the challenged practices. Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra; Alderman v. United States, supra. 
~~ 
The District Court ~~e .principles when it 
concluded that "society's interest in deterring 
[bad faith] conduct by exclusion outweigh(s] 
society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 
135. 
The District Court's reasoning, which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of its own judgment for the 
controlling decisions of this Court. .ffl order to 
piSOVi si an..s--..g.gvsrniA9 ~n:reasonable SQ;a.rcheo ,.... -rhe 
courts 
Constitution itself withholds: an independent right 
"to exclude relevant and probative evidence because 
it was seized from another in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. United States, 
I 
1 4. 
supra, at 174 • In so doing, they slighted the 
. ;.....e 
~l. h h  Interests t at ave led this and other 
1 
courts to limit the class of persons who may invoke 
the exclusionary rule. Were we to accept this use 
of the supervisory power, we would authorize the 
judiciary to circumvent at will the considered 
limitations of the substantive law it is charged 
with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power 
does not extend so far.7/ 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
reversed. 
lfp/ss 4/1/79 
Ellen: What do you think of adding a note along the 
following lines, perhaps at or near the end of the opinion: 
. I 
I The "security of persons and property 
remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers 
must respect. Nor should those who flout the rules escape 
unscathed". Alderman, sopra, at 175. Disciplinary or other 
appropriate action is, however, the responsibility of the 
Executive Branch itself - in this case the Justice Department 
or the Internal Revenue Service. Nor can we assume that the 
lawless conduct practiced in this case, if brought to the 
attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with 
severely. The suppression, in a trial against a third party, 
of highly probative evidence only penalizes society; as a 
sanction against the offending federal official, it is both 
irrational and ineffective. 
FOOTNOTES 
part: 
~/ 18 u.s.c. § 1001 provides in relevant 
"Whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly 
and willfully • • makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements 
or representations, 
fined not more than 
shall be 
$10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both." 
!:.I The unusual sequence of rulings was 
necessitated by the consolidated hearing conducted 
by the District Court. The court initially refused 
to enter a decision on the merits. At the close of 
the evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion 
to suppress. After the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for 
want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated 
the order granting the motion to suppress and 
entered a verdict of guilty. The court then 
reinstated its suppression order and set aside the 
verdict. Respondent does not challenge these 
procedures. 
ll The United States argued in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
2. 
guarantee agreement was discovered by an 
investigation independent of the briefcase search. 
The government also denied that its agents 
instigated or willfully encouraged Casper's illegal 
behavior. For purposes of our decision, we accept 
the District Court's contrary findings on both 
points. 
!/ We are not persuaded by respondent's 
belated suggestion that the Bahamian law of bank 
secrecy creates a reasonable expectation of privacy 
not present in United States v. Miller, supra. 
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court 
addressed this claim, which is based entirely on 
Ch. 157.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands 
(Rev. Ed. 1929). The statute does not on its face 
cloak banking transactions in the enveloping cloak 
of secrecy that respondent envisions. It provides 
that: 
"A bank shall from time to time, if 
required by the Governor, furnish to 
the Governor a special return and 
such further information as such 
Governor may reasonably see fit to 
call 
shall 
for: Provided, that the bank 
not, nor shall anything herein 
contained be construed to authorise a 
bank to make known the private 
account or accounts of any person 
whatever having dealings with the 
bank." 
3. 
The proviso relied upon by respondent merely 
ensures that the reporting obligation created by 
the statute will not be thought to require or to 
permit the disclosure of private accounts. It is 
hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Although 
the statute may admit of a more generous 
construction, we have been directed to no authority 
that would support such a reading. The ease with 
which Norman Casper learned the balance in Allan 
Palmer's account, supra, p. , belies any notion 
of strictly enforced confidentiality. And American 
depositors know that their own country requires 
them to report relationships with foreign financial 
institutions. 31 U.S.C. § 1121; 31 C.F.R. § 
103.24. See California Bankers Assn. v. -shultz 416 
U.S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). These considerations 
erode such limited expectations of privacy as might 
otherwise be thought to flow from Ch. 157.9. 
11 We note that the Internal Revenue 
Service has instituted guidelines in this regard. 
4. 
IRS Manual Supp. 9G-40 (Feb. 3, 1977). The 
guidelines require that agents instruct informants 
on the requirements of the law, id., at § 3.03, and 
report known illegalities to the appropriate state 
authorities, id., at§ 4. Although these measures 
are far less severe than one might expect from an 
agency charged with upholding the law, they do 




~/ None of the cited cases directly 
supports the District Court's view that the 
supervisory power may be used to exclude evidence 
tainted by unlawful conduct that does not intrude 
upon any protected interest of the litigants 
present in court. Indeed, when a court attempts to 
supervise law enforcement behavior that is not 
alleged to have infringed the rights of the 
defendant before the bar, it arguably departs from 
the assigned role of the judiciary -- to adjudicate 
the rights of litigants. The judiciary's efforts 
to deter unlawful activity through the application 
of an exclusionary rule strain this concept even in 
the ordinary case. The extra step taken by the 
5. 
Court of Appeals in this case threatens to divorce 
~t±t~ry the supervisory power from its theoretical 
justification. 
21 Respondent also contends that the 
judgment may be affirmed as a valid exercise of 
power under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The Court of Appeals expressly 
declined to consider this argument. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search at issue 
in this case was so outrageous as to offend deeply 
ingrained "canons of decency and fairness," Rochin 
v. California, 342 u.s. 165, 169 (1952), the fact 
remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process 
Clause come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some 
protected right of the defendant," Hampton v. 
United States, 425 u.s. 484, 490 (plurality 
opinion). One may disagree with the view of the 
plurality in Hampton v. United States, supra, that 
no protected interest of a criminal defendant is 
involved when the police encourage and participate 
in his crime. See id., at 491-495 (POWELL, J., 
concurring in the judgment). But there can be no 
6. 
doubt that the search of Michael Wolstencroft 1 s 
briefcase -- no matter how outrageous -- did not 
intrude upon this respondent 1 s rights in any way. 
Thus, the Due Process claim does not change the 
analysis. The question for decision is still 
whether a person not victimized by an unlawful 
search may use it to obtain the exclusion of 
evidence. Whatever label may be applied, the 
balance of interests remains the same. And the 
outcome of that balance is determined by the prior 
decisions of this Court. 
er 4/1/80 
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
The question is whether the District 
Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful 




Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in 
September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972 
federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 • .l/ The indictment alleged that respondent 
denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time 
when he knew that he had such an account at the 
7 
· Castle Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama 
Islands. The government's case rested heavily on a 
loan guarantee agreement dated April 28, 1972, in 
which respondent pledged~ funds in his Castle 
Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan. 
~ 
Respondent moved to suppress the 
guarantee agreement and waived his right to jury 
trial. With the consent of the parties, the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of 
} C l.,'o 1 
Il{ino'rs took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
2. 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The 
court found respondent guilty as charged on the 
basis of all the evidence. The court also found, 
however, that the government discovered the 
guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly 
illegal search that occurred on January 1 5, 197 3. 
The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 
introduced in the case by the Government with the 
exception of Jack Payner' s 1972 tax return 
and the related testimony." 1434 F.Supp. 11 3, 
· l~v~,J 
136 
As the tax return alone was insufficient 
to demonstrate knowing falsification, the District 
Court set aside respondent's conviction.~/ 
The events leading up to the 1973 search 
are largely undisputed. In 1965, the Internal 
Revenue Service launched an investigation of -btu. 
t Y'O .J t- ~. 
foteign tax havens under the code name "Operation 
Trade Winds." Suspicion focused on the Castle Bank 
in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker named Allan Pal-meff 
had an account there. Special Agent Richard Jaffe, 
who supervised Operation Trade Winds from the 
Service's Florida offices, knew that a ~1 banker 
3. 
med F. Euqene Po-e served on the Castle Bank board 
9 .s;U. di1:.ec.t.or.s. Jaffe also knew -thatj Norman Casper , 
( a private investigator and occasional informant, } 
-friendly wi t-h--Pcr • 
• ~arn what he could .--
The a g en 1;-. asked [ C as.per t a§ fo:v., •""""' ""-'~ 
,1.])})_ !,( nc :J 1; re1.{ cflt4 
about Palmer's ae-eetmt • i; 
krrJ,jll~ ~.(YtRw 
Through Poe, Casper met vice-president Herbert {J)'fiit 1;t..£ (JUJ~ !ct,.J, 
"" Michael Wolstencroft of the Castle Ba+l-k. 
Wolstencroft told Casper that the balance in Allan 
(') 
Palmer's account was $25,000. 
rCasper passed this intelligence along to 
agent Jaffe, who expressed interest in a 
computerized depositor list that Casper had 
observed in Wolstencroft' s office. 
~' Casper ~etermined t-o cultivat~ his 
VY1 ltt-J (;J.J sf-eM ff J 4.. u,~- ~1"''-'J \.J 
relationship with f te bank-of"fi:-c'er-. H'f introduced 
S'..'j ~ /G r j I wL" ()._ "1(7/ 
Wolstencroft to se-veral wo en · t-he-~ 
\ u n ~ /, ~~t U f ft. 1J.. l f 1 1 " I t • j 
_3-amor:tg the-m /_a p rivate investigator) name-d 
_Q Kennedy. When Casper discovered that Wolstencroft 
intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
J r 
1973, he wf_nt to Jaffe with a plan. The agent 
of a scheme to gain 




appreved the basic outline 
bf4./.,, 'rut.f..J .1 . · / ' f 
access to j Wolstencroft' s 
J; 1 r c "'PfJ_ if~ f ~  
briefcase an Casper 
turned to Kennedy for assistance. 
4. 
' Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 
15 and went directly to Kennedy's apartment. At 
Key 
Casper entered the 
apartment using a key supplied by Kennedy. He 
removed the briefcase and delivered it to Agent 
Jaffe. While Jaffe supervised the copying of 
approximately 400 documents taken from the 
briefcase, a "lookout" observed Kennedy and 
Wolstencroft at dinner. Th~ observer notified 
left the restaurant, and the Casper~the pair rn ~ '10- J!A D~W~ fj;j-jJe j 
QCasper rece~ was 
.,;.J t -tt.. , { IJL t/ l I ~ CA-(1- {$" 
~r-p. Tlu.• ct. Cftl< r ~j. "'(; fir t ..# k 
swiftly replaced. 
,. t1 , u 
-- -, rl')(il 'l("{ltf!.tL J (IA.At>Vf 
The District Court found that the United /tL<•frL l~u~' -ff~.~~ 
,~ in~ash for these services. 
States, acting through Jaffe, "knowingly 
will fully participated in the unlawful seizure 
and 
of 
/~u fC dtc+·~~~ 
1i/ f~ / (,_Jl fitJ 
6.- hllP--t-¢( ~ 
\ ()_ ,jJ ~r: c) ~_J 
." j 434 F. Michael Wolstencroft' s briefcase 
Supp., at 120 .l/ According to that court, "the 
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that 
the Fourth Amendment standing 1 imitation permits 
them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional 
search and seizure of one individual in order to 
obtain evidence against third parties ••• " Id., 
5. 
) tlSc(\}{..141/ 
at 13 2-133. ):'he loan guarantee agreement was, in 
A. 
the District Court's view, a product of this 
intentional violation of Wolstencroft's 
~ constitutional rights. Id., at 123. The District 
Court believed that t~~"o/:;;a;..:r:::J I><! 
<tdeterred -- even where, as here, the search did not 
impinge upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment 
rights. The court concluded that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the inherent 
supervisory power of the federal courts require the 
exclusion of evidence obtained from a search 
motivated by a "knowing and purposeful bad faith 
hostility to any person's fundamental 
"'v constitutional rights." Id., at 129 (emphasis in 




The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
affirmed in a brief order endorsing the 
Court's use of its 
(pno ,, .)J 
supervisory power. L590 
( 1979 t The Court of Appeals did not 
decide the Due Process question. We granted 
) l \ - ( ;q 
certiorari,j and we now reverse. 
r 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of 
), 
6. 
\ D( ~ (-0\V-ttl AIM9-«~~ t I 
"standing to invoke the exclusionary rule"f n some 
detail last term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 
138 We reaffirmed the established rule 
that a court may not exclude evidence under the 
Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful 
search or seizure violated the defendant's own 
constitutional rights. at 133-140. See, 
'v 
e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 u.s. 223, 229-230 
"-
(1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 u.s. 165, 
171-172 (1969); Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 
377, 389 (1968). And the defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate 
expectation of privacy rather than that of a third 
\ ~ 
party. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at 
(POWELL, J., concurring); Combs v. United 
States, 
\r"< .. Jj 
408 u.s. 224, 227 (197 Mancusi v. 
DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369-370 (1968). 
These principles were applied to bank 
"\, 
records in United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 
(1976). Miller rejected a depositor's challenge to 
the use at trial of information that his bank had 
surrendered under an allegedly defective subpoena. 
7. 
We held that the depositor had no "protectable 
Fourth Amendment interest," because he lacked the 
requisite expectation of privacy in the copies of 
his checks and deposit slips retained by the bank. 
~ 
Id., at 437; see id., at 442. The Fourth Amendment 
simply "does not prohibit the obtaining of 
information revealed to a third party and conveyed 
by him to Government authorities, even if the 
in format ion is revealed on the assumption that it 
will be used only for a 1 imi ted purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be 
7 betrayed." Id. at 435. 
0 ---
The foregoing authorities establish, as 
the District Court recognized, that respondent 
u~D.t tt.. r~ .... 4~:.:!J 
lacked standing ~ to suppress ~the documents 
illegally seized from Wolstencroft. The Court of 
Appeals did not disturb the District Court's 
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy 
interest in the Castle Bank documents that were 
seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F.Supp., at 126. 
Nor do we • .!/ Both courts believed, however, that a 
federal court's inherent supervisory power permits 
it to suppress evidence tainted by gross 
8. 
illegalities that do not infringe the rights or 
interests of any party to the litigation. The 
government argues that this novel doctrine 
improperly expands the reach of the supervisory 
power in a manner calculated to upset the careful 
balancing of interests embodied in the Fourth 
Amendment decisions of this Court. We agree. 
A 
fdAM~/ 
-{kttiiDA M The District Court held that its decision 
J.t/J~ 
~~~~ 
to suppress the disputed evidence was dictated by 
the need to deter deliberate intrusions into the 
privacy of persons who are unlikely to become 
defendants in a criminal prosecution. F. 
'--- 'v 
S u pp. , at 1 3 5 ; see i d . at 1 3 4-1 3 5 n . 7 5 , 1 2 9 & n • 
65, 131-133. We share the court's commendable 
desire to deter the deliberate use of illegal 
conduct as a means of obtaining evidence. No court 
should condone the unconstitutional and possibly 
criminal behavior of those who planned and executed 
this "briefcase caper."~/ Indeed, the decisions of 
this Court are replete with denunciations of 
willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 
j 
9. 
'V u.s. 368, 386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United 
\._(tqa~)j 
States, 277 u.s. 438, 485 J (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). But sweeping pronouncements of 
principle cannot decide the question presented 
today, for the principle is not in dispute. The 
issue is whether this respondent, whose Fourth 
Amendment rights were not infringed, has standing 
to invoke the exclusionary rule. 
The suppression of probative but tainted 
evidence exacts a costly toll upon the ability of 
courts to ascertain the truth and to acquit or 
convict the defendant in a criminal case. E .g. ' 
"v v 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States 
v. Ceccolini, 435 u.s. 268, 275-279 (1978). Our 
Tlu-r {/)<Ju,9. ClliM ~ttrf 
L ~~"'t .;~lr 
ttt~ v~,Jt ~-t;~ i c( 
-!#_ ~Cll~ u4 -{to JJjJwl~~ 
-1ub .u tiff~~ d"'- Wu16 
of> ~ f"'Utlk w(u~ O\A71.\. 
1 J¥~-t;t~ ¥, f'IU!Wfr U44 
~ 11/'rRJJ, 
{<I 
cases recognize that n -unbending 
~ l 1; U5lM ~ tt-tu0. ~ 1 
ins1s tt_nce -upon -
ethe ideal of governmental rectitude would impede to 
<A Jt -i 1. - [>" r( r 
an unacceptable degree the cerformarrc-e ;-hes~ 
~+ ~I 11M d.V.. J ~ ~~ ~L 1 t, Hi J 
necessary fmret--3:-orw of a: ::a~::~ cf:~eT.~Thus, 
the Court has refused to extend the exclusionary 
rule to "anything which deters illegal searches •• 
~ 
" Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. ) 
Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor 
permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in 
1 0. 
all proceedings or against all persons." United 
\; 
States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that 
weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary 





see United States v. Ceccolini, 
\, 
supra, at 275-279; United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 
454-J. 457-460 (1976);V Stone v. Powell, 
428 u.s. 
~ \_ ~~oj 
46ft_, 485-489 ( 1976); [ united States v. 
Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
The rule that bars a defendant from 
asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers 
rests explicitly on just such a balance. 
"The deterrent values of preventing 
the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have 
been considered sufficient to justify 
the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgment. But we 
are not convinced that the additional 
benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment 
upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime 
and having them acquitted or 
11. 
convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." 
'\; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175. The 
Court has applied this principle consistently. 
\I~Jll \ 
.1\ E g Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; 
\Y~ / •• , 
~ 
see Stone 
1>- t\\J ',_-~, v Powell supra at 488-489 ;\,.United States v. 
~~ . ' ' --------------
~~ 
~~~ Calandra, supra at 348. 
. ,, 
~ . .\\ \ \\, .)J.~ 






is sought by 
B 
does not change when 
invoking the 
~ l M~ ,L-16\\ ~•:J; 
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power of the federal courts. To be sure, a court ~-
t 
may employ tnat power in some circumstances to 
exclude evidence taken from the defendant by 
"willful disobedience of law." 
"v 
McNabb v. United 
'\, 
States, 318 u.s. 332, 345 (1943); see Elkins v. 
United States, 364 u.s. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. 
United States, 350 u.s. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. 
'v 
Hampton v. United States, 425 u.s. 484, 495 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment).~/ But the 
Court has never suggested that the supervisory 
I I 
l:L 
h161!'1IO...>!J O'U..') c~c/){tf)r 
f I~M '-J~~o 
f.JJ..Afl·~ Q..tv.< l .. ue .c. 
6ottM/.LL<f..Q. ~ 
power authorizes court 
obtaine~~~ ~olatio~J of 
to suppress ~ evidence 
Constitution, statute :J 
IM~-t; tt tfl~ t6 l ~ 
I~ ~ld;;, I 
rule. ;(rn United States v. · Caceres, 440 u.s. 741, 
754-757 (1979), we refused to apply a uniform rule 
1 2. 
hj ~ . 
exclu  as a remedy follviolation of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for 
a restrained application of the supervisory power #. 
in terms that foreshadowed the language that would 
later appear in Alderman v. United States, supra: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the 
process of discovering truth in a 
federal trial ought to be imposed 
only upon the basis of considerations 
which outweigh the general need for 
untrammeled disclosure of competent 
and relevant evidence in a court of 
justice." 364 u.s., at 216. 
) 
Thus, the District Court's decision tB 
- ~~ I "\ L 
proceed under its [ s upervisory power did not permit 11. Wn, .. O (.buJT 




the interests implicated 
.... r 
exclusionary rul • ~=dt<d tn=e change ' 
the. alance. The need to deter the underlying 
conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are 
the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth . Amendment. And our Fourth 
Amendment decisions have established beyond any 
doubt that the societal interest in deterring 
1 3. 
illegal searches is not sufficient to justify the 
exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a 
party who was not victimized by the challenged 
practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra; Alderman v. 
United States, supra. The District Court 
disregarded these principles when it concluded that 
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh[s] society's interest 
in furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant 
~evidence." 
) 
(A, 1i.S 1J.t. v 1 "--4 
434 F. Supp., at 135. 
The District Court's reasoning, which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of its own judgment for the 
controlling decisions of this Court. The courts 
below -- understandably shocked by the conduct of a 
federal officer -- sought to fashion a remedy that 
the Constitution itself withholds: an independent 
right "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. ·United States, 
\ suera, at 174. In so doing, they slighted the 
societal interests that have led this and other 
courts to limit the class of persons who may invoke 
14. 
the exclusionary rule. Were we to accept this use 
of the supervisory power, we would authorize the 
judiciary to circumvent at will the considered 
limitations of l rfiU4it IJuAJ,.l~tU-:f zydt.t,r{lqs ;~ I the ~tantive 1 aw it is gRar~ed 
~- We hold that the supervisory power 
does not extend so far.l/ 






..}/ 18 U.S.C. ~ 1001 provides in relevant 
"Whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly 
and willfully • . makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements 
or representations, 
fined not more than 
shall be 
$10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both." 
'}_/ The unusual sequence of rulings was 
necessitated by the consolidated hearing conducted 
by the District Court. The court initially refused 
to enter a decision on the merits. At the close of 
the evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion 
to suppress. After the Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for 
want of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated 
the order granting the motion to suppress and 
entered a verdict of guilty. The court then 
reinstated its suppression order and set aside the 
verdict. Respondent does not challenge these 
procedures. 
ll The United States argued in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
6. 
Rochin v. California, 342 u.s. 165, 169 (1952 ~ , the 
fact remains that "ft] he 1 imitations of the Due 
Process Clause • • come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some 
protected right of the defendant," Hampton v. 
\ __ f!t'~ 
United States, 425 u.s. 484, 490 L (plurality 
opinion). One may disagree with the view of the 
plurality in Hampton v. United States, supra, that 
no constitutionally protected interest of a 
criminal defendant is involved when the police 
encourage and participate in his crime. See id., at 
491-495 (POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). 
But there can be no doubt that the search of 
Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase however 
outrageous did not intrude upon this 
respondent's rights in any way. Thus, the Due 
Process Clause adds little 
\ 0~ ~ 
to ti!._e tl analysis. 
The question for decision is still whether a person 
not victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to 
) aJ-f 
suppress its fruits. Th balance of interests 
<::.. remains the same, and the outcome of that balance 
is determined by the prior decisions of this Court. 
JJ-4 u.~, L!ol; 4-t? 
( 1 qlfsJ( or'wOl' "t 
r,IL(( bfurtf/1 ;J.) 
5. 
er may e used to exclude eviaerrce 
ta;integ h¥ unlaw.f con'duct t oes not intrude 
upon -the · ants present 
in CQU Indeed, when a attempts to 
supervise law enforcement that is not 
alleged to have rights of the 
defendant before the bar it · arguably departs from 
its assigned role adjudicating the rights of 
litigants. efforts to deter 
unlawful through the application of an 
exclusiona rule strain this concept even in the 
The extra step taken by the Court 
in this case threatenes to divorce the 
supe power from its -theoretical 
'cat..ion~ 
A fl-u"('}~ f~l (V1 
7/ ~ent on tend that the 
JL~ .. '!!! :J:i ;!: ll(t ( c.? ~ - .a.L.id exerci.s-e o.£0,.., 
....__. the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendmen;{ The Court of Appeals expressly 
tf I 
declined to But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search 
±-tt tlt i 3 c 2ffl was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "canons of decency and fairnes s," 
2. 
guarantee agreement was discovered by an 
investigation independent of the briefcase search. 
The government also denied that its agents 
instigated or willfully encouraged Casper's illegal 
behavior. For purposes of our decision, we accept 
the District Court's contrary findings on both 
points. 
!/ We are not persuaded by respondent's 
suggestion that the Bahamian law of bank secrecy 
creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 u.s. 435 (1976). 
Respondent relies upon a proviso to Ch. 96.9 of the 
Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
the proviso was repealed by ~ 5 of the Banks 
~ Amendment Act of 1965, Bahamas Acts 1965,~ 281, 
Bahamian law does provide Banks and Trust Compani~s 
Regul-ation Act of 1~n-ts a measure of 
confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 
10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act 
1?~~-~· ·1· Ad, no, t,~~ b I£·; 7 ~_, --of 196 s;provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the 
performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions under this 
Act or when lawfully required to do 
so by any court of competent 
3. 
jurisdiction within the Colony or 
under the provisions of any law of 
the Colony, no person shall disclose 
any information relating to . . • the 
affairs of • • • of any customer of a 
[bank] licensee which he has acquired 
in the performance of his duties or 
the exercise of his functions under 
t h i s Act. " Bah am as ets % 5-=-, --,~~+--';c.::t.5-
G 
276. 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of 
privacy. Its application is limited: it is hedged 
with except ions: and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, the ease 
Pu... 
with which learned the balance in 
I - belies any 
notion of strictly enforced confidentiality. And 
American depositors know that their own country 
requires them to report relationships with foreign 
financial institutions. ~31 U.S.C. § 1 1 21 : 31 
C.F.R. § 
~ 5<AU .£1 
1 03. 24. See ornia Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz 416 u.s. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). These 
considerations reinforce our conclusion that 
respondent lacked a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in his Castle Bank account. 
~/ "The security of persons and property 
4. 
remains a fundamental value which law enforcement 
officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." \ Alderman v. United 
States, 394 u.s. 165, 175 (1969). Disciplinary 
action is, however, the responsibility of the 
Executive Branch. We note that the Internal 
Revenue Service has adopted guidelines that require 
agents to instruct informants on the requirements 
of the law, and to report known illegalities to 
appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual Supp. 9G-
·o 4 o, § § 3. o 3, 4 (Feb. 3, 1 9 7 7) • Although these 
measures are less severe than one might expect from 
an agency charged with upholding the 1 aw, they do 
indicate disapproval of the callous policy found to 
have been implemented in this case. Nor can we 
assume that similar lawless conduct, if brought to 
the attention of responsible officials, would not 
be dealt with severely. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial 
against a third party would penalize society 
unnecessarily • 
.§_/ - Norte of the c i t:...:e;;.;d;;... .... c.;;;..;;;a~s-=e;.;s;;.._. . .,;d;;;;,;;;.;i ~ 
su~e District tnat ffle 
lf.p/ss 4/1/80 Riner A, p. 6 (Payner) 
And whether a defendant's Fourth AMendment riqhts have been 
violated depends upon whethP.r the h~llenqed search or 
seizure invaded ~ leqitimate expectation of privacv rather 
than that of a third party. 
lfp/ss 4/1/80 Rider A, p. 7 (Payner) 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the 
District Court recognized 1that respondent lacked standing to 
urge suppression of the documents illegally seized fr.om 
Wolstencroft. 
Ellen: 
I have suqqested a revision of this sentence to 
emphasize that Alderman and like cases have sooken in terms 
of "standing". We should not lose sight of this in our 
opinion. This is one place we can refer back to "standing". 
You may find other places. 
lfP/ss 4/1/80 Rider~, p; · 8 (Pavner) 
We share the Court's commendable desire to deter the 
deliberate use of. illegal methods bv qovernment aqents or 
officers. 
lfp/ss 4/1/79 Rid~r ~, fn (Pavn~r) 
Ellen: What do you think of addinq a note alonq the 
followinq lines, perhaps at or near the end of the opinion: 
I The "security of per~ons and Property 
remains a fundamental value which law enforcement officers 
must respect. ~or should those who flout the r.ules escane 
unscathed". Alderman, supra, at 175. Disciplinary or other 
appropriate action is, however, the resPOnsibility of the 
Executive Branch itself - in this case the Justice Department 
or the Internal Revenue Service. Nor can we assume that the 
lawless conduct practiced in this case, if hrouqht to the 
attention of responsible officials, would not be dealt with 
severely. ~he suPpression, in a trial aqainst a third partv, 
of hiqhlv probative evidence only p~nalizes society7 as a 
sanction aqainst the offendinq federal official, it is both 
irrational and ineffective. 
er 4/3/80 
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
fcll'\eJ to~~ . 
lo K-e~s ? 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
The question is whether the District 
Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful 
search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in 
September, 1976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972 
federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1 001 • .,!/ The indictment alleged that respondent 
denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time 
when he knew that he had such an account at the 
Castle Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama 
Islands. The government's case rested heavily on a 
loan guarantee agreement dated April 28, 1972, in 
which respondent pledged the funds in his Castle 
Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan. 
Respondent waived his right to iury trial 
and moved to suppress the guarantee agreement. 
With the consent of the parties, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
2. 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The 
court found respondent guilty as charged on the 
basis of all the evidence. The court also found, 
however, that the government discovered the 
guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly 
illegal search that occurred on January 1 5, 197 3. 
The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 
introduced in the case by the Government with the 
exception of Jack Payner• s 1972 tax return 
and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F.Supp. 113, 136 (1977). · As the tax 
return alone was insufficient to demonstrate 
knowing falsification, the District Court set aside 
respondent's conviction.!/ 
The events leading up to the 1973 search 
are not in dispute. In 1965, the Internal Revenue 
Service launched an investigation of the financial 
activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. 
The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," was 
headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida. Suspicion 
focused on the Castle Bank in 1972, when 
investigators learned that a suspected narcotics 
trafficker had an account there. Special Agent 
3. 
Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked 
Norman Casper, a private investigator and 
occasional informant, to learn what he could about 
the Castle Bank and its depositors. To that end, 
Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle Bank 
vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper 
7 
• L 
introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private 
investigator and former employee. When Casper 
discovered that the banker intended to spend a few 
days in Miami in January of 197 3, he devised a 
scheme to gain access to the bank records he knew 
Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 
1 5 and went directly to Kennedy's apartment. At 
about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key 
Biscayne restaurant. Shortly thereafter, Casper 
entered the apartment using a key supplied by 
Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it 
to Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying 
of approximately 400 documents taken from the 
briefcase, a "lookout" observed Kennedy and 
Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer notified 
4. 
Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was s.wi-J t l¥- replaced. The documents 
photographed that evening included papers 
evidencing a close working relationship between the 
Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Florida. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately 
uncovered the loan guarantee agreement at issue in 
this case. 
The District Court found that the United 
States, acting through Jaffe, "knowingly and 
willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of 
Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase II 434 F. 
s u pp • , at 1 2 0 • 3 I According to that court, "the 
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that 
the Fourth Amendment standing 1 imitation permits 
them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional 
search and seizure of one individual in order to 
obtain evidence against third parties ..• " Id., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the 
documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the 
leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the 
critical loan guarantee agreement. 
~ 
Id., at 123. 
Although the search did not impinge upon the 
5. 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the inherent supervisory power 
of the federal courts required it to exclude 
evidence tainted by the government's "knowing and 
purposeful bad faith hostility to any person's 
fundamental constitutional rights." Id. , at 1 29 
(emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in a brief order endorsing the 
District Court's use of its supervisory power. 
United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (1979) (per 
curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the 
Due Process quest ion. We granted certiorari, 
u.s. (1979), and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of 
"standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment] 
exclusionary rule" in some detail last term. Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 1 28' 1 38 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may 
not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment 
unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure 
6. 
violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. 
Id., at 133-140. See, e.g., Brown v. United 
States, 411 u.s. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 u.s. 165, 171-172 (1969); 
Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 377, 389 (1968). 
And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are 
violated only when the challenged search or seizure 
invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy 
rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (POWELL, 
J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408 u.s. 
224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 u.s. 364, 
368 (1968). 
The rule that bars a defendant from 
asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers 
;;. l 
rests in part on the perception that Fourth 
.. 
Amendment rights are personal and cannot be 
asserted vicariously. Rakas · v. Illinois, supra, at 
133, quoting Alderman v. United States, supra, at 
174. It also represents the Court's considered 
judgment that the societal costs of the 
exclusionary rule counsel against expanding the 
class of persons who may invoke it. Although 
7. 
exclusion is a necessary deterrent to unlawful 
conduct in appropriate cases, the Court has 
acknowledged that the suppression of probative but 
tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon the 
ability of courts to ascertain the truth and to 
acquit or convict the defendant in a criminal case. 
E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United 
States v. Ceccolini, 435 u.s. 268, 275-279 (1978); 
see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 u.s. 433, 450-451 
(1974). Our cases recognize that an unbending 
application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce 
ideals of governmental rectitude would impede to an 
unacceptable degree the truthfinding functions of 
judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, 
and not the constable, who stands trial. 
For these reasons, the Court has not 
interpreted the exclusionary rule to command the 
'L~-/ 
suppression of "anything which deters 
A 
illegal 
searches " Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality 
neither requires nor permits us to exclude 
"illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or 
against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted 
? . 
8. 
a balancing approach that weighs the benefits of 
applying the exclusionary rule in a given situation 
against its high societal costs. Ibid. ; see 
United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; 
United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 454, 457-460 
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 464, 485-489 
(1976); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 
531, 535-539 ( 1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third 
party's Fourth Amendment rights, the balance tips 
against application of the exclusionary rule. 
"The deterrent values of preventing 
the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have 
been considered sufficient to justify 
the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgment. But we 
are not convinced that the additional 
benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment 
upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime 
and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." 
9. 
Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175. The 
Court has applied this principle consistently. 
E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone 
v. Powell, supra, at 488-489; United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
III 
The foregoing authorities establish, as 
the District Court recognized, that respondent 
lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to 
suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d, 
at 20 7. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the 
District Court's conclusion that "Jack Payner 
possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank 
documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 
F • S u pp . , at 1 2 6 • Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 u.s. 435 (1976), established that a 
depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no 
"protectable Fourth Amendment interest" in copies 
of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank. 
Id., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in the 
record supports a contrary conclusion in this 
case.!/ 
1 0 0 
The District Court and the Court of 
Appeals believed, however, that a federal court 
should use its supervisory power to suppress 
evidence tainted by qross illegalities that do not 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. 
The United States contends that this novel approach 
psets the careful balance of interests embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court. In 
the government' s view, rvisory power does 
court to free a ~uilty person 
}-k..:_ / 
(..;jl""" ..... ~~_,.....~loCWI~nrd~t: ~ ~~ 
~~-et:!'Q...-a-aeJ'"I9~ ilt lt i<>L We J 
__ ,..........shaJ::.J th District Cou 's commeooable 
desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the 
privacy of persons who are unlikely to become 
defendants in a criminal prosecution. See 434 F. 
S u pp • , at 1 3 5 • No court should condone the 
unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of 
those who planned and executed this 
"briefcase 
caper. "_5! I d 
n eed, the decisions of this Court are 
replete with denunciations of willfully lawless 
activities undertaken in the of name law 
1 0 0 
The District Court and the Court of 
Appeals believed, however, that a federal court 
should use its supervisory power to suppress 
evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not 
lfp/ss 4/4/80 
In the qovernment's view, such a substantive extension of the 
supervisory power would enable federal courts to exercise a 
standardless discretion as to whether and when to apply the 
d:.~ 
Fourth Amendment as this Court has construed .\ We aqree with 
the government. 
We ~~greement also with the District 
Court's commendable 
District e~·s commendable 
desire to deter del1'berate · t · · 1n rus1ons 1nto the 
privacy of persons who are unl'k 1 t 1 e y o become 
defendants in a criminal prosecution. See 434 F. 
Supp., at 1 35 0 No court should condone the 
unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior of 
those who planned d an executed this "briefcase 
caper. "_5! 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are 
replete with denunciations of willfully lawless 
activities undertaken in the name of law 
11. 
enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J. , dissenting). 
-Sweeping pronouncements of principle cannot, 
however, decide the question presented today. 
wdb~~ 
Wolstencroft .i. s aoubH~s entitled to some remedy 
for the government's willful invasion of his 
rights. But the only issue in this case is whether 
this respondent, whose Fourth Amendment rights were 
not infringed, has standing to invoke the 
exclusionary rule. 
Federal courts have used their 
supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude 
evidence taken from the defendant by "willful 
lll. 
disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 
) 
!/ ~ "l4 trv--e.._ 
1/lc....., 1-o M;:;t;; 
u.s. 332, 345 (1943); see Elkins v. United States, 
364 u.s. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 
U.S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United 
States, 425 u.s. 484, 495 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). This Court has never held, 
however, that the supervisory power authorizes 
suppression of evidence obtained from third parties 
in violation of Constitution, statute or rule.6/ 
11. 
enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 u.s. 368, 
386 (1964): see Olmstead v. United States, 277 u.s. 
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J. , dissenting). 
-Sweep'ng pronouncements of principle 
lfp/ss 4/4/80 
~ . 1 These unexcept1ona 
Rider · A, · p; - 11 - (Payner) 
pronouncements of principle do not, 
this case the reliance by the courts 
however, support in 
below upon the supervisory power. 
exclusionary rule. 
Federal courts have used their 
supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude 
evidence taken from the defendant by "willful 
disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 
U.S. 332, 345 (1943): see Elkins v. United States, 
364 u.s. 206, 223 (1960): Rea v. United States, 350 
U.S. 214, 216-217 (1956): cf. Hampton v. United 
States, 425 u.s. 484, 495 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). This Court has never held, 
however, that the supervisory power authorizes 
suppression of evidence obtained from third parties 
in violation of Constitution, statute or rule. 6/ 
, 
1 2. 
(/ We have invoked the supervisory power with some 
caution even when a criminal defendant asserts a 
. ·' 
violation of his own rights. In United States v. 
Caceres, 440 u.s. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused 
to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for 
a restrained application of the supervisory power: 
" [A] ny apparent 1 imitation upon the 
process of discovering truth in a 
federal trial ought to be imposed 
only upon the basis of considerations 
which outweigh the general need for 
untrammeled disclosure of competent 
and relevant evidence in a court of 
justice." 364 u.s., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 u.s. 338, 
340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power 
does not permit a federal court to suppress 
evidence without carefully balancing the same 
interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal 
theory alter the weight to be assigned the elements 
of the balance. The need to deter the underlying 
conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are 
1 3. 
the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth 
Amendment decisions have established beyond any 
doubt that the societal interest in deterring 
illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 
not victimized by the challenged practices. Rakas 
v. Illinois, supra; Alderman v. United States, 
supra. 
The District Court disregarded these 
principles when it concluded that "society's 
interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by 
exclusion outweigh[s] society's interest in 
furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant 
evidence." 4 3 4 F • S u pp • , at 1 3 5 • The District 
Court's reasoning, which the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its own 
judgment for the controlling decisions of this 
Court.7j 
IV 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of 
a federal off. ~ ~ /'} -- leer, the o· .  ~l~S~t~~~~~~~~bo~~~~~~~._r~ "'~4>-"""'iind .tb.e--.Court 




I\ Cor::u;.t~ ~l&ID..: -an.. i.nde,pepd.en.t J;,j,~fit "to 
exclude relevant and probative evidence because it 
was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 
In so doing-;-they slighted the societal 
interests that have led this Court to 1 imi t th 
class of persons who may invoke the exclusionary, 
Were we to accept this use of the 
supervisory power, 
. ~ ClM 
to J..~R.t. a-t lelil-i the cons ide red 1 imitations of 
the substantive law it is charged with enforcing. 
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend 
so far. 




~/ 18 u.s.c. § 1001 provides in relevant 
"Whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly 
and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements 
or representations, 
fined not more than 
shall be 
$10,000 or 
imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both." 
~/ The unusual sequence of rulings was a 
byproduct of the consolidated hearing conducted by 
the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the 
evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion to 
suppress. After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want 
of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the 
order granting the motion to suppress and entered a 
verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. 
Respondent does not challenge these procedures. 
ll The United States argued in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
guarantee agreement was discovered through an 
FNl 
rfl 2. 
independent investigation untainted by the 
briefcase search. The government also denied that 
its agents will fully encouraged Casper's illegal 
behavior. For purposes of this opinion, 
~ c..i P" -t. .. /~ 
the District Court's contrary findings on both 
points. 
!/ We are not persuaded by respondent's 
suggestion that the Bahamian law of bank secrecy 
creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, vwfr.:: 425 u.s. 435 
( 1976). f)"" 
Respondent cites a proviso to Ch. 96.9 of the 
Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks 
Amendment Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, 
Bahamian law does grant a measure of 
confidentiality to banking transactions. Section 
10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 
Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, provides in 
relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the 
performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions under this 
Act or when lawfully required to do 
so by any court of competent 
jurisdiction within the Colony or 
? 
I 
F tJ 3. 
under the provisions of any law of 
the Colony, no person shall disclose 
any information relating to . • • the 
affairs of • • • any customer of a 
[bank] licensee which he has acquired 
in the performance of his duties or 
the exercise of his functions under 
this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of 
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged 
with except ions; and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American 
depositors know that their own country requires 
them to report relationships with foreign financial 
institutions. 31 U.S.C. ~ 1121; 31 C.F.R. § 
1 03. 24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. 
Shultz 416 U.S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). This 
respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an 
American bank, the Bank of Perrine, in connection 
with the loan transaction that eventually led to 
his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle 
Bank records that documented his account. 
2/ "The security of persons and property 
remains a fundamental value which law enforcement 
officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United 
FN 4• 
States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 (1969). {jisciplinary 
action is not, however, the responsibility of the 




11 & ) 
revealed in this record led to a congressional 
investigation of Operation Trade Winds. See 
Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS I 
before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on 
Government Operations, 94th Cong • ' 1st Sess. 
(1976). As a result, the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue "called off" the operation. Tr. Oral Arg. 
35. The Service also adopted guidelines that 
require agents to instruct informants on the 
requirements of the law, and to report known 
illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS 
Manual Supp. 9G-40, ~§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977). 
Although these ~vv-~~k~ 
measures-\ ~r~ lees •~w~.re  
than one might expect from an agency charged with 
10 c ....... 
upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of 
~ 
~~ 
the Ga:Howli! .Po-l i.e¥ found to have been implemented 
"\ 
in this case. Nor can we assume that similar 
lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of 
would not be dealt with responsible officials, 
~·require in addition the suppression 
(-N 5. 
of highly probative evidence in a trial against a 
third party would penalize society unnecessarily. 
~/ The cited cases do not confer upon the 
courts a generalized license to oversee the 
practices of law enforcement agencies. That 
responsibility is confided, subject to applicable 
law, to the Executive Branch. United States v. 
Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 (1973). The supervisory 
power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
"the administration of criminal justice" among the 
parties before the bar. McNabb v. United States, 
318 u.s. 332, 340 ~en a court attempts to \ WL ~ 
-~ ontrol law enforcement behavior that has had no /A.u._ 
ffect on the rights of persons present in court, ~ 
it arguably departs from its assigned 
~the rights of litigants. 
'}_/ The same difficulty attends 
respondent's claim to the protections of the ..,... 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court of Appeals expressly declined to consider the 
Due Process Clause. But even if we assume that the 
unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to 
offend fundamental "canons of decency and 
r:f\J 6. 
fairness , " Roc h in v • C a 1 i for n i a , 3 4 2 U • S • 1 6 5 , 1 6 9 
(1952), quoting Malinski v. New York 324 u.s. 401, 
40 7 ( 194 5) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.) , the fact 
remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process 
Clause come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some 
protected right of the defendant," Hampton v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality 
opinion). Even if one disaqrees with the view of 
the Hampton plurality that no protected interest 
was implicated in that case, see id. , at 4 91-49 5 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment), there can 
be no doubt that the search of Michael 
Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this 
respondent's rights in any way. Thus, the Due 
Process Clause adds little to our analysis. The 
question for decision is still whether a person not 
victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to 
suppress its fruits. That balance of interests is 
determined by the prior decisions of this Court. 
LFP 4/'/;80 
No. 78-1729 United States v. Payner 
MR. JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion 
of the Court. 
The question is whether the District 
Court properly suppressed the fruits of an unlawful 
search that did not invade the respondent's Fourth 
Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in 
September~976, on a charge of falsifying his 1972 
federal income tax return in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1 00 1 . .l/ The indictment alleged that respondent 
denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a time 
when he knew that he had such an account at the 
Castle Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama 
Islands. The government's case rested heavily on a 
~ 
" 
loan guarantee agreement dated April 28, 1972, in 
which respondent pledged the funds in his Castle 
Bank account as security for a $ 100,000 loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial 
and moved to suppress the guarantee agreement. 
With the consent of the parties, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio 
took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
2. 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The 
court found r espondent guilty as charged on the 
basis of al l the evidence. The court also found, 
however, that the government 
-:;.. 
discovered the 
guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly 
illegal search that occur red on January 1 5, 197 3. 
The court therefore suppressed "all evidence 
introduced in the case by the Government with the 
exception of Jack Payner' s 1972 tax return 
and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F.Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax 
return alone was insufficient to demonstrate 
knowing falsification, the District Court set aside 
respondent's conviction.2/ 
The events leading up to the 1973 search 
are not in dispute. In 1965, the Internal Revenue 
Service launched an investigation of the financial 
activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. 
The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," was 
headquartered in Jacksonville, Fl~a. Suspicion 
focused on the Castle Bank in 1972, when 
investigators learned that a suspected narcotics 
trafficker had an account there. Special Agent 
~~------------~--~~ 
Jo 
Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked 
Norman Casper, a private investigator and 
occasional informant, to learn what he could about 
the Castle Bank and its depositors. To that end, 
Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle Bank 
vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper 
introduced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private 
investigator and former employee. When Casper 
discovered that the banker intended to spend a few 
days in Miami in January of 197 3, he devised a 
scheme to gain access to the bank records he knew 
Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
1\. Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 
15 and went directly to Kennedy • s apartment. At 
about 7:30p.m., the two left for dinner at a Key 
Biscayne restaurant. Shortly thereafter, Casper 
entered the apartment using a key supplied by 
Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it 
to Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying 
of approximately 400 documents taken from the 
briefcase, a "lookout" observed Kennedy and 
Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer notified 
4. 
Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed 
that evening included papers evidencing a close 
working relationship between the Castle Bank and 
the Bank of Perrine, Fl~a. Subpoenas issued to 
the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered the loan 
guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United 
States, acting through Jaffe, "knowingly and 
willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of 
.....--
Michael Wolstencroft 1 s briefca~. II 4 34 F. 
S u pp . , at 1 2 0 • 3 I According to that court, "the 
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that 
the Fourth Amendment standing 1 imitation permits 
them to purposefully conduct an unconstitutional 
search and seizure of one individual in order to 
"""-.. 
obtain evidence against third parties ••.• " Id., 
~ 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the 
documents seized from Wolstencroft provided the 
leads that ultimately led to the discovery of the 
critical loan guarantee agreement. Id., at 123. 
Although the search did not impinge upon the 
defendant 1 s Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
5. 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment and the inherent supervisory power 
of the federal courts required it to exclude 
evidence tainted by the government's "knowing and 
purposeful bad faith hostility to any person's 
fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 129 
(emphasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed in a brief order endorsing the 
District Court's use of its supervisory power. 
United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (1979) (per 
curiam) . The Court of Appeals did not decide the 
,,ru: ~cess question. We granted certiorari, __ 
u.s. (1979), and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of 
"standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment] 
exclusionary rule" in some detail last term. Rakas 
~ 
v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 1 28, 1 38 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may 
not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment 
unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure 
violated the defendant's own constitutional rights.~ 
6. 
Id., at 133-140. See, e.g., Brown v. United 
~ 
States, 411 u.s. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 u.s. 1 65, 171-172 (1969); 
Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 377, 389 (1968). 
And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are 
violated only when the challenged search or seizure 
invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy 
rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (POWELL, 
J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408 u.s. 
224, 227 ( 1972); Mancusi v. · neForte, 392 u.s. 364, 
368 (1968). 
The rule that bars a defendant from 
asserting the Fourth Amendment rights of strangers 
rests on the perception that Fourth Amendment 
rights are personal and cannot be asserted 
vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 133, 
quoting Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. 
It also represents the Court's considered judgment 
that the societal costs of the exclusionary rule 
counsel against expanding the class of persons who 
may invoke . it. Although exclusion is a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases, 
7. 
the Court has acknowledged that the suppression of 
probative but ainted evidence exacts a costly toll 
upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
and to acquit or convict the defendant in a 
criminal case. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 
137-138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435 u.s. 268, 
275-279 (1978); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 u.s. 
433, 450-451 (1974). Our cases recognize that an 
unbending application of the exclusionary sanction 
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede to an unacceptable degree the truthfinding 
functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the 
defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial. 
For these reasons, the Court has not 
interpreted the exclusionary rule to command the 




supra, at 174. 
neither requires 
II Alderman v. United States, 
Our abhorrence of illegality 
nor permits us to exclude 
"illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or 
against all persons." Uniterl States v. Calandra, 
414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted 
a balancing approach that weighs the benefits of 
8. 
applying the exclusionary rule in a given situation 
against its high societal costs. 
United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; 
United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 433, 454, 457-460 
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 464, 485-489 
(1976); see also United States v. Peltier, 422 u.s. 
531, 535-539 (1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third 
party's Fourth Amendment rights, the balance tips 
against application of the exclusionary rule. 
/I "The deterrent values of preventing 
the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have 
been considered sufficient to justify 
~ the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the 
de fend ant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that i udgment. But we 
are not convinced that the additional 
benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further e ncroachment 
upon the public interest in 
P.rosecuting those accused of crime 
' -
and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the 
y.lderman 
evidence which exposes the truth." t) 
v. United States, supra, at 174-175. The 
9. 
Court has applied this principle consistently. 
E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone ---
v. Powell, supra, at 488-489; United States v. 
Calandra, supra, at 348. 
III 
The foregoing authorities establish, as 
the District Court recognized, that respondent 
lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to 
suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d, 
at 20 7. The Court of Appeals did not disturb the 
District Court's conclusion that "Jack Payner 
possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank 
documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 4 34 
F • S u pp. , at 1 2 6 . Nor do we. United States v ~ 
Miller, 425 u.s. 435 ( 1976), established that a 
depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no 
"protectable Fourth Amendment interest" in copies 
of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank. 
Id., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in the 
record supports a contrary conclusion in this 
case.if 
The District Court and the Court of 
1 0. 
Appeals believed, however, that a federal court 
should use its supervisory power to suppress 
evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. 
The United States contends that this novel approach 
upsets the careful balance of interests embodied in 
the Fourth Amendment decisions of this Court. In 
the government's view, such a substantive extension -"/ 
of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion as to 
whether and when to apply the Fourth Amendment as 
this Court has construed it. 
government. -7 
We agree with the 
We nevertheless agree with the District 
Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate 
intrusions into the privacy of persons who are 
unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court 
should condone the unconstitutional and possibly 
criminal behavior of those who planned and executed 
this "briefcase caper."~/ I ndeed, the decisions of 
this Court are replete with denunciations of 
willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
11 • 
of law enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 
u.s. 368, 386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United 
States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). But these unexceptional 
pronouncements of principle do not support the 
District Court's reliance upon the supervisory 
power to free a defendant whose own constitutional 
rights were not infringed.~/ 
The supervisory power is applied with 
some caution even when a criminal defendant asserts 
a violation of his own rights. In United States v. 
Caceres, 440 u.s. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused 
to exclude all evidence tainted by viol a tions of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
United States, supra, at 216, the Court called for 
a restrained application of the supervisory power: 
(/ .. [A] ny apparent 1 imitation upon the 
process of discovering truth in a 
~ federal trial ought to be imposed 
only upon the basis of considerations 
which outweigh the general need for 
untrammeled disclosure of competent 
and relevant evidence in a court of 
justice." 364 u.s., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 u.s. 338, 
340 (1939). 
1 2. 
We conclude that the supervisory power 
does not permit a federal court to suppress 
evidence without carefully balancing the same 
interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal 
theory alter the weight to be assigned the elements 
of the balance. The need to deter the underlying 
conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are 
the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth 
Amendment decisions have established beyond any 
doubt that the societal interest in deterring 
illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 
not victimized by the challenged practices. Rakas 
v. Illinois, supra; Alderman v. United States, 
supra. 
The District Court disregarded these 
principles when it concluded that "society's 
interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by 
exclusion outweigh[s] society's interest in 
furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant 
evidence." 4 3 4 F • S u pp. , at 1 3 5 . The District 
1 3. 
Court's reasoning, which the Court of Appeals 
affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its own 
judgment for the controlling decisions of this 
Court.l/ 
IV 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of 
a federal officer, the courts below sought to 
fashion a remedy that our decisions do not 
authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative 
evidence because it was seized from another in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment." Alderman v. 
United States, supra, at 1 7 4. Were we to accept 
this use of the supervisory power, we would confer 
on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard 
the considered limitations of the law it is charged 
with enforcing. We hold that the supervisory power 
... 
does not extend so far. 




~/ 18 U.S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant 
{/"whoever, in any matter within the 
jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United Stat~s knowingly 
and willfully . . makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements 
or representations, 





imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both." 
~/ The unusual sequence of rulings was a 
byproduct of the consolidated hearing conducted by 
the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the 
evidence, it simply granted respondent's motion to 
suppress. After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want 
of jurisdiction, the District Court vacated the 
order granting the motion to suppress and entered a 
verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. 
Respondent does not challenge these procedures. 
ll The United States argued in the 
District Court and the Court of Appeals that the 
guarantee agreement was discovered through an 
FN2. 
independent investigation untainted by the 
briefcase search. The government also denied that 
~ 
/ 
its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal 
behavior. For purposes of this opinion, we need 
not question the District Court's contrary findings 
on either point. 
!/ We are not persuaded by respondent's 
suggestion that the Bahamian law of bank secrecy 
creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 u.s. 435 ( 1976). 
Respondent cites a proviso to Ch. 96.9 of the 
Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks 
Amendment Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, 
Bahamian law does grant a measure of 
confidentiality to banking transact ions. Section 
10 of the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 
Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, provides in 
relevant part: 
(/"Except for the purpose of the 
performance of his duties or the 
exercise of his functions under this 
Act or when lawfully required to do 
so by any court of competent 
jurisdiction within the Colony or 
FN3. 
under the provisions of any law of 
the Colony, no person shall disclose 
any information relating to • • • the 
affairs of . • any customer of a 
[bank] licensee which he has acquired' 
in the performance of his duties or 
the exercise of his functions under 
this Act." 
(/The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of 
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged 
with exceptions; and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American 
depositors know that their own country requires 
them to report relationships with foreign financial 
institutions.· 31 u.s.c. § 1 1 21 ; 31 ~' c § 
103.24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v~ 
Shultz 416 U.S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). This 
respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an 
American bank, the Bank of Perrine, in connection 
with the loan transaction that eventually led to 
his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle 
Bank records that documented his account. 
5/ "The security of persons and property 
remains a fundamental value which law enforcement 
officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United 
FN4. 
States, 394 u.s. 165, 175 (1969). We note that the 
briefcase affair was revealed to Congress in the 
course of an extensive investigation of the 
Service's intelligence operations. See Oversight 
Hearings into the Operations of the IRS before a 
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government 
Operations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976). As a 
result, t he Commissioner of Internal Revenue 
t 
"called off" Operation Trade Winds. Tr. ~ Oral Arg. 
35. The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that 
require agents to instruct informants on the 
requirements of · the law, and to report known 
illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS 
Manual Supp. 9G-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977). 
Although these measures appear on their face to be 
less positive than one might expect from an agency 
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate 
disapproval of the practices found to have been 
implemented in this case. Nor can we assume that 
similar lawless conduct, if brought to the 
attention of responsible officials, would not be 
dealt with appropriately. To require in addition 
the suppression of highly probative evidence in a 
trial against a third party would penalize society 
FN5. 
unnecessarily . 
.§./ Federal courts have used their 
supervisory power in some circumstances to exclude 
evidence taken from the defendant by "willful 
disobedience of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 
u.s. 332, 345 (1943); see Elkins v. -united States, 
364 u.s. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 350 
U.S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. - United 
States, 425 U.S. 484, 495 (POWELL, J., concurring 
in the judgment). This Court has never held, 
however, that the supervisory power authorizes 
suppression of evidence obtained from third parties 
in violation of Constitution, statute or rule. The 
courts have no generalized 1 icense to oversee the 
practices of 1 aw enforcement agencies. That 
res pons ibil i ty is confided, subject to applicable 
law, to the Executive Branch. United States v. 
Russell, 411 u.s. 423, 435 (1973). The supervisory 
power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
"the administration of criminal justice" among the 
parties before the bar. McNabb v. United States, 
318 u.s. 332, 340 (1943). 
]_I The same difficulty attends 
FN6. 
respondent's claim to the protections of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court 
of Appeals expressly declined to consider the Due 
Process Clause. But even if we assume that the 
unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to 
offend fundamental "canons of decency and 
fairness , " Roc h in v • C a 1 i for n i a , 3 4 2 u . s • 1 6 5 , 1 6 9 
(1952), quoting Malinski v. New York 324 u.s. 401, 
I. 
407 ( 1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact 
remains that "[t]he limitations of the Due Process 
Clause come into play only when the 
Government activity in question violates some 
,. 
protected right of the defendant," Hampton v. 
United States, 425 u.s. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality 
opinion). One may dis agree with the the Hampton 
plurality's view that no protected interest was 
involved in that case. See id., at 491-495 
(POWELL, J., concurring in the judgment). There 
can be no doubt, however, that the search of 
Michael Wolstencroft' s briefcase did not intrude 
upon this respondent's rights in any way. Thus, 
the Due Process Clause adds little to our analysis. 
' . 
The question for decision is still whether a person 
FN7. 
not victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to 
suppress its fruits. That balance of interests is 
determined by the prior decisions of this Court. 
er 4/8/80 
Although the Court of Appeals relied 
solely upon the supervisory power, the Fourth 
Amendment is the constitutional provision most 
directly in point when a defendant seeks 
suppression of evidence obtained in an unlawful 
search. Consequently, the policies that have 
informed established doctrines of "standing to 
invoke the [Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule," 
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 138 (1978), are 
instructive in this case. The Fourth Amendment 
does not require the exclusion of evidence from a 
criminal trial unless the challenged search or 
seizure violated the defendant's own constitutional 
rights. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.' 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I ~-
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September,p976, 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1. The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castie 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully .. . makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
' ' 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov· 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search arc not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion the financial activities of American citizens in the 
'Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to Ruppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent docs not chal-
lenge these procedures. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi- . 
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe , "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp., at 120 . ..----;tCCording to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti~ 
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan uarantee 
agreement. !d., at 123. lthough the search did not impinge 
\ upon thl)lgf®mls t'e Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
COurt believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
8 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
inves tigation untainted by the briefcase search . The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 129 ~ 
nlaesili iw oti~i•~; see id., at 133, 134-135. 
-The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's usc of its super· 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per cur·iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
' -process question. We granted certiorari,-- U. 8.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
Thls Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 430 U. S. 128, 138 (1078). \Ve 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
1unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con· 
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. Sec, e. g., Brown v. 
Un·iled States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). A11d the defei~d­
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when 
ohaJ4wl~li'R Fraroh 81' PPiiKU'€ invaded his legitimate expecta ion 
ofj)rivacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De· 
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
~------~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
:Amendment rights .-£ iltJ?ttn~elS ttsts Oil Clle perceptiOn that 
Fourtft ATMttd:nte'Mor!~l+~ IU'8 f'et'MI!ftl Ml~ I!IRMMil @8*!11UJ01h8 
~:ciru.lsly. ~ ~i!8, .,~~12-~iling ±tllfefll 
~~!;'; rc~~:!:~t::,s::!::;[ :;::r:P:!f:F:::~: :::: .. 
~olusiena:r:rru~~~ e~l!'im!t expmn:liH~ilbe ileiil 4 pe'* 
~t~lil:il 'Alute l'llR3r i~ it..'\1 Although exclusion is a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases, the Court 
I I 
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has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but 
tainted evidence exacts a fSTIY 'toll upon the ability of courts ~ 
to ascertain the truth aRel tie t:tet1ttit or eon: c iet the elsfsRElattt in 
a c:iminal case. E. g., f!~kas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;~}-o -r\.Q. " · f~) 
Umted States v. Ceccoltnt, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 42.~ U S lfi.A 
see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450-451 (1974). Our L\ ~ -~q\ 1q1"£:,) • 
cases recognize thajf • unbending application of the exclu- ~ C ) 
sionary sanction to enforce ideals of overnmental rectitude -'1 
would impede ~ unacceptabl ~ the truthfinding 1 
functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and 
not the constable, who stands trial. 
or these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the exclu-
sionary rule to command t;Ju 1 1 1 · Iii 8f " [every l thing 
which deters illegal searches .... " Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires 
nor permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a 
balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the 
exclusionary rule in a given situation against its high societal 
costs. Ibid.; see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-
279; United States v. ~anis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 
i (1976); Stone v. Powell,J;WG H: OJ 101, 485-489 ; see 
· al o United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evidence even though the case aga.inst the defendant 
J 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
~# ----jut we are not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants 
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would justify further encroachment upon the public inter-
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
..flence which ex oses the truth." Alderman v. United 
tates, supra, at 17 -175. 
E. g., 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
488-489; United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 
... 
--- ------------
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court· 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally sei~ed from 
. Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; Gie 590 F. 2d, at 207.' 
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's 
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest 
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolsten-
c.:roft." 434 F. Supp., at 126_; I Nor do we. United States . 
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) , established that a depositor 
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creates an experta1ion of privacy not present in 
United States v. Mille!', 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent ci1 es a proviso 
to Ch. 96 .9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama. Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas 
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law does grant a measure of confi-
dentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust 
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the perfo1mance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do y. 
court of competent juri diction within the Colo y or under the provi-













~ UNITED STATES v. PAYNER . 7 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities ~ do not 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United 
States contends that this novel approach upsets the careful 
balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment deci-
- cc.,-
sions of this Court. In the Government's view, such ~ 
stsu 1 • B extension of the supervisory power would enable fed-
eral courts to exercise a standardless discretionp;Eilitr\ffie~ 
a:ml when be !tp}Jly tfte l'-eurtl1: Am:e11eh~l81lt as~~COUl:.tshai. 
~ued ~ We agree with the Government. A. 
e JHWP ihJ~I'!~S · t e District Court's commen a-
ble desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos<.:J who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bankl licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with exception. ; and we have been dir~ee ed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, Ameriran depo. i ll'::l know 
tha,t their own country requires them to report relationl'hipR 'llh foreign 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. Sec gen-
erally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-63,71-76 {1974). 
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank, 
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transact ion thaL even-
tually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked it reagon-
able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented 
L----,;-;-us;-;;"alll. ount. 
" " he security of persons and property remains a fundamental value [ , ' 
which I:tw enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who floutr ' , .._ ... t lidOJ 
tho ruins escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, II\ "·~~ 
175 (1969). We note( that tllil ~1·ie~88fll! niliir WQQ J;Qnocdeel t~t•CongreRs 
itt th8 oilnrP8 8t !tii orh s· w m l·g t' I tliC . ' . * lliSBI~og (D .raf;O'f\ 
oporoltilll Sec Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS be-r r .. J 
fore a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operation~ \t~ I V\0 S _, 
~rv~~c+ ~ICUieM J 
~ ~~rc~~s 
Tr~f~cX-'t~ 
~ PfDj fJ.M)) 
I 
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( 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia- rr;r-d.wJ -+lu_ 
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name . . 1 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, '(Jt"ttt ~ 
386 ( 1964); sec Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485j ~ ~ /a.QI.A\-
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional 14\0~~ 11:> 
pronouncements of principle do not support the District , tl{t btL~ ~ 
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defend- Y Ml - ~-:.S I" 
ant w!1ose own constitutional rights were not infringed~A , .... (/ ~ c:rr 
----~.-..1"'/he supervisory power i <> !lplli(·tl with some caution even t.ovSI~a:Jrt1V\A-
J J ' en a criminal defendant asserts a violation of his own 1 ~~ ""fo 
t;J ~ In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741,. 754-757 1 +Cu 'Mk .. a:h~ 
(1970), we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola- _ /' ri..fr -· 
or 4.AA ~tl.M -
94th Cong., 1::tt Se~s. ~ As :1 result, thE' Commi~sionrr of Internal ' ~
R evenue "called off" Operntion Trnde Winds. Tr. of Ornl Arg. 35. The .$t~ j ' 
Commis.<:ioner also adopted guidelines that require agents to · inst ruct 
informnnts on t.he requirement ~'< of the Jav.g:pmtl to report Tmown Jil~ah- <:r 
tics to appropriate ~ fate authorific~'<. IRS Mnnunl Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 
4 (Feb. 3, 1977) . Although the~r mensures appear on thrir face to be 
less positive than one might expect from nn agency cha,rgcd with upholcling 
the lrLw, they do indicate diHa.pprovnl of tho prnctices found to have been 
implemented in this ear;o. ]:T "'1Mjnssm11ct1i'ii't"""siiffi11ir l1iW1C'R§ con-
duct, if brought. to iho attention of re.-ponsible officials, would not ·be 
dealt with appropriately. To require in addition tho suppreHsion of 
highly probative evidence in a trial against a third 11arty would penalize 
Lsociety unnecessarily. 
6 Federal courts leom ~11 ±heir supervisory power in Rome circum-
stances to exclude eviclrnre taken from the defendant by "willful diRob edi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 3:32, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; R ea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (195G); cf. Jlampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, hO\Y~vcr , that the supervisory power authorizrR suppression of evi-
dence obt.ained from ihird parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
I' :llrr • 
ltM; h sa fi! *i•e ~tlftlsh. b'ni~etl 8tutea '· ~a&beii, 411 8. 8. 118, til 
Tho supervisory powrr merely permits federal coutis to supervise 
"tho administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar. 




UNITED STATES v. PA YNER 9 
tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
nited States, 8" 2 ; t 2H~{111eCourt ca:Ired Tor a restramea . 
application of he supervisory power: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power docs not ermit a 
federal court to suppress evidence w1thout carefully balancing 
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule. Nordoes a c 1ange in legal theoryl alter the 
weight to be assigned the elements of t e balance. The need 
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the 
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth Amendment. .-r our Fourth Amendment 
:::: 
decisions have established beyond an:f"":doubt that the societal 
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclu-
sion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 
no v1c 1m the challenged ·practices. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra; A lder.man v. United States, supra. f. \ · Q.J&\ 
.. The District Court db sg 1 J~ these principles wh_e_n....,.,it-_..,"\. M \~ ~f \ 
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F. 
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amoqnts to a substitution of its 
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.7 
7 Tho same difficulty attends respondent's c]ajm to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to cousider the Due Procer:;s Clause. But even if we \5/--- ass.u o unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous .as. to e 
fundamental " anon!> of decency and fairnes!>," Rochin v. Califomia, ~\"' 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, ~7 l 
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llf$. 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman ·. v. United States, supra, at 174. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 





This Court discussed the doctrine of 
"standing to invoke the [Fourth Amendment] 
exclusionary rule" in some detail last term. Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 u.s. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may 
not exclude evidence under the Fourth Amendment 
unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure 
violated the defendant's own constitutional rights. 
Id., at 133-140. See, e.g., Brown v. United 
States, 411 u.s. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 u.s. 165, 171-172 (1969); 
Simmons v. United States, 390 u.s. 377, 389 (1968). 
And the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights are 
violated only when the challenged search or seizure 
invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy 
rather than that of a third ·party. Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 143; id., at · 149-152 (POWELL, 
J., concurring); Combs v. United States, 408 u.s. 
224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 u.s. 364, 
368 (1968). 
( The foregoing authorities establish, as 








lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to 
suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F.2d, 
at 20 7. The Court of Ap?eals did not disturb the 
District Court's conclusion that "Jack Payner 
possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank 
documents that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 
F.Supp., at 126. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 u.s. 435 (1976), established that a 
depositor has no expectation of privacy and thus no 
"protectable Fourth Amendment interest" in copies 
of checks and deposit slips retained by his bank. 
Id., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in the 
record sup?orts a contrary conclusion in this 
case.!/ 
( Appeals 
The District Court and the Court of 
believed, however, that a federal court 
should use its supervisory power to suppress 
J evidence tainted by gross illegalities, even when 
they do not infringe the defendant's constitutional 
rights. The United States contends that this novel 
ap?roach upsets the careful balance of interests 
embodied in the Fourth Amendment decisions of this 
3. 
Court. In the Government's view, such an extension 
of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in 
their application of the exclusionary rule to 
enforce the Fourth Amendment. We agree with the 
Government. 
A 
We certainly can understand the District 
Court's commendable desire to deter deliberate 
intrusions into the privacy of persons who are 
unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court 
should condone the unconstitutional and possibly 
criminal behavior of those who planned and executed 
this "briefcase caper."2/ Indeed, the decisions of 
this Court are replete with denunciations of 
willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 
u.s. 368, 386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States 
277 *U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). But these unexceptional 
pronouncements of principle do not in themselves 






! supervisory power to free a defendant whose own 
constitutional rights were not infringed. Indeed, 
the .. principles never have been thought to 
encompass the full range of considerations relevant -
to the application of an exclusionary rule. 
\ 
Although exclusion ·is a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases, 
the Court has acknowledged that the suppression of 
probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll 
upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
in a criminal case. E.g~, Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 137-138; United States v. Ceccolini, 435 
u.s. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 428 u.s. 
464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v~ Tucker, 417 
u.s. 433, 450-451 (1974). Our cases recognize that · 
unbending application of the exclusionary sanction 
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truthfinding functions of 
judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, 
and not the constable, .who stands trial. 
For these reasons, the Court has not 
interpreted the Fourth Amendment to command 






" Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. Our 
abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor 
permits us to exclude "illeqally seized evidence in 
all proceedings or against all persons." United 
States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
Instead, we have adopted a balancing approach that 
weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in a given situation against its high societal 
costs. Ibid.; see United States v. Ceccolini, 
supra, at 275-279; United States v. Janis, 428 u.s. 
433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. Powell, supra, 
at 485-489 (1976); see also United States v. 
Peltier, 422 u.s. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to 
suppress evidence obtained in violation of a third 
party's Fourth Amendment rights, the balance tips 
against application of the exclusionary rule. 
"The deterrent values of preventing 
the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have 
been considered sufficient to justify 
the suppression of probative evidence 
even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgment. But we 
are not convinced that the additional 
6. 
benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment 
upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime 
and having them acquitted or 
convicted on the basis of all the 
evidence which exposes the truth." 
Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175. The 
Court has repeatedly affirmed its considered 
judgment that the costs of the exclusionary rule do 
not permit expansion of the class of persons who 
may invoke it. E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 
137; see Stone v. Powell, supra, at 488-489; United 
States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 
B 
The societal interests threatened by 
indiscriminate application of the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule are equally at risk when a 
criminal defendant invokes the supervisory power to 
suppress evidence seized in violation of a third 
party's constitutional rights.~ Indeed, this 
J 
Court has exercised the supervisory power with some 
caution even when the defendant asserts a violation 
of his own rights. In United States v. Caceres, 
440 U.S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude 
7. 
) all evidence tainted by violations of an executive 
department's rules. And in Elkins v. United 
States, supra, at 216, the Court called for a 
restrained application of the supervisory power: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the 
process of discovering truth in a 
federal trial ought to be imposed 
only upon the basis of considerations 
which outweigh the general need for 
\ 
untrammeled disclosure of competent 
l 
and relevant evidence in a court of 
justice." 364 u.s., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 u.s. 338, 
340 (1939). 
[PICK UP at page 9.] 
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The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the balance of 
interests under the supervisory power differs from that 
considered in Alderman and like cases, because the supervisory 
power focuses upon the "need to protect the integrity of the 
federal courts." Although the District Court in this case 
j 
relied upon a deterrent rationale, the~e ca no doubt that 
the supervisory power serves the "two-fold" purpose of deterring 
illegality and protecting judicial integrity. See post, at 7. 
As the dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule serves precisely the same purposes. Ibid., 
citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 
(1979), and Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961). Thus, 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory 
power, is applied in part "to protect the integrity of the court 
rather than to vindicate the constitutional rights of the 
defendant . . . " Post, at 10; see generally Stone v. Powell, 
428 u.s. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 u.s. 
33 8, 486 ( 197 4) 0 
See supra; see also, e.g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-486. 
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A ~ 'h. ll. 
As our Fourth Amendment decisions show, the balanc~ tips against 
( exclusion , in this ca3e. j None of the decisions cited by the 
0-
dissent, post, at 7-9, supports ~ contrary view, since none of 
1\ 
those cases involved criminal defendants who were not themselves 
the victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our decision 
today does not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory 
power in any way: nor does it render that power "superfluous." 
tf,__ 
Post, at 12. We merely reject the\ use ~ 
as a substitute for 
~-J.. ~ ........ ~ '~ ~ 
~\Fourth Amendmen~ 
cases where the lower courts qisagree with the balance struok by 
the decisions of this Court. 
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MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
The Court today holds that a federal court is unable to 
exercise its supervisory powers to prevent the use of evidence 
in a criminal prosecution in that court, even though that 
evidence was obtained through intentional illegal and 
unconstitutional conduct by agents of the United States, 
because the defendant does not satisfy the standing 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. That holding effectively 
turns the standing rules created by this Court for assertions 
of Fourth Amendment violations into a sword to be used by the 
Government to permit it deliberately 'to invade one person's 
Fourth Amendment rights in order to obtain evidence against 
another person. Unlike the Court, I do not believe that the 
federal courts are unable to protect the integrity of the 
judicial system from such gross government misconduct. 
I 
. The facts as found by the District Court need to be more 
fully stated in order to establish the level of purposeful 
misconduct to which agents of the United States have sunk in 
this case. Operation Trade Winds was initiated by the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) in 1965 to gather information about the 
financial activities of American citizens in the Bahamas. The 
investigation was supervised by Special Agent Richard Jaffe in 
the Jacksonville, Fla., office .. It was not until June 1972 
that the investigation focused on the Castle Bank and Trust 
Company of the Bahamas. In late October 1972 Jaffe asked one 
of his informants, Norman Casper, to obtain the names and 
addresses of the individuals holding accounts with the Castle 
Bank. Casper set to work soon thereafter. He was already an 
acquaintance of Michael Wolstencroft, Vice-President and Trust 
Officer of the Castle Bank. Casper knew that Wolstencroft 
frequently visited the United States carrying a briefcase with 
documents from the Castle Bank. Casper therefore introduced 
Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private detective who worked 
_for Casper. In early January 1973, Casper learned that 
Wolstencroft planned a business trip to the United States on 
January 15, 1973, and that he would have Castle Bank records 
with him on that trip. Plans for the "briefcase caper," as 
Casper called it, began in earnest. 
As found by the District Court, Casper discussed the 
details of the plan with Jaffe on several occasions during the 
week before Wolstencroft's trip.!/ Casper told . Jaffe that he 
could get the needed documents from Wolstencroft, but that 
Jaffe would have to supply photographic services. On January 
11, Casper specifically informed Jaffe that he planned to enter 
an apartment and take Wolstencroft's briefcase. Jaffe then 
stated that he would have to clear the operation with his 
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superior, Troy Register, Jr., Chief of the IRS Int~lligence 
Division in Jacksonville. Clearance was obtained, and Jaffe 
told Casper to proceed with the plan. ~/ Casper called Jaffe 
the following day and asked if the IRS could refer him to a 
locksmith who could be "trusted." Jaffe gave him such a 
referral. ~/ 
The plans were finalized by the time of Wolstencroft's 
arrival on January 15. Wolstencroft went directly to Sybol 
Kennedy's apartment. The couple eventually went to a 
restaurant for dinner. !/ Using a key provided by Kennedy, ~/ 
. Casper entered the apartment and stole Wolstencroft's 
briefcase. Casper then rendezvoused with the IRS-recommended 
locksmith in a parking lot five blocks from the apartment; the 
locksmith made a key to fit the lock on the case. Casper took 
the briefcase and newly made key to the home of an IRS agent. 
Jaff~ had selected that location for the photographing because 
it was only eight blocks from the parking lot where Casper met 
the locksmith and Jaffe knew there was a need to act with 
haste. ~/ The briefcase was opened in 
Jaffe, then photographed 
had arranged for Kennedy and 
watched on their date, and this lookout 
called Casper at the IRS agent's home when the couple finished 
their dinner. After all the documents had been copied, Casper 
relocked the briefcase and returned it to Kennedy's apartment. 
The entire "caper" lasted approximately one and one-half hours. 
The illegalities of agents of the United States did not 
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stop even at that point, however. During the following two 
weeksi Jaffe told Casper that the IRS needed additional 
information. Casper therefore sent Kennedy to visit 
Wolstencroft in the Bahamas. While there, acting pursuant to 
Casper's instructions, Kennedy stole a rolodex file from 
Wolstencroft's office. This file was turned over to Jaffe, who 
testified in the District Court that he had not cared how the 
rolodex file had been obtained. ~/ 
The IRS paid Casper $8,000 in cash for the services he 
rendered in obtaining the information abo~t Castle Bank. 
Casper in turn paid approximately $1,000 of this money to 
Kennedy for her role in the "briefcase caper" and the theft of 
the rolodex file. 
The "briefcase caper" revealed papers which showed a close 
relationship between the Castle Bank and a Florida bank. 
Subpoenas issued to that Florida bank resulted in the 
uncovering of the loan guarantee agreement which was the 
principal piece of evidence against respondent at trial. It is 
that loan agreement and the evidence discovered as a result of 
it that the District Court reluctantly 2/ suppressed under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and under its 
supervisory powers. 
The District Court made several key findings concerning the 
level of misconduct of agents of the United States in these 
activities. The District Court found that "the United States, 
through its agents, Richard .Jaffe, and others, ~nowingly and 
willfully participated in the unlawful seizure of Michael 
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Wolstencroft's briefcase, and encouraged its informant, Norman 
Casper, to arrange the theft of a rolodex from the offices of 
Castle Bank." 434 F. Supp. 113, 120-121 (N.D. Ohio 
1977) (footnotes omitted). The District Court concluded that 
"the United States was an active participant in the admittedly 
criminal conduct in which Casper engaged .. ... " Id., at 121. The 
District Court found that "the illegal conduct of the 
government officials involved in this case compels the 
conclusion that they knowingly and purposefully obtained the 
briefcase materials with bad faith hostility toward the 
strictures imposed on their activities by the Constitution." 
Id., at 130 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original). The 
District Court considered the actions of Jaffe and Casper 
"outrageous," ibid., because .they "plotted, schemed and 
ultimately acted in contravention of the United States 
Constitution and laws of Florida, knowing that their conduct 
was illegal." Ibid. 
The most disturbing finding by the District Court, however, 
related to the intentional manipulation of the standing 
w,..... 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment by agents of the United 
States, who are, of course, supposed to uphold and enforce the 
Constitution and laws of this country. The District Court 
found: 
"It is evident that the Government and its agents, 
including Richard Jaffe, were, and are, well aware that 
under the standing requirement of the Fourth Amendment, 
evidence obtained from a party pursuant to an 
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unconstitutional search is admissible against third parties 
who's [sic] own privacy expectations are not subjected to 
the search, even though the cause for the unconstitutional 
search was to obtain evidence incriminating those third 
parties. This Court finds that, in its desire to apprehend 
tax evaders, a desire the Court fully shares, the 
Government affirmatively counsels its agents that the 
' - ~---------
Fourth Amendment standing limitation permits them to 
purposefully conduct an unconstitutional search and seizure 
of one individual in order to obtain evidence against third 
parties, who are the real targets of the governmental 
intrusion, and that the IRS agents in this case acted, and 
~ will act in the future, according to that counsel. Such 
governmental conduct compels the conclusion that Jaffe and 
Casper transacted the 'briefcase caper' with a purposeful, 
bad faith hostility toward the Fourth Amendment rights of 
' . 
Wolstencroft in order to obtain evidence against persons 
like Payner." Id., at 131-133 (footnotes omitted). 
The Court of Appeals did not disturb any of these findings. 
590 F.2d 206 (CA6 1979) (~ curiam). Nor does the Court today 
purport to set them aside. See ante at 3, n.3. But cf. ante, 
at 6, n.S. It is in the context of these findin~~ --
intentional illegal actions by Government agents taken in bad 
faith hostility toward the constitutional rights of 
Wolstencroft for the purpose of obtaining evidence against 
persons such as the respondent through manipula~ion of the 
standing requirements of the Fourth Amendment -- that the 
-6-
suppression issue must be considered. 
II 
This Court has on several occasions exercised its 
supervisory powers over the federal judicial system in order to 
suppress evidence that the government obtained through 
misconduct. See, ~' McNabb v. United States, 318 u.s. 332 
(1943); Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948); Mesarosh 
v. United States, 352 u.s. 1 (1956); Mallory v. United States, 
354 U.S. 449 (1957); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 
(1960). Cf. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 
(1956) (supervisory powers used to enjoin federal agent from 
testifying in state criminal prosecution concerning illegal 
search and from turning over to the State evid'ence illegally 
seized). The rationale for such suppression of evidence is 
two-fold: to deter illegal conduct by government officials, and 
to protect the integrity of the federal courts. McNabb v . 
. United States, supra, at 342, 345, 347; Mesarosh v. United 
States, supra, at 14; Elkins v. United States, supra, at 217, 
222-223. Cf. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 u.s. 643, 659-660 (1961) (Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments); Brown v. Illinois, 422 u.s. 590, 
599-600 (1975) (Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments); Dunaway v. 
New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979) (Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). The Court has particularly stressed the need to 
use supervisory powers to prevent the federal courts from 
bec~ming accomplices to such misconduct. See, ~,~abb v. 
United States, supra, at 345 ("Plainly, a conviction resting on 
evidence secured through such a flagrant disregard of the 
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procedure which Congress has commanded cannot be allowed to 
stand without making the courts themselves accomplices in 
willful disobedience of law"); Mesarosh v. United States, 
supra, at 14 (the Court should use its supervisory powers in 
federal criminal cases "to see that the waters of justice are 
not polluted"); Elkins v. United States, supra, at 223 (federal 
courts should not be "accomplices in the willful disobedience 
of a Constitution they are sworn to uphold"). 
The need to use the Court's supervisory powers to suppress 
evidence obtained through governm~ntal misconduct was perhaps 
best expressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his famous dissenting 
opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471-485 
(1928): 
"Decency, security and liberty alike demand that government 
officials shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct 
·that are commands to the citizen. In a government of laws, 
existence of the government will be imperilled if it fails 
to observe the law scrupulously. Our Government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is 
contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it 
breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a 
law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in 
the administration of the criminal law the end justifies 
the means -- to declare that the Government may commit 
crimes in order to secure the conviction of a private 
criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against that 
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pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its 
face." Id., at 485. 
Mr. Justice Brandeis noted that "a court will not redress a 
wrong when he who invokes its aid has unclean hands," id., at 
483, and that in keeping with that principle the court should 
not lend its aid in the enforcement of the criminal law when 
the government itself was guilty of misconduct. "Then aid is 
denied despite the defendant's wrong. It is denied in order to 
maintain respect for law; in order to promote confidence in the 
administration of justice; in order to preserve the judicial 
process from contamination." Id., at 484. See also id., at 
469-471 (Holmes, J., dissenting); id., at 488 (Stone, J., 
dissenting); Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 453, n. 3 
(1963) (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). 10/ 
The reason for this emphasis on the need to protect the 
integrity of the federal courts through the use of supervisory 
powers can be derived from the factual contexts in which 
supervisory powers have been·exercised. In large part when 
supervisory powers have been invoked the Court has been faced 
with intentional illegal conduct. It has not been the case 
that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has 
blundered," People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, lSO N.E. 585, 
587 (1926). In these cases there has been no "blunder" by the 
government agent at all; rather, the agent has intentionally 
violated the law for the explicit purpose of obtaining the 
evidence in question. Cf. Lopez v. United States, supra, at 440 
(supervisory powers should be exercised only if there has been 
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"manifestly improper conduct by federal officials''). If the 
federal court permits such evidence, the intended product of 
deliberately illegal ~" government action, to be used to obtain a 
conviction, it places its imprimatur upon such lawlessness and 
thereby taints its own integrity. 
The present case falls within that category. The District 
Court found, and the record establishes, a deliberate decision 
by government agents to violate the constitutional rights of 
Wolstencroft for the explicit purpose of obtaining evidence 
against persons such as Payner. The actipns of the government 
agents -- stealing the briefcase, opening it, and photographing 
all the documents inside -- were both patently in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment rights of Wolstencroft 11/ and plainly in 
violation of the criminal law. 12/ The Government knew exactly 
what information it wanted, and it was that information which 
was ·stolen from Wolstencroft. Similarly, the Government knew 
that it wanted to prosecute persons such as Payner, and it made 
a conscious decision to forego any opportunity to prosecute 
Wolstencroft in order to obtain illegally the evidence against 
Payner and others. 13/ 
Since the supervisory powers are exercised to protect the 
integrity of the court, rather than to vindicate the 
constitutional rights of the defendant, it is hard to see why 
the Court today bases its analysis entirely on Fourth Amendment 
standing rules. The point is that the federal judiciary should 
not be made accomplices to the crimes of Casper~ Jaffe and 
others. The only way the IRS can benefit from the evidence it 
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chose to obtain illegally is if that evidence .is admitted at 
trial against persons such as Payner; that was the very point 
of the criminal exercise in the first place. If the IRS is 
permitted to obtain a conviction in federal court based almost 
entirely on that illegally obtained evidence and its fruits, 
then the judiciary has given full effect to the deliberate 
wrongdoings of the government. The federal court does indeed 
}I \~ 
become the accom lice of the government lawbreaker, an 
_____, 
/£accessory after the faci; for without judicial use of the 
evidence the "caper" would have been for nought. Such a 
pollution of the federal courts should not be permitted. 14/ 
It 1s particularly disturbing that the Court today chooses 
I I \\ 
to allow the IRS deliberately to manipulate the standing rules 
_...--- -- -
of the Fourth Amendment to achieve its ends. As previously 
noted, the District Court found that "the Government 
affi·rmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amendment 
standing limitation permits them to purposefully conduct an 
unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual in order 
to obtain evidence against third parties, who are the real 
targets of the governmental intrusion, and that the IRS agents 
in this case acted, and will act in the future, according to 
' 
that counsel." 434 F. Supp., at 132-133 (emphasis supplied}. 
Whatever role those standing limitations may play, it is clear 
that they were never intended to be a sword to be used by the 
Government in its deliberate choice to sacrifice the 
constitutional rights of one person in order to .Prosecute 
another. 
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The Court's decision to engraft the standing limitations of 
the Fourth Amendment onto the exercise of supervisory powers is 
puzzling not only because it runs contrary to the major purpose 
behind the exercise of the supervisory powers -- to protect the 
integrity of the court -- but also because it appears to render 
~he supervisory powers superfluous. In o~der to establish that 
suppression of evidence under the supervisory powers would be 
proper, the Court would also require Payner to establish a 
violation of his Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, 15/ in which 
case suppression would flow directly from . the Constitution. 
This approach is totally unfaithful to our prior supervisory 
power cases, which, contrary to the Court's suggestion, are not 
constitutional cases in disguise. 
I also do not understand the basis for the Court's 
assertion that this is not a case in which the District Court 
was ·supervising the administration of justice "among the 
parties before the bar," ante, at 8, n.7, and therefore 
supervisory powers are inapplicable. Clearly the Government is 
before the bar. Equally clearly, the Government embarked on 
this deliberate pattern of lawless behavior for the express 
purpose of gaining evidence against persons such as Payner, so 
there can be no legitimate claim that the illegai actions are 
only tangentially related to the present prosecution. Instead, 
the Government misconduct is at the very heart of this case; 
without the evidence produced by the illegal conduct, there 
would have been no case at all, and Payner would never have 
been brought before the bar. This is simply not a case in 
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which a federal court has attempted to exercise "g~neral 
supervisory authority over operations of the Executive Branch," 
ante, at 1 (BURGER, C.J., concurring). Rather, this is a case 
where the District Court refused to be made an accomplice to 
illegal conduct by the IRS by permitting the agency to use the 
proceeds of its crimes for the very purpose for which they were 
committed -- to convict persons such as Payner. 
Contrary to the Court's characterizations, this is also not 
a case in which there has been "indiscriminate" or "unbending" 
application of the exclusionary rule. The District Court noted 
that "exclusion on the basis of supervisory power is only done 
as a last resort," 434 F. Supp., at 134, n.74. That court 
concluded that suppression was proper only where there had been 
"purposefully illegal" conduct by the Government to obtain the 
evidence or where the Goverrnnent's conduct was "motivated by an 
intentional bad faith hostility to a constitutional right." 
Id., at 134-135 (footnotes omitted). In this case, both those 
threshold requirements were met, and the District Court in 
addition concluded that absent suppression there was no 
deterrent to continued lawless conduct undertaken by the IRS to 
facilitate these types of prosecutions. 16/ This is not "a 
'chancellor's foot' veto [by the District Court] ·over law 
enforcement practices of which it did not approve," United 
States v. Russell, 411 u.s. 423, 435 (1973); Hampton v. United 
States, 425 u.s. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality opinion ) • As my 
Brother POWELL noted on a prior occasion, "[t]h~ fact that 
there is sometimes no sharply defined standard against which to 
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make these judgments [of fundamental fairness] is not itself a 
sufficient reason to deny . the federal judiciary's power to make 
them when warranted by the circurnstances •.•. Nor do I despair of 
our ability in an appropriate case to identify appropriate 
standards for police practices without relying on the 
'chancellor's' 'fastidious squeamishness or private 
sentimentalism.' .. Hampton v. United States, supra, at 495, ·n.6 
(POWELL, J., concurring). That appropriate case has arrived, 
and the Court should prevent the Government from profiting by 
use in the federal courts of evidence deliberately obtained by 
illegal actions taken in bad faith hostility to constitutional 
rights. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and 
suppress the fruits of the Government's illegal action under 
the Court's supervisory powers. 17/ Accordingly, I dissent. 
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FOOTNOTES 
!/ The Court rather blandly states that "Agent Jaffe approved 
the basic outline of the plan," ante, at 2. Such a 
characterization is misleading in light of the findings of the 
District Court. As is noted in the text infra, Jaffe knew 
explicit details of the operation in advance and helped to make 
the arrangements by recommending a locksmith who could be 
"trusted," by providing a safe and convenient location for the 
photographing of the documents, and by providing a photographer 
from the IRS. 
~/ Jaffe testified in the District Court that "[w]hatever I 
knew, he [Register] knew." See 434 F. Supp. 113, 121, n.40; 
Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p. 513. 
11 It was clear why Casper needed a locksmith who could be 
"trusted." Casper testified as follows in the District Court: 
"Q. Isn't it a fact, Mr. Casper, you knew you were 
committing an illegal act, and you wanted somebody who 
could be trusted to keep his mouth shut about it? 
"A. There is that possibility, yes. 
"Q. Isn't that the fact. 
. . . . 
"A. Yes." 434 F. Supp., at 119, n.20; Tr. in CR 76-305 
(N.D. Ohio), pp. 452-453. 
It is interesting to note that even the locksmith who could be 
-15-
... 
"trusted" refused to enter Kennedy's apartment . with Casper. 
Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p.451. 
The Government contends that when Agent Jaffe made the 
referral he did not know what use Casper intended to make of 
such a .locksmith. Brief for United States 6, n.4. The 
District Court found, however, that Jaffe already knew at the 
time of the referral that Casper intended to enter Kennedy's 
apartment and to take and open Wolstencroft's briefcase. There 
were, then, only two logical alternative~ why Casper would want 
such a locksmith: to make a key to enter the briefcase, or to 
make a key to enter the apartment. Either way, Jaffe must have 
known that Casper's conduct was improper, and yet Jaffe made 
the referral anyway. 
5./ It·. was not established at trial what occurred in Kennedy's 
apartment prior to the couple's depart~re _for dinner. Since it 
was peculiarly within the power of the United States to produce 
Kennedy as a witness and since the Government did not explain 
her absence from the trial, the District Court inferred that 
Kennedy's testimony "would be unfavorable to the Government by 
further delineating the improprieties" of the "briefcase 
caper." 434 F. Supp., at 119, n.22. 
5/ The District Court, after -hearing the testimony of both 
Casper and Jaffe, disbelieved Jaffe's assertion that Casper had 
informed him beforehand that Kennedy had given Casper a key 
with which to enter the apartment. See 434 F. Supp., at 119, 
-16-
n.l5; id., at 121, n.40. See also n. 3, supra .• 
~/ 434 F. Supp., at 120, n.25; Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), 
pp. 494-496. 
ll As noted previously, Casper had told Jaffe to provide the 
photographic equipment. Jaffe testified that one of the 
cameras used was a "microfilmer" which was "much quicker" than 
a regular camera. This camera had been brought by the IRS 
because "Casper had to get the documents and the briefcase back 
to the apartment prior to the return of the owner." Tr. in CR 
76-305 (N.D. Ohio), pp. 493-495. This testimony again shows 
that Jaffe was fully aware in advance that the activities of 
the evening were improper. 
~/ See 434 F. Supp., at 120 & n.34; Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. 
Ohio), p. 501. 
~/ See 434 F. Supp., at 124, 129, 134, n.74. 
10/ The Court's opinion inexplicably ignores this basic thrust 
of our prior supervisory powers cases, and instead implies that 
the only value served by suppression . is deterrence of future 
misconduct. See ante, at 9. ·Deterrence is one purpose behind 
the suppression of evidence in such situations, but it is by no 
means the only one. 
-17-
11/ The Government conceded below that Wolstencroft's Fourth 
Amendment rights had been violated. 434 F. Supp., at 126. See 
Tr. in CR 76-305 (N.D. Ohio), p. 502. See also Brief for 
United States in No. 78-5278 (CA6), p.20. Cf. Tr. of Oral Arg. 
14; Brief for United States 39. The Court agrees that the 
conduct was unconstitutional. Ante, at 6. 
12/ The Court characterizes the actions of Jaffe and Casper in 
the briefcase incident as "possibly criminal behavior," ante, 
at 6. The District Court concluded that the actions of the IRS 
appeared to constitute a prima facie case of criminal larceny 
under Florida law, and possibly violated other criminal laws of 
that State as well. 434 F. Supp., at 130, n.66. Casper 
admitted in the District Court that he knew he was committing 
an illegal act. Tr. in CR 76-305 {N.D. Ohio), pp. 452-453. 
The stealing of the rolodex file from Wolstencroft's office was 
also both unconstitutional and criminal. That theft, however, 
produced no additional evidence against Payner. See 434 F. 
Supp., at 123, n.56. 
13/ See 434 F. Supp., at 129, n.65; id., at 131-133 & n. 69. 
See also Tr. in CR 76-305 {N.D. Ohio), p. 505. 
Wolstencroft in fact was indicted for aiding and abetting 
Payner. Brief for United States 3, n. 2. · However, Wolstencroft 
is a Bahamian resident, and did not return to the United States 
to answer the indictment. Id. The mere fact that the 
Government went through the steps of indicting Wolstencroft 
does not in any way undermine the District Cou~t's finding, 
based on substantial evidence in the record, th a t Wolstencroft 
was never the target of the IRS investigation. In light of the 
Government's concession that Wolstencroft's Fourth Amendment 
rights were violated, it is hard to see how the banker could be 
successfully prosecuted on the aiding and .abetting charge. 
14/ It is simply not a sufficient cure for the Court to 
denounce the actions of the IRS, ante, at 6, while at the same 
time rewarding the Government for this conduct by permitting 
the IRS to use the evidence in the very manner which was the 
purpose of the illegal and unconstitutional activities. 
15/ The Court appears to ·suggest that there can be no 
suppression of evidence based on a violation of the Due Process 
Clatlse in this case because it was not Payner who was the 
immediate victim of the Government's outrageous conduct. Ante, 
at 9, n.9. Although the District Court concluded that the 
evidence should be suppressed under the Due Process Clause as 
well as under its supervisory powers, the Court of Appeals 
specifically did not reach that issue, 590 F.2d 206 (CA6 
1979) (~ curiam), and the Government purposely did not raise 
the issue in this Court. See Pet. for Cert. 21, n. 13. 
Accordingly, the Court's suggestion is pure dicta. 
In addition, the only authority cited by the Court for its 
suggestion is Hampton v. United States, 425 u.s. 484, 490 




opinion, and the issue for which the Court purports to cite it 
was not raised by the facts of that case. Similarly, in the 
Court of Appeals below the United States was able to cite only 
Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404, .407 {1967), a case plainly not 
on point, and the sentence from the Hampton plurality opinion 
quoted by the Court, ante, at 9, n. 9, for . the proposition that 
Payner lacked standing to raise a due process argument. See 
Brief for United States in No. 78-5278 {CA6), pp. 21-22; Reply 
Bri~f 6. ~he issue whether the standing limitations this Court 
has imposed for challenging Fourth Amendment violations also 
apply for violations of the Due Process Clause based on 
outrageous government conduct has not yet been settled by this 
Court. Cf. 434 F. Supp., at 129, n. 65, and authorities 
discussed therein. The due process issue is properly left for 
consideration in the first instance by the Court of Appeals on 
rema-nd. 
16/ There is no suggestion by the Government that any action 
has been taken against Casper, Jaffe or others for the conduct 
·exposed in this case. The Court admits that the corrective 
measures taken by the IRS "appear on their face to be less 
positive than one might expect from an agency charged with 
upholding the law," ~' at 6, n. 5. The District Court 
specifically found that the Government agents knew they were 
violating the Constitution at the time, 434 F. Supp., at 135, 
n. 79, and that continued m~nipulation of the s~anding 
limitations of the Fourth Amendment by the IRS could be 
... 
deterred only by suppression of the evidence, id., at 133. 
17/ The Government argues that Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence stripped the federal judiciary of its supervisory 
powers to exclude evidence obtained through gross misconduct by 
agents of the United States. In the Court of Appeals this 
argument was relegated to one footnote, see Brief for United 
States in No. 78-5278, p. 41, n. 27. The Court does not 
address the issue. I would merely note that the Government's 
discussion of the legislative history behind Rule 402 fails to 
convince me that it was Congress' intent to attempt such a 
radical curtailment of the long-established supervisory powers 
of the federal judiciary. See United States v. Jacobs, 547 
F.2d 772, 777 (CA2 1976), cert. dismissed as improvidently 
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MR. JusTICE PoWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976, 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or repi'esentations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
•' 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~ 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court sot aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion of the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bftfi.Yrecords 
he know Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismi sed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, tho District Court vncated the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge these procedures. 
-0 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe}, "knowingly and wmfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp., at 120.3 According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
a reement. I d., at 123. Although the search did not impinge 
upon the ~clangs Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
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mcnt's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." Id., at 129 (em-
phasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super-
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per cur,iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con:. 
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. Sec, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v.. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate expectation 
of privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, ~ 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972 · · ,Ljllw.e- -- f) P ~. b 
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The rule thaitrars e en an from asser · g the Fourth-
Amendment rights strangers rests on e perception that 
Fourth Amendm t rights are persona nd cannot be asscr 
vicariously. Ra)cas v. Illinois, sun , at 133, quoting er-
man v. Umted States, supra, a 74. It also repr nts the 
Court' considered judgmer that the societal osts of the 
exclllSionary rule counsel~ cxp~:ud.iug e class of per-
l 
01 s who may invoke itJ Although e wn is a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful conduct ~aJ5propriate cases, the Court 
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has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but 
tainted evidence exacts a clostly toll upon the ability of courts 
to ascertain the truth and to acquit or convic the defendant in 
a criminal case. E. g. , Rakas v. Illinois, pra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 2 , 275- 279 ( 1978); 
see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 0-451 (1974). Our 
cases recognize than an unbending ap ication of the exclu-
sionary sanction to enforce ideals of ·overnmental rectitude 
would impede to an unacceptable egree the truthfinding 
functions of judge and jury. After 1, it is the defendant, and 
not the constable, who stands trial 
For these reasons, the Court h not interpreted the exclu-
sionary rule to command the ppression of " [every] thing 
which deters illegal searches. . . ' Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174. Our abhorren e of illegality neither requires 
nor permits us to exclude ' illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all 1 rsons." United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1 74). Instead, we have adopted a 
balancing approach that eighs the benefits of applying the 
exclusionary rule in a g' en situation against its high societal 
costs. Ibid.; see Uni d States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-
279; United States . Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 
(1976); Stone v. P eU, 428 U. S. 464, 485-489 (1976); see 
also United States . Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
When a crimin defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in vio tion of a third party's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the bal ce tips against application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
terrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
hose rights the police have violated have been 
con · lered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
ti~ evidence even though the case against the defendant 
· weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
ut we are not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the ~x.clusiG-nal'y-rnle- to m- defendants 
6 
78-1729-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. P N 
would justify further encroachment upon tho p c inter-
est in prosecuting those accused of cr.in.'l~ and having 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
dence which exposes the truth." Alderrnan v. United 
States, supra, at 175-175. 
The Court has applied this principle consistently. E. g., 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
488- 89; United States v. CalaryJ[,[J!,.~r.t,;J ~ 348. 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
W:olstoncroft. 431: F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. 
Tho Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's 
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest 
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolsten-
croft." 434 F. Supp., at 126. Nor do we. United States v. 
M.iller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor 
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; sec id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not pre8ent in 
United States v. Mille1·, 425 U. S. 435 ( 1976). Respondent cites a proviso 
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas 
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law does grant a measure of confi-
dentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust 
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully requir!i!cd,!_.W.I-UJ...-.--u:l'-<l.u.lC. ____ _ 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Color or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall isclose any information 
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities that do not 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United 
States co~s t~ this novel approach upsets the careful 
balance of interests embodif'd in the Fourth Amendment deci-
sions of this Court. In the Government's view, such a sub-
stantive extension of the supervisory power would enable fed-
eral courts to exercise a standardlcss discretion as to whether v 
~nd when to apply the Fourth Am~ndment as this Court has 
construed it. We agree with the ~G.io.ovv.c:cronJ.Jm:Jl.E!eJJn.tt __________ ,
e 48: etlilu~lMr~ tt~Ji!Wi :: i1JR.. the f>istrict Court's \commenda-
ble de ire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. Sec 434 F.. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customrr of a [bankl licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions undrr this Act." 
The statuto is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been .dir~c ~ed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, AmNican drpo111iJ!rs know 
that their own country rrquirrs thrm to report relationship~ with foreign . 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. Sec gen-
erally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59--63,71-76 (1974). ~;; 
-Th~ respondent ~evealed his Bahamian account to an Arnrrican bank, 
tho Bank of Perrino, in connection with the loan transaction that even-
tually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reason-
- c...c.....J able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented 
~+----..-h""'Js-a'""'lttount. 
5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officrrs must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscatjl£.d." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
i 
175 (1969). We notejl t1wt the brirfcase affair was revealed to Congress 
in the course of an extensive investigation of the Service's intelligence 
operations. Sec Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS be-
foro a Subcommittee of the · House Committee on Government Operations, 
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Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g. , Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J. , dissenting). 
~:h'll'CiC?!Ii111 iual 1 s 1 r 1 usm to a e iolal!'tbli of his s u 
~ ~ In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 
(1979) , we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola-
94th Cong., 1st, Se~s. (1976) . As a res111t., tho Commi~~ioner of Internal 
Revenue "rnll cd off" Operation Trade Winds: Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The 
Commi~sioner also adopted p;uidelinrs that require agents to instruct 
informants on t.he requirrmrnts of the lfl.wqn:n-d to rrport known illrgali- c:r-
ties to appro]11'iat,o stair authoritio~ . IRS Manual S11pp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 
4 (Feb. 3, 1077). Althon!);h thrsr mrn . .,ures apprar on thrir face io be 
less positive than one might expect from an agrncy charged with upholding 
tho bw, thry do indicate disaJ)proval of the pmcticrs found to hnve been 
implemrnted in thi~ case. Nor can we ass11mc thnt similar lawlrss con-
duct ; if brought to the attention of responf'iblc offirinls, would not be 
dealt with appropriately. To rrquire in addition the ~11J1pres::;ion of 
higlily probative evidence in a trial against a third party would penalize 
society unnccecsarily. 
6 Federal courts have~d their supervisory power in some circum-
stanceR to exclude evidrnre taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); sec 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) ; R ea v. Unit ed States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Ilampton v. Unit ed States, 425 U.S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J ., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi-
dence obt.ained from third partie~ in violation of Constitution, siaiute or 
rule. The courts have no generalized license to over~ee the 11ractices of law 
enforcement agencies. That responsibility is confided , subject to applicable 
law, to ihe Executivo Branch. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 435 
(1973). The supervisory power merely permits federal coutis to supervise 
"the aclmin· a.tion of criminal justice" among the pa.rtics before the bar. 
cNabb v. United Sta , ~ 340 ~ 
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tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. l q (;o) 
United States~S!UprfJJ, at;. 216} the Court called for a restrained-:-- ( ') 
application of the supervisory power: 
"[A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). t 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a -h'"'W \.,~1 ~ 
federal court to suppress evidenc~vithout carefully balancing ~h..J 
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment ex- ~ r,-a-
Glusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal theory alter the 
weight to be assigned the elements of the balance. The need 
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the 
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth Amendment 
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the societal 
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclu-
sion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 
not victimized by the challenged practices. Ralws v. Illinois, 
supra; Alderman v. United States, supra. 
The District Court disregarded these principles when it 
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [ s] society's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F. 
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its 
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.7 
7 Tho samo difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the 
Due Proces · Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "canon · of decency and fairness," Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 407 
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:wJIC· 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged' with enforcing. 
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of tJ1e defend-
anq) Hampton v. UnitwSfafi80 425 U. S. 48'!).-490 ~(plurality 
o]J'ifiionlj' One may disagree with the Hampton plurality's view that no 
protected interest was involved in that case. See id., at 491-495 (PowELL, 
J., concurring in the judgment). There ran be no doubt, however, that 
the search of Mic.lmcl Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this 
respondent's rights in any wtty. Thus, the Due Process Clause adds little 
to our analysis. The question for decision is still whether a person not 
victimized by an unlawful search is entitled to suppress its fruits. That 
balance of interests is determined by tho prior decisions of this Court. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976, 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands, 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U.S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States kno\\'ingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictiLious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found , however, that the Government discov-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner. 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion of the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depo8itors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devi8ed a scheme to (.!;ain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a b~rproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by ihe District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted rrRpondent's motion to Ruppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Si>.ih Circuit dismissed ihe government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinsUtted its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge these procedures. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffee, 11knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ." 
434 F. Supp., at 120.3 According to that court, 11the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. I d., at 123. Although the search did not impinge 
upon the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
s The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." /d., at 129 (em-
phasis in original); see id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's usc of its super-
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per cur'iam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment l exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 ( 1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. !d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 ( 1973) ; Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged search or seizure invaded his legitimate expectation 
of privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PowELL, J .. concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The rule that bars a defendant from asserting the Fourth 
Amendment rights of strangers rests on the perception that 
Fourth Amendment rights arc personal and cannot be asserted 
vicariously. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 133, quoting Alder-
man v. United States, supra, at 174. It also represents the 
Court's considered judgment that the societal costs of the 
exclusionary rule counsel against expanding the class of per-
sons who may invoke it. Although exclusion is a necessary 
deterrent to unlawful conduct in appropriate cases, the Court 
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has acknowledged that the suppression of probative but 
tainted evidence exacts a <fostly toll upon the ability of courts 
to ascertain the truth and to acquit or convict the defendant in 
a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275- 279 ( 1978); 
sec Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450- 451 ( 1974). Our 
cases recognize tha an un en mg app icat10n o t1c exclu-
sionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude 
would impede to an unacceptable degree the truthfinding 
functions of judge and jury. After all, it is the defendant, and ' 
not tho constable, who stands trial. 
For these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the exclu-
sionary rule to command the suppression of " [every lthing 
which deters illegal searches .... " Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires 
nor permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all 
proceedings or against all persons." United States v. Calan-
dra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a 
balancing approach that weighs the benefits of applying the 
exclusionary rule in a given situation against its high societal 
costs. Ibid.; sec United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-
279; United States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 
(1976); Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 485-489 (1976); see 
also United Stales v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 535-539 (1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evidence even though the case against the defendant 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
but we are not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants 
6 
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would justify further encroachment upon the public inter• 
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
dence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United 
States, supra, at 175-175. 
The Court has applied this principle consistently. E. g., 
Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 
488-489; United States v. Cala·ndra, supra, at 348. 
III 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. 
The Court of Appeals did not disturb the District Court's 
conclusion that "Jack Payner possessed no privacy interest 
in the Castle Bank documents that were seized from Wolsten-
croft." 434 F. Supp., at 126. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor 
has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy crcate>s an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent cit es a proviso 
to Ch . 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas 
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian law docs grant a measnre of confi~ 
denliality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust 
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colonly or under the provi~ 
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information 
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The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities UHtt ~. not 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The Umted 
States contends that this novel approach upsets the careful 
balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amendment deci-
sions of this Court. In the Government's view, such a sub-
sta.ntive extension of the supervisory power would enable fed-
eral courts to exercise a standardless discretion as to whether 
and when to apply the Fourth Amendment as this Court has 
construed it. We agree with the Government. 
We nevertheless a.greo..:u•itkl t 1e is nc ourt's commen a-
ble desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who arc unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos'3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." " 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [ba.nkl licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with excor1tiom;; and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depost.iors know 
that their own country requires them to report relationships with fo·reign 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103 .24. Sec gen-
erally California Bankers Assn. v. Sh-ultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59-03,71-76 (1974). 
This respondent alRo revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank, 
tho Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transaction that even-
tually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented 
his amount. 
5 "Tho Recurity of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officer~ must 11espect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alder-man v. United States, 394 U. S. 165 
175 (1969). We noted that the briefcase affair was t~~"liQlocli!e ongress 
in the course of an extensive investigation of the Service's intelligence 
opemtions. See Oversight Hearings into the Operations of the IRS be-
fore a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 
.t.· -t~A- '-c 
~ ~'h.;f;. vt-
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Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denunCia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(1928) (-Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional 
pronouncements of principle do not support the District 
Court's reliance upon the supervisory po·wer to free a defend-
ant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed.6 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
when a criminal d0fendant asserts a violation of his own 
rights. In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 
(1979) , we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by viola-
94th Cong., 1st Sr~s. (1976). AR n rrsnlt., tho Commissionrr of Internal 
Revrpue "cnlled off" Oprrntion Trnde Winds. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The 
Commissioner also adoptrcl gnidclinrs that require agents to instruct 
informantR on the reqnir<'mrnt r< of the law, :mel to rrport known ill<'a;ali-
ties. to approprinte f<tat<' nuthoriti0s: IRS Mnnnnl Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 
4 (Feb. 3, 1977). Although thrf<r mrmmreR apprar on thrir face to be 
less positive than one might <'Xprct from nn ag0ncy charged with upholding 
the law, thry do indirntc cli f<n pprovnl of tho prnrtirrs found to have been 
implemented in thi'R rase. Nor rnn W(' [lSSl!ffi(' thnt Rimilnr lawlc~R con-
duct, if brought, to the nttrntion of f<'f<ponr<iblr offirials, would not be 
dealt with appropriatrly. To rrqnirc in addition the snpprrsRion of 
highly prohat.ivc rviclence in a trial against a third party would penalize 
society unnecef<sn rily. 
1 
/ ~ / 
6 Federal conr1R have fll!d their suprrvisory powN' in ,·orne circum- V 
stanceR to excludr rvidrnce tnkrn from the defendant bv "willful di~obedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. UnilNl States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see 
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 210-217 (1!156); rf. !Iampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 
484, 405 (PowELL, J ., concurring in the jurlgmrnt) . This Court has never 
held, howrver , thn.t. the supcrvi1<ory powrr nuthorizrs supprrssion of evi-
dence obtain0d from third pnrticR in violntion of Comtitution, sta.t ute or 
rule. The rQJIJ:ts ll.:u~d li~o ~.iho fll'~til!es 8£ ltni" ~ 
Wlf9+'Seu:.J91'1t..a~~~ It'R!~Oli:'Iibil~~~ . il'ttBjPllt t9 applieeble r 
law, t8 -tH8 El<~trive flrMl~ l;fonit ~d StatPB " • RussllU, 411 IT ~. 426, 466~ 
L--f,H~+r-4~~~~· ~· 11ower merely prrmitR frcleral rourts to supervi. ·c 
"the admini. tra.tion of criminal just icr" among the parties before the bar. 
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,340 (1943). 
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tions of an executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. 
United States, s'upra, at 216, the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a 
federal court to suppress evidence without carefully balancing 
the same interests implicated by the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule. Nor does a change in legal theory alter the 
weight to be assigned the elements of the balance. The need 
to deter the underlying conduct and the cost of excluding the 
evidence are the same under the supervisory power as they are 
under the Fourth Amendment. And our Fourth Amendment 
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the societal 
interest in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclu-
sion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 
not victimized by the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra; Alderman v. United States, supra. )~ 
The District Court diiiiFQ~!H'aeEl ,stflese principles when it L 
concluded that "society's interest in deterring rbad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F. 
Supp., at 135. The District Court's reasoning, which the 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its 
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.7 
7 The same difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of t.he 
Due Proce~s Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was Ro outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "canons of decency and fairneRS," Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York , 324 U.S. 401, 407 
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IV 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 
'fhe judgmen,t of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita· 
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment uctivity in question violates some protected rigM of tJ1e defend-
ant," Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 484, 490 (1976) (plurality 
o inion . ne may ~a"' e 1 1 mp on p ura 1 y s v1ew 
protected intere t was involved in t.hat case. See id., at 491-495 (PowELL, 
J., concurring in the judgment). There can be no doubt,' however, that 
the search of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase did not intrude upon this 
respondent's rights in any way. Thus, the Due Process Clause adds little 
to our analysis. The queiition for decision is still whether a per,;on not 
victimized by an unlawful sea,rch is entitled to Ruppress its fruits. That 
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The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
j 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 197~ 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. '\Vith the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found/. 
1 18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or repvesentations, ... shall be fined 
not mom thon $10,000 " imp<llioood not m"' thon five Y'""' " both."/ 
, r .--s 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~ 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
·hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
suppress arid entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
. lenge these procedures. 
' .:-
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp., at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. Tho Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
I 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super· 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
·Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con· 
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend. 
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J. , concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion tha.t "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor 
SeJ!. o.iA.o -\iu-
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities oven when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the ~ 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutfh Amend-/" / 
ment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian ~ 
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of · .~---
United States v. Mille1', 425 U.S. 435 (1976) . 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person f:hall disclo::;e any information 
relating to .. . the affairs of . . . any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
's ftmctions under this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no 
authorit.y construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know 
that their own country requires them to report relation.-hips with foreign 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See gen-
erally California Banlce1's Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 , 59-63,71-76 (1974). 
'Fhi!l r9SfJQQQ9n~ aJo;g l'it"ialid lJ.iloJ.-~ -Ameticrrn mt~k, 
the Bank- ot-Pa:rrine, fn connection with th~ lmm tl'ansactign Ula,l; e¥en-
t'tmd:ly tttt"to- trts1m~ We conclude that respondent lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank record:; that documented 
1is account. 
I' 
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[No paragraph] At the outset, it is not clear that 
secret information regarding this respondent•s 
account played any role in the investigation that 
led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. See p. 3, supra. Even if the causal 
link were established, however, respondent•s claim 
lacks merit. He cites a provision, Ch. 96.9 of the 
Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is 
no longer in effect. Bank secrecy is now 
safeguarded by § 19 of the Banks Act, I Bah. Rev. 
Stat. ~, 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 
65, which provides in relevant part: 
'·•'· 
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their applicatiom 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Governm: JIC 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos•.3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 18.5 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).[Bw.ts the'i'e 'WlO~HiiptieRel 
p~u;g.g~Jtst!M-"''f pfinctrne- · · 
5 "Tho security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules esc, p l.lnacathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
1 5 (196_9). Wo not~ono- ~ invest igated ,(improprieties revealed 
in this record.at MIL m 197() Sec Overs1ght Hearings into the 
Operations of the IRS before a u committee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Trndewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Con g., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Ccmmi~sioner also adopted guidelines that re~ 
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual 
Supp. 9G-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977) . Although these mpasures appear 
on their face to be less positive than one might expect. from an agency 
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the prac~ 
ticcs found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
officials, would not be dealt. with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party 
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But our cases also show that these unexceptional 
principles do not command the exclusion of evidence 
in every case of illegality. Instead, they must be 
weighed against the considerable harm¢ that would 
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those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evidence even though the case against the defendant 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
But we arc not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment upon the public inter.-
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the e ·-
donee which exposes the truth." Alderman ~ited 
States, supra, at 174-175. ~ ~ 
. . ' ~~ --!122 fA~, %4) 
('M~~il@.. ","~488-4St[L' . 
t-----------~~.-- _ ~4k.s. ~ (/tt)_; 
.,.;;5 in1~r~sts.::::•:;:,:;:;;• :::::::i ~ <lg t't<t )'/), 
(' 
1 
at risk when a ('rimi11 Al <l<•f ndant invokes the supervisory 
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third 
party's constitutional rights. M18se~ 1he supervisor ower 
is applied with some caution even when a 8Fiminttl defendant 
6 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 2.06, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. IIarnpton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court. has never 
held, howover, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi-
dence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
rule. The upervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar. 
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A though exclusion is a necessary deterrent to unla.wful 
conduct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged .r:; !(ruA (~ " . 
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts /·1.d s~ ; tftf 
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth ( Uf\' ?>,-z3Bb~'\ft 
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138;} !i~~z cl'~ 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 1 'J 
1 
• 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489- 491 (1976); see Michigan ~ 
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974)..{t)ur cases recog- ~(!).Je.,.J~ 
L--+--n-:i-ze-.. that unbending application of the exclusionary sanction 1 J 
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede 
una:cceptably the truthfinding f.unctions of judge and jury.~~\) s~·v , 
A~ter all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands , ~pm, 
tnal. , 1 t~ ~ {) 
- ese-reasons the-€uart has not mterpreted t e exc u- M- '-\~5 ... ., ~ '->7 
sionary rule to mand " [every] thing hich deters illegal 
searches. . . . Alderman v. Uni})it States, supra, at 174. 
Our ab renee of illegality nei~er requires nor permits us 
to ude "illegally seized · clence in ..all 12roceedii · or 
ainst all ~ " United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
~8, 348 (1974)./Inst~ad, we have aclopted a balancmg ap-
proach that weigh§,rtf1e benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in a given · t'llation against its high societal cost. Ibid.; 
see United ates v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United 
States v. nis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. 
Powell supra, at 485-489; see also United States v. Peltier, 
422 . s. 531, 535- 539 (1975). 
hen a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth A~dment 
rights, the balance tips against application of th~~dusionary 
r. ~-
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
1 
To PN 'f 
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asserts a violation of his own rights.() In United States v. 
Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude 
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's 
rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216 
( 1960), the Court called for a restrained application of the 
1t. supervisory powe~ '·\ 11:1 
"[A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
-non :nde that "the~m:50lj"":power ·de · 
edcral co rt to suppress evidence in ted by an unla' ul searc 
- -+--L .. ithou carefully balancing the rune interests i licated b 
he F rth Amendment exclus· nary rule. Nor oes a chan e 
nth legal theory for exclus· n alter the weig to be assign d 
he elements of the balan . The need to eter the uncle - _a_-
. 1g conduct and the co of excluding t e evidence a~r/ t e-
ame under the super sory power as hey are mljer t e 
ourth Amendment. ur Fourth Am dment deci~ns ha 
stablished beyond ny doubt that e societal terest i 
eterring illegal s rches does not justify the exclusion o 
ainted evidence the instance a party w. o was not th 
victim of the c llenged practi s. Rakas . Illinois, supr , 
derman v. United States, supra. 
- -+--..;the District Court · 1 when it 
c ncluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F. 
Supp., at 135. 'l'he ~-Qn:tr~/..g Xreasonmg, which the 
l~ivtc:W.d Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of * ~ 
-1 
~ judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court ... ----:::; 
]} w~ 8 The wma dHlioulty attenru. '"pnndant'a ebim to the pmtaationa nf the {jJo fl] 
( e \ \ Due P""""' Clause nf the Fifth Amandmont. Tha Cnmt of Appeal. 
\ -huw- If 7-'t' ) 
No. 78-1729 Payner; INSERT No. 2 p. 9: 
We conclude that the supervisory power 
does not permit a federal court to suppress 
evidence tainted by an unlawful search without 
carefully balancing the benefits of exclusion 
against its high societal costs. And our Fourth 
Amendment decisions have established beyond any 
doubt that the interest in deterring illegal 
searches does not justify the exclusion of tainted 
evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 137; Alderman v. United States, 
supra, at 174-175.2/ The values assigned to the 
competing interests do not change because a court 
has elected to analyze the question under the 
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. 
In either case, the need to deter the underlying 
conduct and the detrimental impact of excluding the 
evidence remain precisely the same. 
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m 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. f.l..pitecl .State.s, supra. 17. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
e hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
~ 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of the defend-
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[April -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1. The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
Hme when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loa11 guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
118 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
' 'Whoever, in any matter within the juri:;diction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
.fictitious or fraudulent statement:; or representations, ... shall be fined 
Ilot mora th!t.n $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence 'introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew W olstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of n1lings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the Di:strict Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment 011 the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
grant-ed re:spondent'~:> motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismi:ssecl the government'~; appeal for want of juri~:>­
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
·uppre:ss and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated it-; 
suppre~:;.~ion order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge· these procedures. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and W olstencroft a.t dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation· 
shin betv,reen the Castle Bank and the Bauk of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlll wful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ." 
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Cla.use of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
pea,h; that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
iuve~;tigution untainted by the briefcase ~Search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouruged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
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ment's ''knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~ 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
!_Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffinned the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds tha.t an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
Un-ited States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171- 172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PoWELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolsteucroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Mil7er, 425 U. B. ,435 (1~76) , estab1i'$bed that a depositor.-
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
Ullited States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend-
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creatP~ an expectation of privacy not present in 
U11ited States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the out><rt, it. is not 
clmr that, srrrPt information regarding this respondent's account played 
any rol<> in the invP:.:tigation that, led to thr discovery of the critical loan 
gunrantee agreement. SeP p. 3, supra. Even if the rau~allin.k werp cstab-
li:;ht>d, howrwr, re~pondent's claim lacks merit. He citPfi a provi;;ion, 
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909) , that is no 
longer in rffPrt.. Bank sPcrrcy is now safegua.rded by § 19 of the Banks 
Ar.t, I Bah . Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65, 
which providr,.; in relPvant part: 
"Ex<·ept, for the purpose of tlie performance of his duties or the exercise 
of hi:; function,; under this Art or when lawfullr required to do so by any 
court, of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of uuy law of the Colony, no pel'l:ion :.:hall disclo~e :my information 
rPlating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
whirh he has acquired in the performance of hi:s duties or the exercise of 
his funcLion:; under this Act." 
Sn nlll6 tht , Dilnks 11t1d 'Pr uilt G6HlflHHi@l• ~or111l~~ieN A6r, 1Q8 ;l,ial~, Acts 
Seo al:;o the Bunks and Trust Compani<:'s Regulation Act, 1965 Bah . Act No, &'-1-) 
1071 Bah. Arts No. 15. The :.:tatutr i:; hardly a blanket guarantee of 
prinlry . Its application is limited; it il:! hedged with exceptions: and we 
have b<·<.'n dirpcted t.o no authority construing itR terms. ~forcover, 
Am<:'rican dPpositors know that their own country require:; them to report 
r<'lation~hipR with foreign financial inRtitutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 
CFTt § 10:3.24. Sf'e gPnerally California Bankers Assn. v Shultz, 416 
F . S. 21, 59--fl.1, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a 
rpa::;onablf' <:'Xj)<.'Ctation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that docu-
mented hi:; account. 
q .. .21 ) ~q373.3{3)) 
~373.f (,z{z7Jn , 
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men t decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such 
' an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can vnderstand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become 'defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutionaJ an·d possibly criminal behavior 
of thos•.:J who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of ~illfully lawless activitieB underta:ken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. (J., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
5 "The t*'Curity of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcemE-nt officer~ must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rulE>.-; escape unscathE-d." Alderrnan v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prietiPS revealed in this rPcord. See Ovpr~ight Hearings into the Op-
eratiou;; of tlw IHS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Nnrcotics Traffickers TaxProgram), 94th Cong., lst -Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopbed guidelines that re-
quire agent~> to instruct infonmmts on the requirements of the law and to 
r<,port known illegalities to [appropriate state authorities. IRS Mmnwl 
Snp1~ 9Q m, §§ 3 Ol 4. (Ji'e'B. a, 19'?71. Although these memmres appear· 
on their face to be le~s positive than one might expect from an agency 
charged with upholding t11e law, they do indicate disapprovaJ of the prac-
tices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot a.!Ssume 
that similar lawle:;s conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
officials, would not be deaJt with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppressioq of highly probative evidence in a trial against a -third pa:rty.· 
would penalize ::;ociety unuece:ssarily. 
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that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that wou1d 
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
Although exclusion ..i8.('a11ecessary deterrent to unlawful 
couuuct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged 
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts 
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccolin.i, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 
StoneY. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan 
v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433. 450-451 ( 1974); Kaufman v. United 
States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) ] 
Our cases have consistently recognized that unbending appli-
cation of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of 
governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-
finding functions of judge and jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 
348 (1974). After all, it is the defendant, and not the con-
stable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal 
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence 
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.0 
8 .Federal courts may use their supervi~ory power in ~ome circum-
:,;Lances to exclude evidence t<lken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence' of law." McNabb v. United States, ;ns U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, that the supervisory power Huthorizes supprrl'tlion of evi-
deme obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, shLtute or 
rule. The supervi<>ory power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
" the admini:;tra.tion of criminal ju~tice" among the parties before the 'bar. 
McNabb v. United States, supra, ~t 340. 
78-1729-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER 
In Unite,d States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-75·7 (1979), 
we refused to exclude a.ll evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
" [A] ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evide11ce in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216~!Jf 
Sec also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939) . 
I' 
'\Vc conclude that the supervisory power do<'R not ]Wrn:it a 
f<'d<'ral court to suppress evidence fainkd h.r l:tili l!l:Hlawfwl 
liii'MI'iolh · 1tlhett~ elnBhilly 8al&FIIIiF~!!j tR.e 8ettefit.a ef -exci"trsiun 
~tits high societal eest~ i\n~.gur Fourth Amendment 
decisions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 
at 137; Aldennan v. United States, supra, at 174-175.7 Tl.,..h...,e __ /~ 
values assigned to the( competing interests do not change {._; 
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case. the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
cisely the same. 
1 "The deterrent. vainer: of preventing the incrimination of tlwRe whose 
rights 1 he pol ire havr violntf'd have been ronsiderrcl Rnffirient to ju ~tify 
ihe supprrs~ion of proba.tivr f'Yidencr rwn though the ea~r agaim;t t.hc 
(]pfrndant. i:; weakrnrd or de~troyrd. We adhrrr to that judgment. Hut 
wr arr noi. convincrd that. the additional benefits of extending thr Pxelu-
Rionar·~ · rulP 1.o other clrfendan1s would ju;;tify further rner·oarhmrnL upon 
thf' public interest, in pro;:rcuting those accused of crimP a.ncl having thrm 
acquitted or convicted on thr basis of all the rviderrcf' which cxpo~r:; the 
truth.'' Alrlernum v. United States, supm, at 174-175. Src al~o Stone 
78-1729-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PA YNER 
Thus, the District Court erred when it concluded that "so-
ciety's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
out-weigh'[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de-
cisions of this Court.8 Were we to accept this use of the 
supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
v. l'utrell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 
U S. 3BS, 348 (1974). 
8 The ;;a me difficul1 y attends re-spondent's cbim to the protections of the 
Duo Proce!'s Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful brief~1-~e sen.rch was o;o outrageous as to offend 
f11nchun<•ntnl "'canons of decency and fairness,' " Rochin v. Califomia, 342 
l l S l65, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J .), the fact remains that " [t]he limita-
tions of the Du~ Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
l'nun<'nt. activity in question viohttes some protected right of t.he defend-
nut/' Hampton v, United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) . 
,. 
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The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976, 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found , however, that the Government discov-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 ( 1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investi~~:a­
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devi:::ed a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially fruled to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, tho District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge these procedures. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
shin between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The Dil'trict Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlAwful sei:wre of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp., at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. !d. , at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
3 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
,, 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134--135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super" 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con" 
stitutional rights. /d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Ralcas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De" 
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp. , at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor 
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has no expectation of privacy a.nd thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should me its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutrh Amend-
ment decisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). Respondent cites a proviso 
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of the Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas 
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, Bahamian hw does grant a measure of confi-
dentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Trust 
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know 
that their own country requires them to report relationships with foreign 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See gen-
erally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,59-63,71-76 (HY74). 
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank, 
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan transaction that even-
tually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented 
his account. 
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their applicatiol'l 
of the exclusior\ary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
A 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the · unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional 
pronouncements of principle do not support the District 
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defend-
5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers rp.ust re~'<pect. Nor should those who flout 
the niles escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969). We note that Congress investigated improprieties revealed 
in this record at some length in 1976. See Oversight Hearings into the 
Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that re-
quire agPnts to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual 
Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977). Although these measures appear 
on their face to be less positive than one might expect from an agency 
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the prac-
tices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party 
would penalize society unnecessarily. 
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ant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed. n-
f!jci, the princ'p ne er have b~n t~~"Cl'5Tn~ 
l~~~u:~c~1~~i~~a~~' ~~~:.idor~t to th~~tion 
Although exclusion is . a necessary deterrent to unlawful 
conduct in appropriate cases, the Court has acknowledged 
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts 
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan 
1 \ v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 ( 1974)1) 0ur cases~-
-~ J-~n"!":Ize:}that unbending application of the ex~lusionary sanctiOn 
to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede 
unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge and jury. 
After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands 
trial. 
Eor tl)P'a@ r9&s9na,...the Court h&.a.llOt.int.eJ:preted the IP¥CJu-
sionaqr rwle ~ eaffirnand "[e~~:yj4ihittg ~deters lllegttl-
S4tarches ... . ).) Alderman ~~W States, S'U'pro, -1t lU ... 
Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor permits us 
to exclude "illegally seized evidence in aU proceedings or 
against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 
338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a balancing ap-
proach that weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in a given situation against its high societal cost. Ibid.; 
see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United 
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. 
Powell, supra, at 485-489t'> SQ@ alsB bll%itB8! ~tfl!t88 V: }&BUiBf", 
~22 u.s. 5Bl, 586 e611 (1Q'>i81. 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
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those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evidence even though the case against the defendant 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment upon the public inter-
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and having 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
dence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United 
States, supra, at 174-175. 
The Court has repeatedly affirmed its considered judgment 
that the eosts of the exclusionary rule do not permit expansion 
of the class of persons who may invoke it. E. g., Rakas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, supra, at 488- 489; 
· United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. 
III 
- B -t~ . . 
Th!-societal interests tll,~Qt9~9a 'b0c indi~c:;r;iminrte appllmr-
MeB OX tb~ ~m:.~lR@.:R.dJ;oegt.ewhu;i.QR<aP"""'~ are 8CfUal 
at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory 
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third 
party's constitutional rights. Indeed, the supervisory power 
is applied with some caution even when a criminal defendant 
° Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); R ea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in tho judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi-
dence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar. 
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340. 
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asserts a violation of his own rights.0 In United States v. 
Caceres, 440 U.S. 741, 754-;-757 (1979), we refused to exclude 
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's' 
rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216 
( 1960), the. Court called for a restrained application of the 
supervisory power: 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. / 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (193~9:J· ~(?ht., ,J. 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a cJ.MA j 
federal court to suppress evidence tainted hY an unlawful search .t!JI. . 
5
,... 1 ~ 
without carefully balancing th~ne iniiete~t~ implicated by ~ ~-aJ_ 
t:.}:}e FottPtH: h);l.iAQm8At QX9lw.si9~ rnle ;wor QQ8S a eH:ttHge ~k ~ · 
it? iRe legal t:heeFy £or exclm:io~t !MteF'the weight to be assigned a,as.f-S. ~ e;f 
the elements of the balance. The need to deter .the under- __)./ ~ 
lying conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are the 
same under the supervisory power as they are un.der the 
Fourth Amendment. /'Jur Fourth Amendment decisions have 
established beyond any doubt that the ~Miettri interest in 
deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra,· 
Alderman v. United States, supra. ~ 
iW.t-.¥'he District Court · l 
concluded that "society's interest in 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] society's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of {act with all relevant evidence." 434 F. 
Supp., at 135. J'hbS 4:listPiet; €8wr~asoning, which the .IJ •. 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of._ ~ ~") 
~judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.7 
7 The srune difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
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III 
Understandably shocked by the conduct of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
We hold that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "'cnnons of decency and fairness,' " Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protecLed right of the defend-
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the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976, 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001,1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S.C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or repl'esentations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
-
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner. 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 ( 1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The proj ect, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focu:-ed on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its dPpoRitors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discowred that the 
b:mker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devi.:oed a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a bypro<inct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the Distri ct Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent 's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vaca ted the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent docs not chal-
lenge these procedures. 
. ·' 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents tflken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was reD]aced. The documents photographed that 
evening includPd papers evidencing a close working relation-
shiD between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine nltimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The Di~trict Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlAwful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
8 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investiga,tion untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point . 
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ment's ''knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~ 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
'[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
·Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. /d., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 140- 152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor 
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contra.ry conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Foutrh Amend-
ment decisions of this Courf In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
. 4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of baJJk secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). Respondent cites a proviso 
to Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909'). Although 
that proviso was repealed by § 5 of t.he Banks Amendment Act, Bahamas 
Acts 1965 No. 65, at 281, BahamiaJJ. law does grant a measure of confi-
dentiality to banking transactions. Section 10 of the Banks and Tmst 
Companies Regulation Act, Bahamas Acts 1965 No. 64, at 275-276, 
provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by aJJY 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose aJJY information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... aJJY customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his ftmctions under this Act." 
The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of privacy. Its application is 
limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we have been directed to no 
authority construing its terms. Moreover, American depositors know 
that their own country requires them to report relationships with foreign 
financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 CFR § 103.24. See gen-
erally California Bankers Assn. v. Slntltz, 416 U.S. 21, 59'-63, 71-76 (1974). 
This respondent also revealed his Bahamian account to an American bank, 
the Bank of Perrine, in connection with the loan tran&'Lction that even-
tually led to his undoing. We conclude that respondent lacked a reason-
able expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that documented 
his account. 
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courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
A 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos•.3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States , 277 U.S. 438, 485 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But these unexceptional 
pronouncements of principle do not support the District 
Court's reliance upon the supervisory power to free a defend-
5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers must t'espect. Nor should tho ·e who flout 
the rules esca e unscathed." Alderman v. United States 394 U. S. 165, ~U . 
1 9). We note t 1a Con,.ress investigated improprieties revealed fv...t; 
in 1s recor , · ~ Sec Overs1ght Hearinp;s into the 
Operations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project H::wen, and 
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt•ed guidelines that re-
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illegalities to appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual 
Supp. 90-40, §§ 3.03, 4 (Feb. 3, 1977). Although these measures appear 
on their face to be less po~itive than one might expect from an agency 
charged with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the prac-
tices found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party 
would penalize society unnecessarily. 
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ant whose own constitutional rights were not infringed./fu-
~ · the full range of considerations relevant to the application 
1 
deed, the principles never have been thought to encompass 
of an exclusionary rule) 
Although exclusion is a necessary deterrent to unlawful 
conduct in appropriate -cases, the Court has acknowledged 
that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts 
a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); 
- 1tone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan 
~ t4<~~ . 'l'ucker, 417 U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974). Our cases)'ecog-r ize that unbending application of the exclusionary sa1ction r to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would impede 
-~ unacceptably the truthfinding functions of judge anEtd jury. 
After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands 
trial. (DIIJ). tk 
'--) r For these reasons, the Court has not interpreted the ~~ 
l siouarr plf:>. to command "[every]thing which deters illegal searches .... " Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. Our abhorrence of illegality neither requires nor permits us to exclude "illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or -r) against all persons." United States v. Calandra, 414 u. s. 
338, 348 (1974). Instead, we have adopted a balancing ap-
proach that weighs the benefits of applying the exclusionary 
rule in a given situation against its high societal cost. Ibid.; 
see United States v. Ceccolini, supra, at 275-279; United 
States v. Janis, 428 U. S. 433, 454, 457-460 (1976); Stone v. 
Powell, supra, at 485-489; see also United States v. Peltier, 
422 U.S. 531, 535- 539 (1975). 
When a criminal defendant asks a court to suppress evidence 
obtained in violation of a third party's Fourth Amendment 
rights, the balance tips against application of the exclusionary 
rule. 
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of 
) 
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those whose rights the police have violated have been 
considered sufficient to justify the suppression of proba-
tive evidence even though the case against the defendant 
is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. 
But we are not convinced that the additional benefits 
of extending the exclusionary rule to other defendants 
would justify further encroachment upon the public inter-
est in prosecuting those accused of crime and ha.ving 
them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
dence which exposes the truth." Alderman v. United 
States, supra, at 174-175. 
~ {;EHoJ:Ft h88 PQp02 todliF offirmod i+s- considered judgment 
that t)1e costs of the exclusionary rule 99 JU* ponnit Pxpansion 
of the class of persons who may invoke it. /!!. (}71(akas v. 
Illinois, supra, at 137; cf. Stone v. Powell, sftpra, at 488-489; 
I 
United States v. Calandra, supra, at 348. " · 
' c:~ ----6 
B 
The societal interests threatened by indiscriminate applica-
tion of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule are equally 
at risk when a criminal defendant invokes the supervisory 
power to suppress evidence seized in violation of a third 
party's constitutional rights. Indeed, the supervisory power 
is applied with some caution even when a criminal defendant 
6 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the drfendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States. 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); R ea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; rf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, tha,t, the supervisory power authorizes suppression of evi-
dence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
rule. The supervisory power merdy permits federal courts to supervise 
"the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar. 
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340. 
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asserts a violation of his own rights.6 In United . States v. 
Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), we refused to exclude 
all evidence tainted by violations of an executive department's 
·rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 216 
(1960), the Court called for a restrained application of the 
A. supervisory power&) 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not permit a 
federal court to suppress evidence tainted by an unlawful search 
without carefully balancing the same interests implieated by 
the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule. · Nor does a change 
' in .the legal theory for exclusion alter the weight to be assigned 
the elements of the balance. The need to deter the under-
lying conduct and the cost of excluding the evidence are the 
same under the supervisory power as they are under the ~ 
Fourth Amendment. ~~ndmeni5 decisions have ~ ~ 
established beyond any doubt that the sociJ al interest in , 
deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challei•ged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra; 
Alderman v. United States, supra. 
The District Court m-isappli,ed-t.h~ pdnmples when it 
concluded that "society's interest in deterring [bad faith] 
conduct by exclusion outweigh [s] soci~ty's interest in fur-
nishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence." 434 F. _ a J.S 
Supp., at 135. The· Dis~Gourtls reasoning, which the J i' 
Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a substitution of its 
own judgment for the controlling decisions of this Court.7 
7 The same difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
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III ____ 
Understandably ~·t of a federal officer, 
the courts below sought to fashion a remedy that our decisions 
do not authorize: "to exclude relevant and probative evidence 
because it was seized from another in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174. 
Were we to accept this use of the supervisory power, we would 
confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the 
considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
~~old that the supervisory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment ;tihe onrt or Appeals IS 
Reversed. 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental" 'canoll s of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of t.he defend-
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § lOOP The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found----------
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the juri~diction of any department or 
agency of the United States .knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
.fictitious or fraudulent statoments or representations, .. . shall be fined ~ 
not mora than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both;" ~ 
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respondent guilty as cha.rged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov.-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence 'introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised· a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the Di~tri ct Court. The court init ially failed to 
enter judgme11t on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismi::;sed the govrrnment's appeal for want of juris-
diction , the Di::;trict Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
uppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppreiii>ion order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not clw-
lenge· these procedure , 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation· 
shio between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unl11wful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp, at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. /d., at 123 8 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
s The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
pe!lls that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
~rary findings on either point. 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super~ 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
I Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con~ 
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. Un·ited States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolsteucroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U. B. 435 (lll76) , establi>hed that a depooi~ 
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l1as no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. !d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
Uuited States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend~ 
4 We are not. persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creatP::J an expectation of privacy not. present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) . At. the outsPt, it is not 
cll'ar that. o:rcrPt information regarding thi~ respondent 's account played 
any role in the inve:;tigation that. led to the discovery of the critical loan 
gunrantee agreement. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the causal link were estab-
li:::lwd, howrvrr, respondent's claim lacks merit.. He cites a provi~ion, 
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909) , that is no 
longer in effect.. Bank secrpcy is now snfeguarded by § 19 of the Banks 
Art, I Bah. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65, 
which provid~ in relevant. part: 
"Ex<·ept for the purpose of t.l\c performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when la.wfull~· required to do so by any 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of uny law of the Colony, no person ;;hall disclose any information 
relating to . . . the affairs of . . . any customer of a [b;mk] licensee 
whirh he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functionH under this Act." 
Bce nlde tltc Q::PJlcs and TttiSI 5GIII]Jttnie~ "'Ro~ulttthan 4 et; 72§ B J. An 3 
Sen also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah . Acts 
1971 Bah. Acts No. 15. The ~tatute i;; hardly a blanket guarantee of 
privacy . Its application is limited ; it is hedged with exception~ ; n.nd we 
luwe been directed t.o no authority construing its term». Moreover, 
American depositors know that their own country requires them lo report 
rrlation:ships with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121 ; 31 
CFH. § 108.2-1. See generally California Banke1·s Assn. v. Shultz, 416 
U. S . 21, 59-6:3, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent. lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in t.he Castle Bank records that docu~ 
mentcd his a.ccount. 
No. c.....f > ~ 10 , 
IU~~J, l%& 
f.... Ad~ No ?3 > 
\~bl ~ A { 
q-:2 1) ~~1313. '5{3)) 
q373.t.J c1)Qc.. 
~ll \c117) . 
78-1729-0PINION 
c UNITED STATES u. PAYNER 
men t clecisions of this Court. In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can \}nderstand the District Court's commend~ 
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become 'defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutionaJ a1id possibly criminal behavior 
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of '~illfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, ~ 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485_....,--
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
s ''The i::i('Curity of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which bw enforcement officers must respect . Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderr/ULn v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969). We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prirties rPv(•aled in this record. 'See Ovrrsight Hearings into the Op-
erations of the IHS before a Subcommitter of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Nnrcotic,; Traffickers TaxProgram), 94th Con g., 1st·5ess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called dff' Operation Tra;de Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopted guidelines that re-
uire agentli to instruct informants on the .!..equirements of the law and to_ lo.._, s.u ~JQ.Av i~ J.ftcV> 
re >ort known illegalitie~ to ~appropl'late state authorities. IRS Manual f , , L..... ) 
Snpp. 90 i9, §§ 3.93, 4 (Fee. 3, 1977). Although these measures appear· la.)Wl I\ 1 t'\ T~ll(\ 
on their face to be le:ss positive than one might expect from an agency ~c..te.d +o W\o41N 
charged with uiJ1JOlding tlle law, they do indicate uisapproval of the prac- . J 
ticPs found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume 
t at similar lawle:ss conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
official!:!, would not be dealt with nppropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a t:hi:rd party.· 
would prnalize :society unuece:ssarily. 
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that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of i1legality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
~ TW!A ~ ~~ow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
. ) tt <# Although- e~shu;ion is a J~essa~e-tefli'BH1; oo ~fu 
~j JUJ ggutJ"t~e1; tR lilpJ:u:a}lriate. ·caseQ tpe Court has acknowledged 
~ ~('1(.; that the suppression of probative but tainted evidence exacts 
\:hn~ <1J\Jl.AA.. w\1\UU. a costly toll upon the ability of courts to ascertain the truth 
·b; in a criminal case. E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; 
1 • United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 ( 1978); /( 1/ 
o-tyc...--hves o.IU- Stone v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan/ 0 
1\\oS r .JJ ... £.£tct01A.Sl"( v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 450-451 ( 1974) aufrnan v. nt e 
b~ · - 1-\\\)~) V ·-k.JJ tates, 394 U.S. 217. 237-238 (1969) ack, J., disseuting)_; 
~lV'ft..Q. • ~ Our cases ave consistently recognized that unbending apph-
5\al~~ \1. (~rA)! cation of the exclusionary sanction .to enforce ideals of 
t.\ t.\ 1;\ .S 33 ~ governmental rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-
\ ' ;, "'- > finding functions of judge and jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, 
.9+~ (I ttif )· supra, at 485-489; United States v. Calandra, 414 IT S ~~g, r-..s~r·~. 1 CA...t-




(t.W.( 5-tA.~ )/ 
3?- u. t~~.l. £R,v, 
(dpt; ) 7~-74b, 
7'55-7~ (tq1D;, 
stable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a crimiual 
defell(laut i11vokcs tlw supervisory power to suppr<>Rs evidence ~· 
seized iu violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
\\hen the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.~/ 
> l Federal courts may u~e their supervi::mry power in some circum-
:,;tances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
enre' of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see 
Elkins v. United States. 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, .f., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never --------
held, however, tha,t the sup<>rvi1<ory power authorizel:l :::;upJH'PK1<ion of evi-~ 
dem·e · obt<tim•d from 1 hird Intrlie~ in violation of Con::<tit.utiou, statute or 
rule . The supervi:::;ory power merely permits federal courts to l:lUpervise 
" lhe admini:::;tration of criminal ju;,;tice" among the partie::; before the bar. 
McNabb v. Unit~,;d States, supra, 11-t 3'!0. 
-' 
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), 
we refused to exclude aU evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
" [A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." .364 U. S .. at 216. 
Sec also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
'Ve conclude that the supervisory power does not }3eFfl:ut It 
:ffideFQl court te sYppress eviElenee t!Wn~l by an unlawful 
se~lt \\tthoni; ~rg--tfie.-heA.efits-of xelusiOll" 
againstrii;s :RigA ~oei~M ee~ ~ _9ur Fourth Amendment 
t:cc~ions have established beyond anyc doubt that the interest 
1 terring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was 110t the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175.•Y The 
values assigned to the competing interests do not change 
b'ecause a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
cisely the same. 
I 
$.The de-terrent v::<lue::: of preventing tho incrimination of those whose 
rightR the police have violated hnvc been considered suffi ciC:'nt to jw:illfy 
the iiUpJlression of probative evidener even though the ca~c agah1Ht tJ1e 
clrfendrmt is wenkPnccl or de:-;troyrd . We aclhC'rC:' to thai judgmE-nt. But 
wr fli'P noi. convinrf•d that the additional benefit::< of extending thr rxclu-
Rionm·~· rule t.o othrr defendants would ju,;tjfy fmther encroachment upon 
tlw public interest in pro:-;ecuting tho::<r nccused of crimP :mel lmving them 
acquitted or convicted on the ba~i s of all tho evidence wh1C'h rxpo~e::< the 
truth." Alderman v. United States, sup.ra, at li4-175. Sec ul::;o Stone 
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~ .t,.he District Court erred when it concluded that "so-
y's 11Pfurest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
weigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
WJ t 1 all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of individy9-l judgment for the controlling de-
cisions of this Court.•.1'were we to accept this use of the 
supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
v. Pwell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 
_ tJ. s. 3a~. 348 (1974). 
:!/ .. The l:mme difficulty attends respondent's claim to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appe~tls 
expres:;ly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
·,;ume that the unlawful briefcase search was ~;o outrageous as to offend 
fundaml'ntul "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U. S !65, 169 (1952), quoting Malimki v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J .), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tio!lls of the Due Proces,.; Clause ... come into play only when the Goy-
ernment. activity in que~:>·tion violates some protected right of the defend-
rwt," Hampton v, United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion). 
'l'o: 'l'ne Chief Jus"tic"' 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 78-1729 
United States, Petitioner, I On ·writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Appeals 
Jack Payner. for the Sixth Circuit. 
[April -, 1980] 
Mn. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in a11y matter within tho jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully . . , makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or impri ·oned not more than five years, or both." 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all theevidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~ 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds/' 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker ha.d an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle· 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
1 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the meritl:>. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to ;;uppre::;s. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction , the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
uppre::ls and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppre;;sion order and set aside the verdict Respondent doe;; not chaJ-
len~e these {lrocedtt,res. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlBwful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge· 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
8 The United States argued in the District Court ltnd the Court of Ap-
peals that the bruarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase ~;earch. The Government also 
denied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." !d., at 129; se6 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super .. 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979) 
(per cur-iarn). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U. S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude· 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Sirnrnons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra., at 143; id., at 149- 152 (PowELL, J. , concurring); Cornbs· 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968) . 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
¥ ilier, 425 U. S. 435 ( 1976) , established that a depositor· 
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. 'rhe 
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend-
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
Uui.ted States v. Miller. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the out.~rt, it is not 
clear that secrf't information regarding this respondent's account played 
any rolr in thP im·f'stigation that led to the discovery of the critical loan 
guarantee agrf'f'ment. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the ca,u~allink werr rstab-
lished, however, respondent's claim lacks merit. He cites a provi::;ion, 
Ch. 96.9 of the St atutc Law of the Bahama Islands ( 1909), that is no 
longer in effect.. Bank secrecy is now safrguarded by § 19 of thr Bm1ks 
Act, I Bah. Hrv. Stat. ch. 96 ( 1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65, 
which providr:-: in relevant. part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performa11cr of his duties or the exercise 
of his functionH under thi:o Art or whrn lnwfull~' required to do so by any 
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of m1y law of the Colony, no person shall di::;close any information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of hi::; duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
~re also the Banks and Trust Companies Rrgulation Act, 1965 Bah. Acts 
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. ActR No. 20, 
1971 Bah .. Act;; No. 15. The statute is hardly a bl~tnket guarantee of 
privacy. Its a.pplication is limited; it is hedged with excepbon~; and we 
have been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover, 
Americm1 depo::;itor~ know that their own country requires them to report 
relat.ion::;hips with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S . C. § 1121; 31 
CFR § 103.24. Sre generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 
U. S . 21, 59-63 , 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a 
rea:;onable expectation of privu,cy in tho Castle Bank records Lhat docu-
mrntL-'Cl his account. 
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ment decisions of this Court. ' In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos•3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
6 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prieties revealed in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Op-
erations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Trafficker:; Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Se:;s. As a. result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that re-
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report. known illegalities to a supervi:;ory officer, who is in turn directed 1 
lo notify appropriate state authorities. IHS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3 
(3), 9373.4- (Dec. 27, 1977) . Although these measures appear on tlwir 
!ace to be les::> pos1tivP than one might expect from an agency charged 
with upholding the law, thPy do indicate disapproval of the practice:> 
found to have beE'n implemented in this cal:ie. We cannot a::;sumt' 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to t.he attention of responsible 
t>fficials, would not be dealt with a,ppropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party· 
wonld penalize ~:~ocicty unttece::;sarily. 
78-1729-0PINION 
UNITED STATES v. PAYNER 7 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously 
l!erved." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression 
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon 
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. 
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and 
jury. E. g. , Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States 
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and 
not the constable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal 
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence 
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7 
8 See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 2:37-238 (1969) \ 
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure, 87 F . Chi. L. Rev . 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970). 
7 Federal court::; may u:;e their ·upervi::<ory power in ·orne circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant b~r "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 31R U. S. 332, 345 (1943) ; see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960) ; Bea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELl,, .J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
held, however, that the supervisory power authorize:; ::mppre:;sion of evi-
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979), 
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power, 
"[A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize I 
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third 
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment deci-
sions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
taintPd evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Ill-inois, supra, 
at 137; A lderrnan v. United States, supra, at 174-175.8 The 
values assigned to the competing interests do not change 
dence obtaint>d from third parties in violation of Constitution, sta.tute or 
rule. The supen~KOry power mer-ely permits fE>deral courts to supervise 
"the ndministmtion of criminal .in~tice" among the partie:> before the bar. 
JfcNabb v. United States. supra.. nt 340. 
8 "The cletcrrrnt. values of preventing t.hr incriminntion of 1ho;;e whose 
right~ tlw policr ha.vr violatrcl have been considered ~ufficirnt t.o ju"tify 
the suppresHion of probn tivr evidence even though the ca.,e againot llJC 
defendant. is WE>akened or dc:-itroyNl. Wf.' nclhcre to that judgment. But 
we nro not. convincf.'cl that the addilionnl bt'tJCfib of extending the <'xclu-
sionary rule l.o other defeJldants would jnstif~r l'urther enrroachmf.'nt upon 
thP pnblic in terr. ·t in pro,;ecuting those accused ol' crime and having them 
acquitted or ronvictf.'d on the basis of nll the eviclenc<' whieh cxpOiSP. " tho 
truth ." Alde1·man v. United States. supra. at ]74-175. See al::;o Stone 
v. Powell, 42R U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United Sta.tes v. Calandra, 414 
u.s. '33 '34 (1974), 
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
ilUpervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
eisely the same. 
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that 
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
outweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de-
£isions of this Court.l) Were we to acceptt his use of the 
supervisory power, we would ·confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
9 ThP ~-;mne difficulty nttmds respondent's claim to the protect ions of the 
:Vue Proces:; Claui'if' of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to consider the Due Proce;,.":! Clause. But ev('ll if we 
as:;ume that the unlawful bnrfctt.~e search was ~;o outrageous a:; to offend 
inndlunental "'canon:; of decency and fairness,'" Bochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, Hi9 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurtt>r, J .), the fact remains that "[L]he limita-
tion:; of the Due Proce:;:; Clau:se ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment a.ctiviLy in quest1on violates some protected right of the defend-
ant," Ilampton . United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion). 
'l'u: T.hu Chief Justi ce 
Mr. Jul'!tic& Brennan 
l.lr. iustioe Stewart 
Mr . .Just log W'b1te 
0?Y Mi:· . .Ju~ r, loe t~.arshall Mr. JuntiiJe Bls.okmun Mr. Ju•; .:: icc R1hnquiet 
Mr. Juo' · ., .., Stevens 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funtls in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant, part: 
"Whoever, in ~tny matter within the jnrisdic1ion of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
:fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
' . 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov~ 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds,'' 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle· 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
1 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merit<!. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent'rs motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court. vacated the order grunting the motion to 
suppresrs and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinrstated its 
"Uppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent doel:l not cl1al-
lenge tbese \)rocedq_res •. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank and the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase .... " 
434 F. Supp ., at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132- 133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. !d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
s The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
inve~:>t igation untainted by the briefcase ~:.-earch . The Govemment also 
dPnied that its agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
• I 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super ... 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U. S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Ralcas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude· 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own c -
stitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 ( 1973) ; A' derman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the· 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra., at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 ( 1968) . 
'l'he foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
l'ecognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 425 U, S. 435 (1976), established that a depositor· 
~ikd s~ --v. ~1AcU-') 
~0 1q -2-4 4 
l~-,t~~o) 
(cii!( op./ od 2-~, 
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities even when they 
do not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The 
United States contends that this novel approach upsets the 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Fourth Amend-
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy create;; an cxJwctn.tion of priva<·y not present in 
United States v. Mille1·. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the outRct, it is not 
clear that sec rPt information regarding this respondent's account played 
any role in thr invrstigation tlmt led to the diRcovery of the critjcal loan 
guarante<> agrP<>m<>nt. Seep. 3, supra. Even if the causal link were estab-
li;;hed, howewr, respondent'i> claim lacks merit.. He cites a provision, 
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is no 
longer in effect.. Bank secrecy is now safrgnarded by § 19 of the Banks 
Act, I Bah. Hov. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Ball. Acts No. 65, 
which providPH in relevant. part: 
"Except for the purpo::;e of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functiom; under this Art or when lawfully required to do so by any 
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person r:hall di::;close any information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functjons nnder this Act." 
~ro also the Banks and Trust Companie.s Regulat.ion Act, 1965 Bah. Acts 
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah . Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Act;; No. 20, 
1971 Bah . A<'ts No. 15. The statute is hardly a blanket. gua.rnntee of 
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hed~ed with excepUon;;; ami we 
h::tw b<>en din,cted t.o no authority construing its terms. Moreover, 
AmericUJJ depo;;itor::; know that their own country rf'quir<>s them to report. 
relat.ionship;; with foreign finnncial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121 ; 31 
CFR § 103.24. See generally Califumia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 
U. S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent. lacked a 
reawnable rxprrt::ttion of privacy in the Castle Bank records that docu· 
mentcd his <Lecount. 
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ment decisions of this Court. ' In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos•3 who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 ( 1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 485 
6 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prieties revealed in this record. See Oversight. Hearings into the Op-
erations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that re-
quire agents to in~:~truct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illl'glllities to a supervi~:;ory officer, who is in turn directed I 
to notify appropriate state authoritie~. IH.S Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3 
(3), 937;U (DN·. 27, 1977) . Although these mea~:;ure~:~ appear on their 
face to be less pmntive than one might expect from a11 agency charged 
with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the practice:; 
found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot a>iSume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of re::;pon::;ible 
vfficiahl, would not be dealt. with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party· 
would penalize ::;ociety mrnece::;sarily. 
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously 
served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression 
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a ·costly toll upon 
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. 
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 ( 1976); see Michigan V. rrucker, 417 
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and 
jury. .E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485--489; United States 
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and 
uot the constable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal 
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence 
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7 
n See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 2:37-238 (1969) I 
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclu~ionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure, 37 TT. Chi . L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970). 
7 Federal courts may u,;e their supervi;;ory power i11 some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (19(i0) ; Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956) ; cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, .J ., concurring in t.he judgment) . This Court ha::; never 
held, however, that the :oupervisory power authorizel:i ;,upprel:il:iion of evi-
~I 
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-7S7 (1979), 
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
f'[A lny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only U!)On 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele~ 
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize I 
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third 
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment deci-
sions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
ln deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
taintPcl evidence at the instance of a part who was not 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 
at 137C)./~X)ifJQfitJ•de? Vi lfi5LJ;fW~'ep•;tt::J ;Mi'n liJN.s The 
values assigned to the competing interests do not change 
dence obtained from third parties in viohtt.ion of Con. titution, sta.tute or 
rule. The superviso ry power mei'rly permits fPderal courts to supervise 
"Lhe administration of criminal jn~ticP" among the parties before the bar. 
JfrNabb 1' . United States. supm.. at 340. 
"The cletPrrrnt values of prevrnting the incrimination of lhoRr whose 
rightK tlH1 police have violated have brrn considrred suffici<'ni to justify 
the supprc·s:;ion of probative evidence evrn though the case against the 
defen(hmt is weakened or de~troyed. We ndhrro to that judgment. But 
we :no not. conYincrd that. the additional benefit::; of ext.pnding the exclu-
sionar~' rule t.o othrr dPfendant.s would justif~r further encroachment upon 
t{M;{ed~ 
v. WvtA.W.J 
No .-7'1--v--1 ~ 
(~t1f';uj-
l0 -II). 
the public interPr>t in pro,;ecuting those accused of crime and having tlwm 
acquitted or convicted on the bn:;is of nil the evidence which expo~~ .... 
truth ." Alderman v. United States. supra. aL 174-175. Sec al:;o St'r:flzev \.. 
v. Powell, 42R U. S. 464, 488- 489 (197()); United States v. Calandra, 414 
u.s. '338, 348 (1974), 
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
2upervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
eisely the same. 
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that 
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
outweigh{s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de-
~isions of this Court.1) Were we to accept{ his use of the 
supervisory power, we would confer on the Judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
9 Thr smne diffieul1y atf.pnds rrspondent!s claim to thr protections of the 
l)ue Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
expressly declined to consider the Due Proce~:>."> Clause. But even if we 
al:ll:iUme that, the unla,wful Qnrfcase search was !:iO outrageous a:; to offend 
Itmdaml•ntal "'caJ10llN of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U. S. 165, 169 {1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J .), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the DuP Proce:;::; Clause ... come into play only when the Gov- · 
ernment act1vity in questiOn violate~ some protected right of the defend-
ant," Hampton . United States, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) , 
The Chief Justice 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 100V The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pledged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
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parties, the United States District Court for the Northern/ 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U. S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
fictitious or fraudulent stat<'ments or representations, ... shall be fined / 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both."/ ' 
1' 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov-
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there-
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds/' 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle· 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he knew Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
1 The unusual sequence of mlings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially failed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
uppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinsta-ted its 
.suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge these :procedttres •. 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
two left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
ship between the Castle Bank ru1d the Bank of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
the loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The District Court found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
unlawful seizure of Michael Wolstencroft's briefcase. . . ." 
434 F. Supp ., at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmatively counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefully con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
mately led to the discovery of the critical loan guarantee 
agreement. I d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
8 The United States argued in the District Court and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement wa.s discovered through an independent 
investigation untainted by the briefcase search. The Government also 
denied that it:; agents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purposes of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 1:29; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super .. 
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 (1979) 
(per cur·iam) . The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari, - U. S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not ·exclude· 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. Id., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
United States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs· 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 (1972); Mancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U. S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
'Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126 ; see 590 F . 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v;. ~ 
Milie~, 425 U. S. 435 (1976) , est,.blished that a ·deposito/ 
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. I d., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case.4 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to ,1 . _J J..{J 
__ s_u_p~press evidence tainted by gross illegalities ,r 'ffiGL\.. 
c not infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. D ( ·IJ'J f~ 
United States contends that this~ approach ups s fii/A.O\f h 
careful balance of interests embodied in the Four h ~mend- ~ cde. -
4 We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
htw of bank secrecy create~ an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Mille1·. 425 U. S. 435 (1976). AL the outset., it is not 
clea.r t.hat secret information regarding this respondent.'s account played 
any role in the investigation that led to the discovery of the critjcal loan 
guarantee agrPement. Seep. 3, supm. Even if the ca.usa.llink were e;,'iab-
li::;hed, however, respondent's claim lacks merit.. He cites a provision, 
Ch. 96.9 of the St a.tute Law of the Bahama Islands ( 1909), that is no 
longer in effect.. Bank secrec~' is now safegua.rded by § 19 of the Ba11ks 
Act, I Bah . Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65, 
which providE'$ in relevant part: 
"ExcepL for the purpose of Lhe performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or whPn lawfully required to do so by any 
eourt of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall di~:;close any information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the perfonnance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
~ee also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah. Act 
No. 64, § 10, ns amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Acts No. 20, 
1971 Bah , Act;; No. 15. The statute is hardly a blanket. gua.rantro of 
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged with exception;;; and we 
Juwe been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover, 
American depo::;itor;; know that their own country requires them to report 
relatjonship;; with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 
CFR § 103.24. See generally California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 
U. S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974) . We conclude that respondent lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in tho Castle Rank records that docu-
mented his account. 
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ment decisions of this Court. · In the Government's view, such 
an extension of the supervisory power would enable federal 
L
courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their application 
of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment. 
We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F .. Supp., at 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of thos·~ who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name~ 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
5 "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officer::; must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alde1-man v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969) . We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prieties rewaled in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Op-
erations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Trafficker::; Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Commissioner also adopt,ed guidelines that re-
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illegalities to n supervi:sory officer, who is i11 turn directed I 
to llOtJfy appropriate state authoritie;:;. IHS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373 .3 
(3), 9373.4 (Dec. 27, 1977) . Although these measures appear on their 
!ace to }){' les:; po:s1tive than one might expect from aJ1 agency chargt>d 
with upholding the law, they do indicat.e disapproval of the practicp::; 
found to havr bren implemented in this case. We cannot a<ii:iume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to lhe attention of respomnble 
e>fficials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the 
uppression . of hi~hly probative :vidence in a trial against a third party· / 
~ 
wonld penahze ~ocwty mroece~sanly. / 
. I. 
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
that these unex-ceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
flow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously 
llerved." United States v. Calandra, · 414 U. S. 338, 348 
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression 
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a ·costly toll upon 
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. 
E . g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U. S. 464, 489·-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
U. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and 
jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States 
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and 
uot the constable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal 
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence 
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even ~ 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7 ~ 
6 See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969) \ 
(Black, J., dissenting) ; Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure, 37 TT. Chi . L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970) . 
7 Federal courts may usc their supervi;;;ory power in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowgLL, ,J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never / 
held, however, that the supervisory power authorizes :;uppression of evi- / 
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In Unite,d States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-75-7 (1979), 
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
364 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disclosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize \ 
a federal court to suppress otherw. ise admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third 
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment deci-
sions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
in deterring illegal sea.rches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim. of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, ~ 
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175 . 8 The/ 
values assigned to the competing interests do not change 
dence obt<1.ined from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
rule. Thr supervi;.;ory power merdy permjts fE-deral courts to supervise 
" the administration of criminal jn;;tiee" nmong the partie8 before the bar. 
JfcNabb \'. United States. supra.. at ~40 . 
g "Thr deterre-nt. values of preventing the incriminntion of thoRr whose 
rightK tho police havr violated ha.vc brrn considrred ~ufficie-nt t.o .iu ~tify 
t he supprE>s;; ion of probative <>vide-nrc even though the case again~t the 
defendant. i:; wE>akrtwd or drstroyrd. We adhere to thnt judgmE-nt. Bu t 
we are not. convincrcl that the additional benrfit::; of r xtending the rxclu-
sionar~r rule to other clrfe11dants would justif~· further enrroachment upon 
the public int<>rcl't, in ]wo:,:ecuting tho:;e accused of rrimr and having tlwm 
acquittNl or convicted on the basi~ of all the evidc•nc<> which expo:;e~; the 
truth." Aldennan v. United States, sup1·a, at 174-175. See also Stone 
v. Powell , 42R U. S. 46-1:, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 
u. s. :338, 34 (1974), 
~ INStfl-1 
INSERT in No. 78-1720, United States · v~ · Payner, p. 8 n. 8. 
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the balance of 
interests under the supervisory power differs from that 
cons ide red in Alderman and 1 ike cases, because the supervisory 
power focuses upon the "need to protect the integrity of the 
federal courts." Although the District Court in this case 
relied upon a deterrent rationale, we agree that the supervisory 
power serves the "two-fold" purpose of deterring illegality and 
protecting judicial integrity. See post, at 7. As the dissent 
recognizes, however, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule 
serves precisely the same purposes. Ibid., citing, inter alia, 
Dunaway · v~ · New · York, 442 u.s. 200, 218 (1979), and Mapp · v~ · Ohio 
367 u.s. 643, 659-660 (1961). Thus, the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule, 1 ike the supervisory power, is applied in 
part "to protect the integrity of the court rather than to 
~ 
vindicate the constitutional rights of the defenda~ II 
~, at 10; see generally Stone .. v~ .. Powell, 428 u.s. 465, 486 
(1976); United · states · v~ · calandra, 414 u.s. 338, 486 (1974). 
2. 
In this case, where the illegal conduct did not 
violate the respondent's rights, the interest in preserving 
judicial integrity and in deterring such conduct is outweighed 
by the societal interest in presenting probative evidence to the 
trier of fact. See supra; see also, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 485-486. None of the cases cited by the dissent, 
post, at 7-9, supports a contrary view, since none of those 
cases involved criminal defendants who were not themselves the 
victims of the challenged practices. Thus, our decision today 
does not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory power in 
any way; nor does it render that power "superfluous." Post, at 
12. We merely reject its use as a substitute for established 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
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because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
lilUpervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
eisely the same. 
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that 
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
{)Utweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
substitution of individual judgment for the controlling de-
cisions of this Court.0 Were we to accep tfhis use of th 
lilUpervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
9 Th11 ~<LIU<.' difficulty att.md:;; rrspondent,'s claim t.o the [)rotections of the ~ 
Due Proces::; Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeal~ 
flxpre.ssly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
as~:;ume that, the unhtwful briefcase search W!li:i so outragcou:> a::; to offend 
ftmdamC:'ntal "' cmwns of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U. S. 165, 169 (1952) , quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opimon of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains thaL "[t]he limita-
tion:,; of the Dut> Proce::;::; Clau:se ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment acttvity in que::;twn violates some protected right of the defend-
"'",'' Hampton • l'nU<d '"''"• •upm, at 490 (plummy opinion) . / 
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v. 
Jack Payner. 
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On Writ of Certi~f'RJr<f01~R : ------
United States Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit. 
[April -, 1980] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question is whether the District Court properly sup-
pressed the fruits of an unlawful search that did not invade 
the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights. 
I 
Respondent Jack Payner was indicted in September 1976 
on a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax return in 
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 1001.1 The indictment alleged that 
respondent denied maintaining a foreign bank account at a 
time when he knew that he had such an account at the Castle 
Bank and Trust Company of Nassau, Bahama Islands. · 
The Government's case rested heavily on a loan guarantee 
agreement dated April 28, 1972, in which respondent pl~dged 
the funds in his Castle Bank account as security for a $100,000 
loan. 
Respondent waived his right to jury trial and moved to 
suppress the guarantee agreement. With the consent of the 
parties, the United States District Court for the Northern 
District of Ohio took evidence on the motion at a hearing 
consolidated with the trial on the merits. The court found 
1 18 U.S. C. § 1001 provides in relevant part: 
"Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or 
agency of the United States knowingly and willfully ... makes any false, 
:fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, ... shall be fined 
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 
.. ...... . 
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respondent guilty as charged on the basis of all the evidence. 
The court also found, however, that the Government discov· 
ered the guarantee agreement by exploiting a flagrantly illegal 
search that occurred on January 15, 1973. The court there· 
fore suppressed "all evidence introduced in the case by the 
Government with the exception of Jack Payner's 1972 tax 
return ... and the related testimony." United States v. 
Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113, 136 (1977). As the tax return 
alone was insufficient to demonstrate knowing falsification, the 
District Court set aside respondent's conviction.2 
The events leading up to the 1973 search are not in dispute. 
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service launched an investiga-
tion into the financial activities of American citizens in the 
Bahamas. The project, known as "Operation Trade Winds," 
was headquartered in Jacksonville, Fla. Suspicion focused on 
the Castle Bank in 1972, when investigators learned that a 
suspected narcotics trafficker had an account there. Special 
Agent Richard Jaffe of the Jacksonville office asked Norman 
Casper, a private investigator and occasional informant, to 
learn what he could about the Castle Bank and its depositors. 
To that end, Casper cultivated his friendship with Castle 
Bank vice-president Michael Wolstencroft. Casper intro-
duced Wolstencroft to Sybol Kennedy, a private investigator 
and former employee. When Casper discovered that the 
banker intended to spend a few days in Miami in January of 
1973, he devised a scheme to gain access to the bank records 
he kneYv Wolstencroft would be carrying in his briefcase. 
Agent Jaffe approved the basic outline of the plan. 
2 The unusual sequence of rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated 
hearing conducted by the District Court. The court initially fai!ed to 
enter judgment on the merits. At the close of the evidence, it simply 
granted respondent's motion to suppress. After the Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit dismissed the government's appeal for want of juris-
diction, the District Court vacated the order granting the motion to 
suppress and entered a verdict of guilty. The court then reinstated its 
suppression order and set aside the verdict. Respondent does not chal-
lenge these procedures . 
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Wolstencroft arrived in Miami on January 15 and went 
directly to Kennedy's apartment. At about 7:30 p. m., the 
t'l\·o left for dinner at a Key Biscayne restaurant. Shortly 
thereafter, Casper entered the apartment using a key supplied 
by Kennedy. He removed the briefcase and delivered it to 
Jaffe. While the agent supervised the copying of approxi-
mately 400 documents taken from the briefcase, a "lookout" 
observed Kennedy and Wolstencroft at dinner. The observer 
notified Casper when the pair left the restaurant, and the 
briefcase was replaced. The documents photographed that 
evening included papers evidencing a close working relation-
shin between the Castle Bank and the B~mk of Perrine, Fla. 
Subpoenas issued to the Bank of Perrine ultimately uncovered 
thP- loan guarantee agreement at issue in this case. 
The Di,trict CoPrt found that the United States, acting 
through Jaffe, "knowingly and willfully participated in the 
un lfl wfu 1 seizure of Michael Wolsteneroft's briefcase. . . ." 
434 F. Supp , at 120. According to that court, "the Govern-
ment affirmativelv counsels its agents that the Fourth Amend-
ment standing limitation permits them to purposefullv con-
duct an unconstitutional search and seizure of one individual 
in order to obtain evidence against third parties .... " I d., 
at 132-133. The District Court also found that the docu-
ments seized from Wolstencroft provided the leads that ulti-
matelv led to the discoverv of the critical loan gnanmtee 
agreement. /d., at 123 3 Although the search did not impinge 
upon the respondent's Fourth Amendment rights, the District 
Court believed that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment and the inherent supervisory power of the federal 
courts required it to exclude evidence tainted by the Govern-
3 The United States argued in the District Ccurt and the Court of Ap-
peals that the guarantee agreement was discovered through an independent 
inn-stigation untainted bv the briefcase search. The Government also 
deniPd that its ag:ents willfully encouraged Casper's illegal behavior. For 
purprses of this opinion, we need not question the District Court's con-
trary findings on either point. 
.. 
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ment's "knowing and purposeful bad faith hostility to any 
person's fundamental constitutional rights." I d., at 129; see 
id., at 133, 134-135. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a 
brief order endorsing the District Court's use of its super-
visory power. United States v. Payner, 590 F. 2d 206 ( 1979) 
(per curiam). The Court of Appeals did not decide the due 
process question. We granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1979), 
and we now reverse. 
II 
This Court discussed the doctrine of "standing to invoke the 
[Fourth Amendment] exclusionary rule" in some detail last 
Term. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128, 138 (1978). We 
reaffirmed the established rule that a court may not exclude 
evidence under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an 
unlawful search or seizure violated the defendant's own con-
stitutional rights. ld., at 133-140. See, e. g., Brown v. 
United States, 411 U. S. 223, 229-230 (1973); Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S. 165, 171-172 (1969); Simmons v. 
Un#ed States, 390 U. S. 377, 389 (1968). And the defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when the 
challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of 
privacy rather than that of a third party. Rakas v. Illinois, 
supra, at 143; id., at 149-152 (PowELL, J., concurring); Combs 
v. United States, 408 U. S. 224, 227 ( 1972) ; M.ancusi v. De-
Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968). 
The foregoing authorities establish, as the District Court 
recognized, that respondent lacks standing under the Fourth 
Amendment to suppress the documents illegally seized from 
Wolstencroft. 434 F. Supp., at 126. The Court of Appeals 
did not disturb the District Court's conclusion that "Jack 
Payner possessed no privacy interest in the Castle Bank docu-
ments that were seized from Wolstencroft." 434 F. Supp., at 
126; see 590 F. 2d, at 207. Nor do we. United States v. 
Miller, 4.25 U. S. 435 ( 1976), established that a depositor· 
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has no expectation of privacy and thus no "protectable Fourth 
Amendment interest" in copies of checks and deposit slips 
retained by his bank. ld., at 437; see id., at 442. Nothing in 
the record supports a contrary conclusion in this case! 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals believed, how-
ever, that a federal court should use its supervisory power to 
suppress evidence tainted by gross illegalities that did not l 
infringe the defendant's constitutional rights. The United _, 
States contends that this approach as app 1e m t 1s case._ 1 
upsets the careful balance of interes s embodied in the Fourth 
• We are not persuaded by respondent's suggestion that the Bahamian 
law of bank secrecy creates an expectation of privacy not present in 
United States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435 (1976). At the outset, it is not 
clear that secret information regarding this respondent's account played 
any role in the investigation that led to the discovery of the critical loan 
guarantee agreement. See p. 3, supra. Even if the ca.usallink were estab-
lished, however, respondent's claim lacks merit. He cites a provision, 
Ch. 96.9 of the Statute Law of the Bahama Islands (1909), that is no 
longer in effect. Bank secrecy is now safeguarded by § 19 of the Banks 
Act, I Bah. Rev. Stat. ch. 96 (1965), as amended, 1965 Bah. Acts No. 65, 
which provides in relevant part: 
"Except for the purpose of the performance of his duties or the exercise 
of his functions under this Act or when lawfully required to do so by any 
court of competent jurisdiction within the Colony or under the provi-
sions of any law of the Colony, no person shall disclose any information 
relating to ... the affairs of ... any customer of a [bank] licensee 
which he has acquired in the performance of his duties or the exercise of 
his functions under this Act." 
See also the Banks and Trust Companies Regulation Act, 1965 Bah. Acts 
No. 64, § 10, as amended, 1968 Bah. Acts No. 33, 1969 Bah. Acts No. 20, 
1971 Bah. Acts No. 15. The statute is hardly a blanket guarantee of 
privacy. Its application is limited; it is hedged with exceptions; and we 
have been directed to no authority construing its terms. Moreover, 
American depositors know that their own country requires them to report 
relationships with foreign financial institutions. 31 U. S. C. § 1121; 31 
CFR § 103.24. See generally Califomia Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 
U. S. 21, 59-63, 71-76 (1974). We conclude that respondent lacked a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the Castle Bank records that docu-
mented his account. 
'. 
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Amendment decisions of this Court. In the Government's 
view, such an extension of the supervisory power would enable 
federal courts to exercise a standardless discretion in their 
application of the exclusionary rule to enforce the Fourth 
Amendment. We agree with the Government. 
III 
We certainly can understand the District Court's commend-
able desire to deter deliberate intrusions into the privacy of 
persons who are unlikely to become defendants in a criminal 
prosecution. See 434 F. Supp., a.t 135. No court should 
condone the unconstitutional and possibly criminal behavior 
of those who planned and executed this "briefcase caper." 5 
Indeed, the decisions of this Court are replete with denuncia-
tions of willfully lawless activities undertaken in the name 
of law enforcement. E. g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368, 
386 (1964); see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 
G "The security of persons and property remains a fundamental value 
which law enforcement officers must respect. Nor should those who flout 
the rules escape unscathed." Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S. 165, 
175 (1969). We note that in 1976 Congress investigated the impro-
prieties revealed in this record. See Oversight Hearings into the Op-
erations of the IRS before a Subcommittee of the House Committee 
on Government Operations (Operation Tradewinds, Project Haven, and 
Narcotics Traffickers Tax Program), 94th Cong., 1st Sess. As a result, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue "called off" Operation Trade Winds. 
Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. The Ccmmissioner also adopted guidelines that re-
quire agents to instruct informants on the requirements of the law and to 
report known illegalities to a supervisory officer, who is in turn directed 
to notify appropriate state authorities. IRS Manual Supp. 9-21, §§ 9373.3 
(3), 9373.4 (Dec. 27, 1977). Although these measures appear on their 
face to be less positive than one might expect from an agency charged 
with upholding the law, they do indicate disapproval of the pra.ctices 
found to have been implemented in this case. We cannot assume 
that similar lawless conduct, if brought to the attention of responsible 
officials, would not be dealt with appropriately. To require in addition the 
suppression of highly probative evidence in a trial against a third party 
would penalize society unnecessarily. 
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(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). But our cases also show 
that these unexceptional principles do not command the ex-
clusion of evidence in every case of illegality. Instead, they 
must be weighed against the considerable harm that would 
ftow from indiscriminate application of an exclusionary rule. 
Thus, the exclusionary rule "has been restricted to those 
areas where its remedial objectives are most efficaciously 
served." United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 348 
(1974). The Court has acknowledged that the suppression 
of probative but tainted evidence exacts a costly toll upon 
the ability of courts to ascertain the truth in a criminal case. 
E. g., Rakas v. Illinois, supra, at 137-138; United States v. 
Ceccolini, 435 U. S. 268, 275-279 (1978); Stone v. Powell, 
428 U. S. 464, 489-491 (1976); see Michigan v. Tucker, 417 
V. S. 433, 450-451 (1974).6 Our cases have consistently 
recognized that unbending application of the exclusionary 
sanction to enforce ideals of governmental rectitude would 
impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and 
jury. E. g., Stone v. Powell, supra, at 485-489; United States 
v. Calandra, supra, at 348. After all, it is the defendant, and 
not the constable, who stands trial. 
The same societal interests are at risk when a criminal 
defendant invokes the supervisory power to suppress evidence 
seized in violation of a third party's constitutional rights. 
The supervisory power is applied with some caution even 
when the defendant asserts a violation of his own rights.7 
0 See also Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 237-238 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search 
and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 736-746, 755-756 (1970). 
7 Federal courts may use their supervisory power in some circum-
stances to exclude evidence taken from the defendant by "willful disobedi-
ence of law." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943); see 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, 223 (1960); Rea v. United States, 
350 U. S. 214, 216-217 (1956); cf. Hampton v. United States, 425 U. S. 
484, 495 (PowELL, J., concurring in the judgment). This Court has never 
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In United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 754-757 (1979,, 
we refused to exclude all evidence tainted by violations of an 
executive department's rules. And in Elkins v. United States, 
864 U. S. 206, 216 (1960), the Court called for a restrained 
application of the supervisory power. 
"[A]ny apparent limitation upon the process of discover-
ing truth in a federal trial ought to be imposed only upon 
the basis of considerations which outweigh the general 
need for untrammeled disClosure of competent and rele-
vant evidence in a court of justice." 364 U. S., at 216. 
See also Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
We conclude that the supervisory power does not authorize 
a federal court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence 
on the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a third 
party not before the court. Our Fourth Amendment deci-
sions have established beyond any doubt that the interest 
in deterring illegal searches does not justify the exclusion of 
tainted evidence at the instance of a party who was not the 
victim of the challenged practices. Rakas v. Illinois, supra, 
at 137; Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175,.8 The 
dence obtained from third parties in violation of Constitution, statute or 
rule. The supervisory power merely permits federal courts to supervise 
''the administration of criminal justice" among the parties before the bar. 
McNabb v. United States, supra, at 340. 
8 "The deterrent values of preventing the incrimination of those whose 
rights the police have violated have been considered sufficient to justify 
the suppression of probative evidence even though the case against the 
defendant is weakened or destroyed. We adhere to that judgment. But 
we are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclu-
eionary rule to .other defendants would justify further encroachment upon 
the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the 
truth." Alderman v. United States, supra, at 174-175. See also Stone 
v. Powell, 428 U. S. 464, 488-489 (1976); United States v. Calandra, 414 
u.s. 338, 348 (1974). 
The dissent, post, at 8, urges that the balance of interests under the 1 
supervisory power differs from that considered in Alderman and like cases, 
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values assigned to the competing interests do not change 
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the 
supervisory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. In 
either case, the need to deter the underlying conduct and the 
detrimental impact of excluding the evidence remain pre-
oisely the same. 
The District Court erred, therefore, when it concluded that 
"society's interest in deterring [bad faith] conduct by exclusion 
outweigh[s] society's interest in furnishing the trier of fact 
with all relevant evidence." 434 F. Supp., at 135. This reason-
ing, which the Court of Appeals affirmed, amounts to a 
eubstitution of individual judgment for the controlling de-
cisions of this Court.9 Were we to accept this use of the 
because the supervisory power focuses upon the "need to protect the 
integrity of the federal courts." Although the District Court in this case 
relied upon a deterrent rationale, we agree that the supervisory power 
serves the "two-Jold" purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judiciai 
integrity. See post, at 7. As the dissent recognizes, however, the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary n1le serves precisely the same purpo~es. Ibid., 
citing, inter alia, Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 218 (1979), and 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659-660 (1961). Thus, the Fourth Amend-
ment exclusionary rule, like the supervisory power, is applied in part "to 
protect the integrity of the court rather than to vindicate the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant. ... " Post, at 10; see generally Stone v. 
Powell, 428 U. S. 465, 486 (1976); United States v. Calandra, S. 
- 486 (:~). 
In this case, where the illegal conduct did not violate the respondent's 
rights, the interest in preserving judicial integrity and in deterring such 
conduct is outweighed by the societal interest in presenting probative evi-
dence to the trier of fact. See supra; see also, e. g., Stone v. Powell, 
supra, at 485-486. None of the cases cited by the dissent, post, at 7-9, 
supports a contrary view, since none of those cases involved criminal 
defendants who were not themselves the victims of the challenged prac-
tices. Thus, our decision today does not limit the traditional scope of the 
supervisory power in any way; nor does it render that power "super-
fluous." Post, at 12. We merely reject its use as a substitute for estab-
lished Fourth Amendment doctrine. 
9 The same difficulty attends respondent's cla.im to the protections of the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court of Appeals 
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supervisory power, we would confer on the judiciary discre-
tionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the 
law it is charged with enforcing. We hold that the super-
visory power does not extend so far. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Ret·ersed. 
expressly declined to consider the Due Process Clause. But even if we 
assume that the unlawful briefcase search was so outrageous as to offend 
fundamental "'canons of decency and fairness,'" Rochin v. California, 342 
U.S. 165, 169 (1952), quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 417 
(1945) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), the fact remains that "[t]he limita-
tions of the Due Process Clause ... come into play only when the Gov-
ernment activity in question violates some protected right of the defend:-
qn~," Hampton v. United Statea, supra, at 490 (plurality opinion) .. 
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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FORT 
SIXTH CIRCUIT 
No. 78-1729. Argued Febmary 20, 1980-Dccided April ·-, 1980 
At respondent's nonjury trial for falsifying a federal income tax return 
by denying that he maintained a foreign bank account, respondent 
moved to suppress a loan guarantee agreement in which he pledged the 
funds in the bank account as security. The District Court fotmd 
respondent guilty on the basis of all the evidence, but then (1) found 
that the Government had discovered the guarantee agreement as the 
result of a flagrantly illegal sea rch of a bank officer's briefcase, (2) sup-
pressed all 1 he Government's evidence except for respondent's tax return 
and Iela1ed testimony, and (3) set aside the conviction for failure to 
demonst rate knowing falsification. The court held, inter alia, that, 
although the illegal search did not violate respondent's Fourth Amend-
ment rights, the inherent supervisory power of the federal courts 
required it to exclude evidence tainted by the illegal search. The Court 
of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: 
1. Respondent lacks standing under the Fourth Amendment to sup-
press thr documents illegally seized from the bank officer. A defend-
ant's Fourth Amendment rights arc violated only when the challenged 
conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy rather than that 
of a third party, and respondent possessed no privacy interest in the 
documents seized in this case. Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U. S. 128; 
Unit ed States v. Miller, 425 U. S. 435. Pp. 4-6. 
2. The supervisory power of the federal courts docs not authorize a 
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on the ground that it 
was seized unlawfully from a third party not before the court. Under 
the Fourth Amendment, the interest in deterring illegal searches does 
not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at the instance of a party 
who was not the victim of the challenged practices. And the values 
assigned to the competing interests of deterring illegal searches and of 
I 
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Reporter of Decisions. 
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Syllabus 
furnishing the trier of fact with all relevant evidence do not change 
because a court has elected to analyze the question under the super-
visory power instead of the Fourth Amendment. Such power does not 
extend so far as to confer on the judiciary discretionary power to dis-
regard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing. 
Pp. 6-9. 
590 F. 2d 206, reversed. 
PROGRAM: DATE: • 
EYEWITNESS NEWS FRI., SEPTEMBER 26, 1975 
STATION OR NETWORK: TIME: 
WTOP TELEVISION 6:0-0 PM, EDT 
IRS COMMISSIONER UNDER INVESTIGATION BY HOUSE COMMITTEE 
MAX ROBINSON: Eyewitness News has learned that 
Internal Revenue Service Commissioner Donald Alexander is under 
investigation by the House Ways and Means Committee. Correspon-
dent Clarence Jones has this exclusive report. (FILM CLIP) 
CLARENCE JONES: The House Ways and Means Committee is 
investigating allegations that IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander 
has deliberately sabotaged a massive tax evasion investigation. 
The IRS case involves more than 100 top executives in scores of 
major corporations across the country. There is evidence that 
those corporations hid hundreds of millions of dollars in banks 
in the Bahamas to evade U. S. income taxes. 
Alexander, the nation's top tax enforcement official, 
was appointed by Richard Nixon in the spring of 1973. The 
congressional committee wants to know whether Alexander took the 
job with the understanding he would protect the corporations and 
the executives who helped elect Republicans in 1972. 
Before he took the IRS Commissioner's job, Alexander 
moved in the highest levels of corporate business. His Cincinnati 
law firm represented some of the nation's largest corporations. 
The committee is searching for secret bank or trust accounts in 
the Bahamas that Alexander or his associates might have used to 
evade taxes or to hide illegal campaig~ contributions. 
Extremely reliable sources inside two branches of the 
federal government say the committee has notified Treasury Secre-
tary William Simon that the IRS Commissioner is under investiga-
tion. The committee has suggested, according to our sources, 
that Simon ought to find out why an internal IRS investigation 
of Alexander was short-circuited. 
Investigators to the House Ways and Means Committee 
have talked to IRS agents, who gave them this story. The intelli-
gence.divison received a tip that a meeting was to take place nJ 
between Commissioner Alexander and a major security swindler who cf1 
has ties to organized crime. According to their information, the 
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meeting was set up in Miami shortly after the swindler was 
released from the federal prison in Atlanta. Their infor mation 
says that the meeting was designed to dispose of a tax lien then 
pending against the underworld figure. The amount of that IRS 
claim was more than $100,000. 
IRS regulations require all allegations of suspected 
corruption be reported immediately to the IRS inspection division. 
This was done, but instead of putting surveillance on the 
Commissioner, the inspection division went to Alexander and told 
him about the allegation. The meeting never took place, and the 
accuracy of the information could not be confirmed. 
In addition to the Bahamian bank accounts and the 
Florida meeting allegation, the committee is investigating a 
Seattle customs case, and Alexander's role in it. We'll have more 
tomorrow on how the IRS discovered corporations hiding money in 
the Bahamas. 
The investigat~on that turned up tax evasion in the 
Bahamas may have also discovered hidden campaign contributions 
there. The House Ways and Means Committee is investigating alle-
gations that Commissioner Alexander has used his power to prevent 
his agents from telling grand juries all they know. I'm Clarence 
Jones, Eyewitness News, at Internal Revenue Service headquarters. 
ROBINSON: A spokesman for IRS Commissioner Alexander 
would not deny that an investigation of Alexander was in progress. 
However, that spokesman said the allegations against Alexander are 
untrue and unfounded. He said that Alexander did not move to block 
any IRS investigation. He said some of the cases rising out of 
Project Haven are presently being considered for prosecution. 
Others, however, might be jeopardized by improper procedure used 
by IRS agents. The spokesman said Alexander never met improperly, 
secretly or otherwise, with any individuals involved in a tax case, 
and finally, the spokesman said, Alexander denied that he had any 
role in the dismissal of the customs case. 
GORDON PETERSON: IRS Commissioner Alexander was in New 
Haven, Connecticut, today. There, David Ropik, our Eyewitness 
News correspondent in Hartford, asked him about the allegations. 
What did he say, David, when you asked him if he believed the 
House Ways and Means Committee was investigating him? 
J . 
DAVID ROPIK: The first time I asked him, Gordon, he 
kind of hedged a bit, and didn't really say one way or the other. 
The second time, the same thing; but when I asked him a third time, 
he did say that he had read in a paper somewhere--and he wouldn't 
say where--that he was aware that allegations to that effect are 
being made against him, and he said that he knew of two committees 1~ 
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much what he said in the official statement from his office. 
PETERSON: I see. Did you ask him if he ever talked 
to former President Nixon about blocking tax investigations? 
ROPIK: Yes, I did, and he said that he had only talked 
with the President about tax administration, at which time Nixon 
met him on a receiving line at the White House. Alexander said 
that the President told him, oh, you're the new Commissioner. Do 
your job well and do it honestly. And Alexander, of course, said 
today that he has been doing it well, and he claims he has been 
doing it honestly. 
PETERSON: What about these operations and the meeting 
with the so-called Mafia mobsters and so forth? 
ROPIK: Well, he denied outright that he ever had any 
such meeting in Miami, that he ever planned any such meeting in 
Miami, and that he ever even cancelled any such meeting. 
PETERSON: Uh-huh. And how about the business of his--
the knowledge gained from the Cincinnati law contacts and so forth? 
ROPIK: Well, he said that he has absolutely no know-
ledge whether his former law firm, which does represent many 
major corporations, as I understand~-he says he has no knowledge 
whether that former law firm has any out-of-the-country bank 
accounts, and he said he'd be very surprised to learn that they 
did. 
PETERSON: All right . Thank you very much, David . 
·, . 
.. :~ 
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ABC TELEVISION 7:00 PM, EDT 
HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE INVESTIGATES COMMISSIONER ALEXANDER 
HARRY REASONER: There are reports tonight in· Washington 
of a·new investigation, this. one involving Donald Alexander, 
Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service. ABC's Sam Donaldson 
has details. 
SAM DONALDSON: hnat is described as a very serious 
investigation of IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander, who has 
been commissioner since his appointment by President Nixon in 1973, 
wa£ confirmed today by the Chairman of the House Ways and Means 
Subcommitt"ee. 
CHAIRMAN OF SUBCO:t-1MITTEE: The Subcommittee of Oversight 
of the Ways and Means Committee received a number of allegations 
that --concerning Commissioner Alexander, the Commissioner of the 
Internal Revenue Service. These allegations were unverified. 
DONALDSON: What kind of allegations? 
CK~I~~N: Well, the allegations reflected --had to do 
with the administration of his office, and some others that came 
to the subcommittee. 
DONALDSON: The investigation is being conducted by top 
Treasury Department officials and the FBI. Sources says the 
allegations charge Alexander with a whole grab bag of official 
misdeeds, in the areas of quashing tax fraud investigations, decisions 
to audit or not to audit certain returns, and favorable rulings in 
tax cases. Clarence Jones,of ABC affiliate WPLG in Miami,quotes 
sources as telling him that one of the allegations has it that 
more than 100 top executives in the United States hid hundreds of 
millions of dollars in the Bahamas in order to evade U.S. tax 
returns, and that Alexander sabotaged the IRS investigation of the 
case. Jones reports that it is ·even suggested. that Alexander may 
have taken the job in 1973 on the understanding that he. would 




Congressman Vanik stresses that none of- the allegations 
his subcommittee received have been verified at all. Late today 
the IRS issued a statement that said it may be that .some improper 
investigative procedures within the IRS have been used in the past, 
;II.
. in some cases. But Alexander categorically denies that he has done 
'anything wrong, and he welcomes an investigation. Sam Donaldson, 
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Internal Revenue Service 
9/26/75 
For Release: Immediate 
Washington, DC 20224 
Tel. (202~ 964-4021 
IR-1511 
Wash., D.C.--Untrue and unfounded allegations have been made to the news 
media about inappropriate interference by Internal Revenue Commissioner Donald 
C. Alexander with tax investigations by IRS. 
The Commissioner categorically denied these allegations and called for a 
complete investigation of these accusations by the proper Congressional over-
sight committees. 
One of the allegations appears to refer to an information gathering 
operation called "Operation Tradewinds" and sometimes "Project Haven." 
Several cases arising out of this investigation are presently under considera-
tion for prosecution by attorneys of the Office of Chief Counsel and the 
Department of Justice. Other cases are under active audit and investigation 
in the field by the IRS. An internal audit made by IRS indicated that some 
improper investigative procedures may have been used in that operation. As 
a consequence, these cases are under review and no new cases will be initiated, 
pending a determination as to the effect, if any, on such cases of any improper 
procedures . 
The Commissioner also categorically denied the allegation that he had 
planned to meet improperly, secretly or otherwise, with an individual involved 
in a tax case and that the Internal Security or any other branch of the IRS 
had informed him of any discovery of any such allegation. 
Finally, the Commissioner categorically denied that he had any role in 
the dismissal of any Customs case . 
X X X 
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Internal Revenue Service 
Washington, 09 20224 
Tel. (202) 964-4021 
OPENING RE~lARKS 
By Commissioner of Internal Revenue Donald C. Alexander 
At News Conference 10:30 AM EDT, 9/29/75 
Since I became Commissioner. one of my most important objectives 
has been to ensure that the Internal Revenue Service respects individual 
rights. that its employees always operate within the law in conducting 
investigations. and that the Service confine its activities to those appropriate 
I 
to a tax administration and enforcement agency. 
These objectives have not been shared by some members of the law 
enforcement community. including. I believe. a few present and former 
IRS employees . These individuals have reacted by criticizing me personally, 
by attempting to block efforts to uncover and eliminate inappropriate 
activities by IRS employees and informers. and by circulating scurrilous 
rumors about my personal character. WTOP' s program televised Friday 
and Saturday evenings are examples of such allegations. which I have cate-
gorically denied. 
I intend to continue my efforts to see, to it that IRS powers. information 
and resources are properly used in the administration and enforcement of 
the tax laws. I intend to see to it that IRS follows President Ford's directive 
to conduct itself with decency. honesty and adherence to the law at all 
levels. If those who disagree with this approach persist in efforts to 
discredit me. this is the price that I will have to pay for attempting to 
• d' gua~antee .that law enforcement people always obey the law. 
/>-i 
--t . 
X X X 
The Miami Herald 
Miami, Florida 
October 7, 1975 
. 
Did IRS Clllef Blocl( Pt~oJJe 
To Pt~otect 1-Iis Friends? 
Bv SAUL FRIEDMAN 
Hirild Washintton Burtau 
WASHINGTON - Con.gressionR! 
investigators grilled the nation's 
top tax collectors Monday on why 
they did not follow up on inf orma-
tion that JOO Americans, in clud ing 
prominent businessmen, organized 
crime figures and possibly public 
officials, may have sent money to 
the Bahamas to avoi d or evade 
taxes. 
Rep. Edward Mezvinsky (h., 
low&), &. member of the House <?ov-
ernment Operations SubcommJtlee 
on monet&ry affairs, told the Her-
aJd Washington Bureau that th.e 
names of the Bahamas bank deposJ-
tors on a Jist obtained by the IRS 
include "some very, very prominent 
peop!c." 
THE LIST which a paid infor-
mant gave 'to an IRS agent in 
Miami in January 1973, was the 
focus of the probing questioning 
a.imed at Donald Alexander, coni-
mi.!;sioner of Internal Revenue, and 
~even of his top assi stants. 
In , addition, the hearing room 
was packed with .about 2~0 IRS of-
ficials who were m Washmgton for 
a conference and were ordered to 
attend the session by Alexander. 
Several were plucked out of the au-
dience to answer committee ques-
tions. 
The committee, headed by Rep. 
Benjamin Rosenthal (D., N.Y.), is 
investigating charges by lower ech-
elon IRS officials and agents that 
Alexander, for personal. motives 
llnd perhaps to protect fn.ends a!ld 
fom1er law clients, has cnppled m-
telligence investigations by. th;, IRS. 
Alexander repeatedly sa1d, I Vi-
tegorically deny these charges." 
And as he has in the past, he 
char'ged that some agents. "have le.~ 
their zeal outrun thetr JUdgment 
and have us ed illegal techniques in 
gathering information. 
A CASE in point was what was 
c~Jled "the briefcase incident," 
which occured during a broad in-
ycstioation - "Operation Trade-
wind~" - into the use of banks. in 
the Bahamas by Americans .to h1de 
assets and profits made m lh1s 
country from U.S- tax collectors. 
· One part of "Operation Trade-
:winds" was "Project Haven," an in-
vestigation of the accounts in the 
Castle Bank in Nassau. 
An IRS informant procured a 
woman for an official of the bank 
~uring a visit to Miami. A~d while 
the official was out of h1s room 
with his date, the informant lifted 
the contents of his briefcase, which 
1RS agents photographed before 
they were returned. The con.tents 
inCluded the Jist of 300 Amencans 
with accounts at the bank. 
According to Alexander and 
other officials, the IRS has been 
pursuing an investigation of the 300 
names since 1973. But last Aug. 13, 
just as the names were to bl" sent 
to district and regional officials for 
detailed investigations, the IRS -
w]th Alexander's approval - held 
th em up. 
Alexander maintains that the 
cases may be tainted beca use the 
evidence violated Bahamian bank 
secrecy Jaws and perhaps the civil 
rights of the bank official. 
QUESTIONING by committee 
mempers, d isclosed, however. that 
potential legal problems in obtain-
ing the list had been discussed sev-
eral times since January 1973 WJth 
IRS and Justice Department attor-
neys. 
Indeed as recently as last July, 
IRS officials in charge of the inves-
tigation ordered the dissemin ation 
of the 300 names to field investJga-
tors for detailed examination. 
In reply to Mezvinsky's. ques-
tions, IRS Intelligence DIVISIOn 
Chief Thomas J. Clancy acknowl· 
edged that the list included "some 
very prominent Americans an? a 
number of syndicate and orgamzed 
crime names ." Clancy added that 
some "U.S. banks" were on the list. 
In addition to businessmen, Mez-
vinsky said, "We're talking ·about 
prominent officials, who may have 
affected public policy." 
Neither he nor the IRS officlal~ 
gave any further hint as to what he 
meant. 
Alexander said he has not seen 
the list and therefore was not influ-
enced by the names on it when he 
approved the decision to hold up a 
further investigation of the names. 
OTHER IRS offi cia ls to ld the 
committee that information·gather-
in., in connlction with "Operation 
Tr~dewinds" and ~'Project Haven," 
as well as the dissemination to. 
IRS officers of the 300 names, was 
stopped in reaction to publicity, 
a bout lRS spying and other illegal 
activities. 
News day 
Garden City, N.Y. 
October 30, 1975 
-- , 
Two Seeki11g 
To Join Suit 
Against IRS. 
By Fred Tuccillo 
The special agerrt and the secret informant in .st~um e ntal in 3 
coritroversial Bahamas tax-evasion investigation arc SC'eking to 
join six other Internal Revenue Service special agen!.s in 11 pend-
ing lawsuit against the IRS and its commissioner, Donald C. Al-
exander. 
US. District Court Judge Edward E. N-eaher ordered the 
goveJnment Frida_v to show cause why the IRS agent , Richard E. 
Jaffe of Miami, Fla., and the informant, idE'niified only as "T_\V_ 
24/' should not be allowed to join the original six plain tiffs in the 
case. Both their motion and the original case have now been ad-
journed to Nov. 7 in U.S. District Court, Brooklyn. 
The first six agents went to court earlier this year in an ef-
fort to overturn a March 17 directive from Alexander which in-
structed IRS special agents across the United States to m<Jke the 
mimes of all their confidential informa'l.ts available to the IRS 
internal audit division. 
:1'. The governh:ent agreed before US. District Court -JudgP 
TI1omas C. Platt ~~ay 28 that it would postpone enforcement of 
the directive, pen~ing disposition of the age.'l.ts' suit against Alcx-
arider and the IRS. Platt warned U.S. Attorney Cyril Hym::m 
th~t he would hold the gO\:_ernment in contempt if it did not ad-
~ -~,. ... -. - . 
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here to the agreement , which aLso included a promise not to di -·-
SE~ninai.e the names. af iniormanis or contact tJ1em without fir,;t 
nfffying the IRS spe-cial agent.s responsible for them. 
~ · Jaffe, 48, was in charge of. "Operation ·Tradrwinds" Rrd 
"G)_p.era~icn. Haven," two IRS investigations, beginning in 1965, 
ai"~ed at tax evasion by weallliy Americans through banks in lli:! 
B~as. · 
"':t Alexander orde~ed the investigatio~· sus~ended in late Au· 
g!Bjt;-.saying it had been learned that some evidence had br-en ob-
~eQ by pilfering documents from a Bahama banker's b;·iefcase 
while.the banker was willi a female companion solicited by T.W. 
2t' : ; J'"· Th~ suspension ied _to p.ublished alleg~tions that .Alexander 
! v.~ :trymg to protect h1s fnends and busmess assoc1ale:'. Two 
l cqng:·e.".s-ional committees have been probi.:~g those charge~. The 
• IRS announced Sunday that it was resuming the investigatio•1, 
but rources said that more than 100 investigative leads would re-
mhln"bottl.ed up in IRS headquarters bec_ause of unresolved qncs-
-ti&.1s"im whethe-r !hey were obtained legally. . 
In their motion to join the six IRS special agents as plain-
tiffs, Jaffe and T.W. 24 charge: 
• That despite Platt's warning to the government in M~~·. 
the IRS asked Jaffe in August to "relinquish the names of hi~ 
confide:~tial informants involved in Operation Tradewi.nd;; or he 
would be subject to disciplinary action." 
'4t·That T.W. 24 was visited by two members of the IRS in-
spection department Aug. 19 and was "question~ ... extensive-
ly- ... about his involvement" with the Bahamas operaticns with 
out any notificati0n to Jaffe. 
: . ·• ·That J. 'i eX and e r in September discussed the C3.SP in a 
WashingtoY, press conference and "disclosed ·sufficient m:1terial 
fads so !.'i12.t anyone familiar willh TW. 24 or with his ::JctivHies 
would know his true identity." 
Because of Alexander's revelations, T.W. 24 is claiminJ that 
"he ca.~ no .longer conduct business in the Bahamas ... where 
he .made_ a substantial living" and "is in fear for his personal 
safety." The informant is aski.ng $10 million in damages as ;1 re-
sult. -· ··· ·.. '• ., · ·· ·· ' .· . · .. · ··,) -
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.. 
Honorable William E. ·simon 
Secretary of the Treasury 
Main Treasury Building 
~ashington; D. C. 20220 
Dear Secretary Simon: 
;\ 
/I, 
Soc~oy I C• • ·• 
Sydr•t-Y r: , _,'J:C • ... 
D-o-,. lr" ,,.. ... ... -
On June 10, .1975 Donald C. Alexander, 
the Com.il1issioner of In-terna l Revenue, addressed 
the Executive Co~ittee of the Tax Section of the 
New York State Bar Association. His topi c ~as 
the role of the Internal Revenue Service in the 
law enforcement co~~unity. In his talk t he 
Corainissioner exhibited deep concern over possible 
misuse of powers by agents of the Internal Reven~e 
Service, and the attendan t risk of impairing ~ th~ 
goodwill of the people toward their taxing syst~n." 
The positions taken by Commissioner 
Alexander as to the proper role of the Internal · 
Revenue Service in the criminal en£orcement func-
tion have recently subjected him to widely. 
· . 
publicized p ersonal criticism and attack.· c"on- .. . 
cerned with . the proper functioning 9f the ·tax·. · · ., · 
system and seriously disturbed by the· nature of :·· ·: 
the .attacks made upon the- Comm1ssioner; .the .-:• .. : 
Exe cutive Committee of the Tax Section 11as· instruct:_ . • 
·ed me to communicate its· views·. · ... ·· · • ·.'. 
Whether and to what extent t .he Internal : · _ ·. _:_· 
Revenue Seivice should participate in the criminal · 
enforcement function, _other than strictly in ·th~ 
area of violations of the tax lav1s·, is a subject of. ··< .· 
legitimate. debate. The Commissioner's. expressed 
belief that ·the 's.ervice, ·in alloca.ting. its resources,.":-:' 
must give first priority to the adrnin:lstra!:ion of.· . •. 
the tax laws at the l eas t merits respect. The · · .. 
Commissioner's expressed belief that the Service, 
' · 
in -performing a criminal enforcement function or 
any othe r enforcement funcition, must do so in a · 
manner consistent with the_statutory .and constitu-
\\'rco n Vr., non. Jr 
GtOl~ E. C lr Ary 
~r-a•C' 0 C1"' 1:; .·n 
·. 
FORr,lER CHAIRMEN OF SeCTION 
Charle' J . Tobi n, Jr .. 
v,·,:ti•rn A . Pa1t'( 
c ~r1 tf 'T. l out!'l :t"\ 
Tho"T''<u C. Pl o'loo'lfdcn \V~·d1 1W 
Et!.vin M . Jo"H 
Hvoh ~={_ ... 1 onc-~ 
• Jo~n \'1. • ·~ 
John~. :.·or rin.ey, )1 . 
Ch,.., nn r , ,,.,....:,..., 
i . 
.uccobez- 30, 
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tional rights of taxpayers, is so clearly correct . that it 
· cannot -be a subject of legitimate d e bate. 
If enforcement personnel or other agents of the 
Internal Revenue Service use illegal practices, it is the 
Commissioner's duty to see to it that these practices are 
stopped. It is, we believe, unfair to Commissioner 
Alexander, and injurious to the nation's tax system, to 
criticize him on a personal level for his efforts to ensure 
that the enforcement function is carried out with due 
regard to the rights of citizens and the requir e ments of law. 
Sincer ely yours, 
- ~~cfl?-/~ 
Hartin D. Ginsburg / 
Chairman, Tax Sectioti 
l•lDG/ry 
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F fu\~IK J. SCODI\RI , TI!Oi\AS P . CUT.LE:-1 , JR. , 
\II LLIAI'! H. DE'l'T:1ER , III , t'I ILLTA/·1 G . Ri::tCHERT , 
J. MICIIM: L O,\LY and JII:\ES T . liALLl·IORK , 
Plaintiffs , 
- against -
OO~,'ALD C . ALEXA~Io:::R , Con,:nissioner of tite 
In t~rn.:tl Rev€'nuc Service and t-JILLIA: t E . SH10N , 
Secretary of the T rc~sury, 
Defend.tn ts. 
-----------------------------------------------X 
S TATE OF FLORID,;) 
I 55 . : 
COUNTY 0~ DADE ) 
A FFLDAVIT -·----
Civil Action No. 
7 5C8l3 
RICHARD E. JAFC'E ,. b•~Lnp duly S\VQrt1 , depos..::s ard 5ilys: 
iTfiYF sr:::rJ K' 
1. That I~ "m~)loy':'l by tht~ Int0rnal Rc·;E;nuf;: Service 
a t Hiar:li , F' lorid.l, as a Spt•ci.ul Agen': since Seple!T..!Jt_,r 1 0, 1956. 
2. That a~ting in my officiJl Cdp.tci~y as a Special 
AgC!nt , on J.:1nuny 15 , 1 973 , I receiv.;xl a qu-}n;,..i.::-.y o f documf:!nts 
f or p:lotoyrap:tinc; frO."!l a confiJential infOrmant dcGign,!b~d as 
T . W. 24 in Mi~r1i , Flo~ida. 
3. That the circu~stances , ·as to.w:1ic!1 my advJtlC~d 
a nd photog: .... ltJh~"d, ·.vc::">:.' clc ln',-l in adv.1nce and approved b y my 
,, .,. .. ,. 
' ' 
4 . 
sequcntly arl~nged in loose leaf book~ ancl taken by Chic! , 
Jntellig~ncc Divi~ion, Register to his c~perior in tl1e P0giona l 
Office in Atlanta , Gr:~o1·gia. Be .... :as lhcn ir1slrucled to l<.ll.c t11em 
lo l·iashir,glon , · D.C. The tr.anncr in which fhe drJCUJTv?nls were 
Jntcllig,··nce Division, and the Chief of Opr:rations . 
5 . That U-,c n·<:tflr,cr in which .. he docuruc·nts were 
obtained was also (·;-:plained in hypotlJ•?licnl t.t.~rrr~ s to J.1r . 
Al HinY:le of the Chief Counsel's' Office for the pcrpose of 
gelling his opinion c.s to the legality of uslJ,(.:J the :infotn.alion 
in an official invcstigdlion . 
brought to the a l tent ions of 1•)r . Wi 11 i <Jin Lynch a r.d !1r. Ed Joyce 
of the Organized Crirr.c and Racr.r~teeri ng Sect ion of the Dcpartrrent 
of Justice . 
6 . ~~at in ~~ay and June , 1973 , additi~ndl ni~etings 
were held with ncp~rtMent of Jus1·ice officials, ,including Rich~rd 
Roberts , Scott P. cran1plon and Fred Ugast . At no tiinc Y..'as the 
manner in which these docum~n~s w0re photographed concealed from 
any officials who had a need to kno ..... 1 , in either the Intelligence 
Division of The Internal Rc\'enue Service or the D0partrrent of 
Justice . 
7 . That in the following year when a decision 
230 
w~s mndQ to proceed with a grnnd jury investigation approach 
in Project Haven , the events which led to the photographing of 
the documents w~s ag~in reviewed by Mr . William Hyatt , an attorney 
with the Tax Division , Crlminul Section , t,;nited States Department 
of Justice. ~lr . Hyatt preparcJ a l egal me~or~nd~m on or about 
April 14 , j_q/4, in v.~hich he discussed the mar.ner in which these 
docuroents were photographed and concluded that there was no legal 
bar to their use by the Internal Revenue Service in their 
i nveslig,1lion. Mr. Hyatt q1..u:!stion~d me and I furnishe:'l him with 
all the facts known by me. 
8. Th~t ~pen inforntiltion und belief during the 
month of July, 1975, the Corr·mir:;ion""r of trte Interncll R~v-.. .:r:uc 
or more cong~~- ~i.o1tal co1 : ~itt~~5 ~o have th~m provid~ a for•_lm 
for him to expos~' a "bcmb sh>-.)11" conc.··rnins- anothPr sc.1nJal 
involvi.r.g the Intclli ·•r.-:-e Division. It is beli.f'veJ that CO[llJ:'Iis~i..:: -
. . {?..J) 
er AlexunrJC>t w-1s sllu~~ring to Op•:ration Tradcwind3 and to the manner 
in which Projc:c' He1.v~n \J.J:S ini.ti.nted relative to the photO'jra?hs 
subs".3}'lently n() l·J .-:1 st.:tlE:. . ''I"\t to th•:! Vunik Cormi.ttee in which 
he ultudo--J to u StJriou.i Jl1Jl t~"'r whi.ch he ref,.rr~d to as tht: ~o 




9. Thr.tl on August 7, 1975, I w;Jg con1 oct<"'cl hy 
I11trrnal qrventlP SPrvice Jnspt'c~ors E. }:cith Don:10r ilnd C. C. 
1 T1.1rner of 'iiami , F')oJ .ida , and <tdvis1·d that '~-'·.IS the [;Ubjl'ct , n 
of a criT:'Iirtal ~nvcst.ic;ot:lon concerning the' :"tanner in h•hjct, the 
docu:ncnt s rcJ.:Jt ing Ln the forJT,at~on of Proj(·Cl Jl<Jvc·n Wt.·re 
1 furni~~~·-d them \Jii.h il}>f•TO:dmalpJy 1.\·.'CJJty-tHO (22) d0CUTtf'lltS 
and a cnn.(.:it11.:ru1Jlc a::tounl o.f inforrr,:Jtion re]utivc lO lhc ;'1ill1cr . 
taxr:-ayers have> bern <)p)et.r ... d) . 
10, Thol on the follm:ing coy, 1\;qusL 8 , ]975 , I 
resumed t..he int r->tVi€' 1d v.'ith Inspectors P.on11er and Turner . During 
that int.crv.icw, I nsY.r·d theJ'l v1hat the contc ,rl;:>]ated cr:ininal 
charg<~s v;ere. Inspector Bonner said that he dirl JJOt }:r:ow ond that 
the r(-'~ding of rights 'vh~S being done out of an ovurah;nCance of 
aJ ~o as}:c·d .if any o~1J(:jni strative t1ct ions ,.,..-,u)d he 
a1'a' kc.i CLp_ 
tat:cn agc>i~st me> , if I~:~: '··):self of MY ri!]hts and dPclined 
to ansvJ(~r rlny Si.JPcific questions . Ins!)r•ctor ~onner rcplic>d that 
he did not Y.n0\·1 the ansh·er to that and thu.t he v1ould huvc to 
consult with his superiors in Atlanta . The inl~rvicw was the n 
terMin,:Jted 
I'"'""'" 
to give theM an O?portunity to consult wilh their 
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as E::<:htbi.t " B" . 
11. That upon inforn·,at~on and belief , it is my 
u nderstanding that Conwi~sioner Alczand~r during this period 
c ontacted the Dep~rttnent of Justice and atterrpted to have tl1e1n I 
in itiate.an iDvGstigation of for~cr Director Intel l igence Divisior 
rz'/) 
J ohn Olsze· . .;sk i, former Chief Op0rat io:1s Branch , Lc yoy Vcnab lc, 
"'yself:" oz:cp 
f ormer Chief Inte l ligence G. T. R!;;gi.ster , Jr ., a nd ~.1;--&.<-''-·.....,..,._ 
~~CEe'J·'dl.y viola~~'fe criminal disclosure statute in conneoti'on 
with di~closing details of the Project Hav0n documents to the 
Depart~r.~nt of Justic~ in 1973. 
1 2. That on or about August 19 , 1 975 , I was 
cont~cted by T . W. 24 and adviscj that he hQd bAe:1 contacted and 
int~rvie~crJ by Insp~ctors Bonrl~r· anrl Hehir of the Internal 
Revenue Ser·1ice . At no tL;-;-::- prior to Au;u:.=;t 19 , l97S, had 
r eco;:i.ve.~ a'1y notifi.c:~lion from nnyocw from tho? Interndl R.c:-ve:-·-.uC> 
Service a!'king me or info:r:;,ing mf:' tha~- T . H. 24 , an infor;p.1.nt with 
whom I had worked for n'any years , Y..'dS go i n9 to be 
the Inspct:"tion Scrvil':'e. I,.Pi.rl not lnJ.rn' of this 
.. ~w 
after it had been constJnhtel. 
int~rview unti 1 
13 . That on s~ptcrbcr 29 , 1975, Donnld C. Alex~ncl•,r, 
Denuty Co:l'o\ission,or \Villit,;n 8. \1illia.,s; Dir~c:tor of Inso•c~tion ! ,. . ! 
Se-rvice, Assistur1t Conmission"'r Harro:::·n A . ButPS; and Chir·f Co11n.s•_l 
I 
He.Jd h'hi.tta'l.:·~r hr::l.J a full sc.:tl·~ pr~"S"i confcrrnt·f! .J.t I.R.S. 




5ufficienl ck:oils r•clative to Lh<> rran,.,.r in which th" dc>c''""nls I 
... ,c·re ob'..ainGd and photo.Jrapl1c>d in a publjc st.etU:·Jl·C'nt so ;15 Lo r·.ukc, 
it u r;irrlc ;-altf'r for pr:->r~c~ns L.-Jv.ing ~o;r;c };ncv,le(>.:1c of f!Juject 
7Jtlven 1 !: c,J· .. jr·ctidfo jd-:--:ontify T.,·L ?:4 aS t.Lc inioJ:-n<~nt ln the 
c--.~sc or ~o }(ern T . H . 24'~ irl;;~ntit.y as the in:o1rant )n lhG 
I suLj•:·cl of a 
15 . That I l~ave bf·~n ndvis~d by ~n attorney for 
19 , ]975 . 
16 . That I h;:±ve rL•Cc-nt.Jy appc:ared as a ....,:itn(·Ss 
17 . That lhe subj(•ct ffiatter of these inq11irics is 
an inc~d~nt which occurred in Janunry,~ ~ 973 , whio::h w2s fully 
~)Y J<"S)!?I,Wtf',.m.y 
authorized by my superiors, ~.--W....._~ ....,,as/ ft<lly reviewed by my 
sup~riors, and w11ich I participated in within ll1e ~cope of my 






18. That i t shou l d be ~oted that be9inning on 
J\ugust 11, 1975 in a written memorandum , a copy o f which i s 
at tached as Exhibit 11 0 11 , (a l so other re l at~d nklterin l) I r equeste 
di sclosute authority to discuss al l of the facts wit h my attorney 
necessary for him to def·')nd 111e against the current l y u nstated 
charges. Despite repe~tAd verbal and subsequent written requests 
a nd despite the pub l ic staten :~nt of ~Jation,1 l I. R. S. Officia l s 
i n their appe<.1r~"l.·:e before the Roscn~-ha l Corr.:ni.ttee on October 
6, 1975 , I did n~t rPceive this disclo~ure aut~ority u ntil 
October 31, 1975 . (exhibit "E ") Therefore , I was u nable t o I-· 
c onsult with my attorney about this rr~tlcr until j ust hours 
b efore ~y app~3r~~cn before the Rosenth~ l Con~ittec on TucsJ~y 
morning , Nov~~nb~~r 4 , 1975 . 
1 9 . That i t app~~r~ to m~ increiiblo that I was 
d cni~d disclos,Jre at1thority to discuss privately with my attorn~y 
fo r a pcr_iocl of more than eleven wcel-:s , matters. which •,.Jere 
blatantly disclose-::! by t he Commissioner and h is associates in 
a press conf0rencc on Scpterrb~r 2 9 , 1975 . 
20 . Ttt~t now , t wo ye~rs and e l even months after 
the actua l occur~~:tce , I f i nd myself in this pr.:-Jicamcnt. A 
s ituation in whicl--1 nl l the rulns of the g;"tr•.e have been changed 





even t~ke office unti l five monlhs after the in,..irJ(~nt occurred . 
21. Th"l allhough ~m· the subject of an 
a)Jr~gcd criminal invcstigatio~. ht1\'C bern worY.:lng as a Spr•r;)a l 
Agcrlt invPsligating a general progr~n' type of case. I have 
ll'lV?st •r•-t,c,... r?c,9 
nol bce::n. invo'1 ved in lhc fu rt }y:-·r ~ 0f J (•< . .<}s ycnen~:~Led by 
P1ojc-ct JlavC>n . 
h""!JCHCJ-OJ~B. your (';<::>ponent re~~pt?clful)y r<:>qut:.sts 
Swotn to lJefore me this 
coj·sn· or n .. ;nE . 
STl It OFT LORJDA SS. N? 34548 
.... 
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Addr~~ any tC;'lly to: 
Oatoe 1 tnre;~/yr11/.-rlu 
Received volu~es 1 through 4, consisting of photocopies of docunents 
in re Castle Bank & Tr~~t Company furnished by confid~ntial infor~a r1 t 
Tl<-24 in Janu,ry, 1973. 
'• 
t: 't' ~·-\;'.;r 
··~· 
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S, - <~ ' ,. !; · . • I -~ ·, Ji ~ -~ 
t·D~ring an election · year: .. ·:.' .-r :. ~ , •. • ~ _- _-- ·. . .. ·. • ·- ' , 
L ·No eonti·oversial people allowed 
i: On~ sacrifiCial Iamb. cu~rentlybe;~g readi~ '-. · , , ~~ . ·- . 
, _for the altar of Gerald Ford's political difficul-
' ties is Donald Alexander, commissioner or 
:.. Internal Revenue. · ..... · . ' ' 
.. . ·- ·JtAt · 
.! • •• , FaUe . 
A familiar line comes 
from those well-worn, a-
nonymous . spokesmen at 
· the White House. It goes 
~ . like this: Alexander hasn't 
r . done anythlng wrong. but '. 
he has gotten so Controversial that he Is a li· : 
'ability to the Pre:,ident. Who needs that in an . 
election year? · . _., .. . .. ;,"- •: 
: The disgusting thing is that nobody sta.nds up 
to challenge this Illogic. The major wire serv- · 
jces and the Wall Street Journal have r~ported . 
1
the \Vhite House spokesman's views and no 
.one has responded to them. . · · ·, · · . ; f · .... 
What did Alexander . do to . become 
C:Ontroversial? ,. ,. ' .,: : · 
I • ~ f ' 
'· 
Alexander at the altar , . 
HE TRIED TO CLEAN UP the abuses in the . ::.~~_ .... _:::_~~ ~· 
IRS Intelligence operation. He told his opera- ALL WITH-THi -<AJsr6MARY slap at thei 
tives to restrict their snooping 'to tax. matters 
and not to get intrigued with the sex or drink- r media for having "oversensationaJi.zed " the~ 
ing habits of people whose live$ they happened story in the first place. · · · ·:,)_ 
to come across. - ' ·. · Well, that's politiCal "hard ball,"' as the; 
~ This brought' ~~;;;e 0_ .f 'the. operatives do~e to Nixon operators liked to say. Alexander is a: ·.- .__ useful target for those who want to tar th~ -
; ' . "_...__ . · ,. .. _-: .- ' . -... ':·~-, --: -· - --:-- administration. He has· offended the IRS bu~: 
· mutiny, espeCially in the Miami offiCe where reaucracy and made enemies within it who can' ' 
,i. Oper~tion Leprechaun apparently had strayed provide politicians with ammunition for at;_; 
· ( far af1eld from legitimate IRS inquiries. : · tacking him while themselves enjoying the im-'. 
i_ , Soon Alexander found himself 00 the pan. : · munity of civil service and anonymity. · Jc ·: · ~ 
• f:eak~d stories reached print attempting to tie · Meanwhile, nobody has proved him wrong ; 
=- -..: - - - - . .-'- .. -· .·•. . _ ,. about anything. Every charge against him_ baS~ 
him and ~s CinCinnati Jaw firm to an 'iRs tar:~; been der:ied and remains completely/i 
get bank m the Bahamas. . . . . 1 unsubstantiated. - . , . ,. , . . . · ·' . ,, ' . tl . . . - . •, 
A subcommittee of the House Way d' ' · Yet. simply because of the noise, just about ... 
Means committee, headed by Charles ~ 1 \, everybody h: W~hington takes it for granted .. · · 
. (Democrat of Cleveland), got into the a:1It : · tha~ he wi~l.be sacked. How's that for modern . 
produced a report accusing Alexander of .l. just1ce, pohtJc~l style? . ·" 
: reacting to Operation Leprechaun and ~~~n . .. ..... ~ .. _yo~-,~ __ , ·· . ..:-.:...:_.:.. __ -.- :-·~--- > - ··· ·-
.. even. ~ave Leprechal.J.n a clean bill of health as 






~~-, ··· ·· ·- • ~ ; · ~ - ·· t ·<iv -rr . · -· '7> ' · ::.:c":'=:.· -:·~- : :;> ,·~ ~ '1suspension:told .aHousesubcommit-; J • • · D · s k. tee last October that the decision had ' US tIC e epa rt men t e e S been Traino_r's aJone ~nd that Train_or 
had not consulted WJth the coilllil.lS-
InvestigationS of IRS Chief 
I , ._ 
! . ~ Will Ask Grand Juries to· Inquire Into Suspension · 
~: of Prob~ of ~-a~ibbean Tax Have~, Other Charges 
.' - BY ROBERT L. .JACKSON and GAYLORD SHAW 
' ·'Times 'Staff Writers 
~ '\VASHLNGTON-:-The· ~psti~ Qe- - ~ 
~ -partment,.Q_as decided to ask two fed-
~ .eral gi'fu1d M'ies to investigate aile-
! gations involving Internal Revenue 
~ Service Commissioner · Donald c-C. 
, AJexander, The Times learned Friday. 
;. The department's cecision to bring 
• witnesses before the grand juries-
one based in Washington and anoth-
er in Miami- marks an escalation of 
a three-month--old FBI inquiry into 
AJexander's conduct as the nation's 
chief tax collector. • · 
merit on the Ale~ande; investigation. 
as did Leon Levine, an IRS spokes-
man. - ···'··-.· .. 
Alexander has repeatedly denied 
a.ny wrongdoing. He. was charged 
·that he is the target of "faceless liars" 
and "a small goon squad of congres-
sional investigators:" 
Aside from the Justice' Department 
investigation, .Alexander's steward-
ship of the IRS is being examined by 
two House subcommittees. These in-
quiries are partly the result of a 
long~running controversy over the 
·IRS intelligence division's operations, 
which AJexander has curtailed on 
sioner. . . 
After IRS suspension oi Project 
Haven, it was disclosed that the 
· name and phone number of Alexan-
.' der's former Cincinnati law finn 
were in the files of Castle Bank & 
Trust Co., Ltd., of Nassau, a focal 
point of the prpbe. 
Alexander and the law firm denied 
any dealings with the bank, but The 
Times subsequently revealed that the 
law firm had once represented a 
company m<maged by Castle in a $1 
nullion debt collection case. . 
The Caribbean tax haven investi-
. gation, shut down for 10 weeks by · 
IRS headquarters, has since been re-
sumed and expanded under the direc-
tion of Justice Department attorneys. 
Aside from the suspension ques-
tion, FBI agents have conduc~ f~­
flung interviews to deternune if 
AJexander had once planned to met::. ~ 
a convicted swindler, Mark H. Kroll, , 
· · and several associates aboard a luxu-
ry yacht in Florida. 
The FBI haS been-. examining the 
sworn congressional testimony of 
AJexander and other IRS officials · 
about the agency's m spension last 
August of .a Caribbean tax haven in-
_Please Turn to Page 4, O>L-1 .. 
Without mentioning names, Alex-
ander last September denied in a 
1
• written statement that he had 
vestigation. · · . 
·• FBI agents bB.ve-alw been ·check-
ing out an infonnant's report that a 
con\icted swindler arranged to meet 
with Alexander aooard a yacht to 
discuss the ex-convict's income tax 
debt. Apparently, there never was 
such · a meeting but agents have 
sought to learn if one was canceled 
at the last moment. . 
, Several sources said the purpose of 
these grand juries wouJd be to unrav-
,; el conflicting statements. . : · 
The investigation is not ·at the 
~iage where evidence is being pre-
. sen ted for the purpose of returning 
indktments, one source said. ,- · 
Robert J. Havel, a Justice Depart-
ment spokesman, refused to com-
;. <·_: .. ' .· : ~ -r --:- --· ~ . .-..:..·· ~ . . : . . 
C~t~~ucdfrom Firs! Page .. 
gr~ds f-hat some activities have 
! "planned to meet improperly, secret-~ 
ly or otherwise with an individual in-
been Improper. . . 
· · Government sources said Alexan-
der. might eventually be invited to 
testify before grand jurors. . ., . 
sai'J:'hat's on the horizon," one official 
! . The Times disclosed earlier this 
1 :week that AJexander had advance 
knowledge of the suspension of 
~roject Haven, a probe of tax eva-
SJOn schemes by wealthy Americans 
who use Caribbean trust acconuts 
despite his sworn testimony that h~ 
, hag no foreknowledge of the suspen-
SJOn.. ' .. ~ . . · 
volved in a tax case." : . 
· AJexander also denied a further al-
legation-still being probed by the· 
FBI-that the internal security divi-; 
sion of IRS had tipped him off that i 
the yacht had been placed under sur-, 
veillance. _ · 
In the last three months, Times re-
porters have interviewed Kroll and I~ 
others who have been questioned by l 
the FBI aoout the yacht allegations .. 
All have d_enied to reporters that any j 
such meetmg ever was planned. ! 
The basis for the inquiry was a re-
port from one of several Florida IRS 
1 informants last April that a Kroll~ 
Alexander meeting was being 
planned aboard the J 19~foot ocean-
going yacht "Chanticleer." The yacht 
was berthed at the Frances Langford 
' . . In the wake of this disclosure IRS 1 
officials acknowledged that the ~om­
missioner _gave his approval to · the ~ 
suspension Jess than an hour before it 
_waS · implemented last Aug. 1~. · 
Ho:w~ver, these officials said Alexan-
.d~r d1d not order the suspension . . , Outrigger Resort at Jensen's Beach, 
t · about 100 miles north of Miami. 
Alexander and Edwin Trainor the 
IRS official who implemented' the 
r =---~-·-
Department of the TREASURY 
WASHINGTON. D. C. 20220 TELEPHONE W04-20 41 
• . -
FOR H1.t-1EDIATE RELEASE February 5 , 1976 
The Secretary of the Treasury , William E. Simon , 
stated today that the Commissioner and other senior officials 
of the Internal Revenue Service wil l voluntarily appear before 
a sitting Grand Jury in Washington , D. C., next ~eek at the 
invitation of the Justice Department . In commenting on this 
prospective appearance , the SP.cretary reaffirmed his complete 
confidence in the Commissioner and his integrity1 in the Internal Revenue Service . 8 ,., cl 
The Secretary said that this investigation into the 
allegations made against the Commissioner and the Service 
is an old matter that has been dragging on for months, and 
it is important that the allegations be pursued to a conclusion 
or laid to rest . The Secretary pointed out that the use of 
a Grand Jury by the Justice Department is a routine investigative 
procedure , and he is unaware of any other purpose for this 
particular inquiry . He emphasized that the Treasury and the 
Internal kevenue Service are cooperating in every ~ay with the 
Justice Department . He added that the Treasury has previously 
investigated a number of the allegations and shared the results 
of its investigation with the appropriate committees of Congress , 
and the Justice Department . He said he hoped that the Justice 
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FOR IM1'1EDIATE RELEASE FEBRUARY 5, 1976 
STATEMENT BY THE HONORABLE WILLIAM E. SIJ.lON 
SECRETARY OF TJ{E TREASURY 
The whole purpose for this is to expedite the process 
of investigation. We cannot allow this investigation to drag 
on while Don Alexander and his senior associ a tes are 
subjected to leaks, innuendos and vilification by a mindless, 
invisible bureaucracy. Through these unsavory tactics, men 
such as Don Alexander are subjected to calumnious attacks on 
their character and integrity . ~.Ve must remember that the 
overriding principle in this great country remains that a 
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TAX CHIEF TO TALK·l 
rAn l.R .s .. okesmah .. wotlt~i ' . "'~e. ~f l.he lnte'~al .I.R.S. in-1 
· sp . vesttgat10ns to wh1ch Secretary, 
say ~nly t1at, all the ;a~ous -al- Simon referred today was an 
leg~tJOns of , mpropr.e~) raJsedl inquiry into the origin and 
agamst Mr. Alexander m recent scope ;,f Lepr&ehau h' h 
months "have no su~s~nce.~ had as- hs targets a n~m:e/~f 
,p . t . 
. Mr. Alexander, a CJncmnatJ l Dade County officials and three 
. , tax Ja·wyer who was named by Federal jud£es -
.. . . . ; · i President Nixon to head the tax 1 · 
~ TO A GRAND JURY: 
- · j agency in May 1973, has pre- · 
ilexander Will Testify on ' -viously complained that he is I r . Mr. Afeximder told essootrally I 
j l.he victim of disgruntled pre- ; fhat ·story . tO a House · Gov~rn-
, Charges of Irregularities I sent an,d former I.R.S. em- i ment Operations subcommiutee 
-Simon Supports Him ployees intent on discrediting ' ;last year. One Justice Depart-
him through leaks of erroneous 'men-t source pointe <>ut today 
.·· _, __ . inform<tion to reporters. 1 fwhat he called the ·~improLabi-
· By JOHN M. CREWDSON s tatement today to the "leaks, llity" of Mr. .Alexander's asser- 1 Mr. Simon referred in his' 
Spt>dLI to Th• N,., -.:or< Tim•• inn_uendos .and vilification" !O , ;tion that he had not been as ked : 
WASHINGTON Feb s~o- wh1ch Mr. Alexander and rus ; appr<>ve the decision hjmself,j: · ' · . ·j senior associates at I.R.S. had since Mr. Trainor was imply I 
n_ald C. Alexander, the Com!TllS;- been subjected by ... 3 rnindlss, ftliing in for · a Yaca~ioning 
Sloner of Internal Revenue, 1-fas ~mv i sible bureaucracy." : I.R.S. officia at Uhe time . . · 1 
agreed to a request .from thel The Treasury Department and · The source said that the 1 
I
. the IRs h ·ct 11 d 1 d grand jury would carefully exa- ! 
Department (}f Justice that ne· · . ·- · ·· e sal · a a rea Y mine the testimony .given by1 1• . . _ · rnvest1gated some <>f the char-
testify be-fore a Federal g_r and . es raised against Mr~ Alexan- ' Mr. A•lexander to the Housel, 
jury here next week about sev-· · d_ er and_ had shared_ their ,find· !· subcommittee, which included 
th some statements . that · ihe 
eral alleged irregularities in his rngs WI the Justice Depart- source described as "less than 
.dm· • t . f th .1 ~-• lment, which he said he hopd · d'd 'th . d a mJs ratJO~ 0 , e nt.,,lA1 would Jay the matter to rest. can ~ W1 a VIew towar pes -
Revenue Service. ; : . ";" Although the Secretary ible prosecution for perjury, 'l h 1 Mr. Trainor, who has s ince 
Secretary of the ·Treasury :termed ~ e alle~ations against . returned to his post as . a· region- ' 
William E. Simon in announc- :Mr. Alexander an ?1d matter · al J.R.S chief in Chicago, ·.repor-1 
. • ,; ~ hat has been draggmg on for dl d · I 
mg what h€ termed the volun- months," Justice Departmen . te Y en ed the dissemination 
~ ta~"' appearances before .the sources took a considerably · ¢ · intelligen·~ , information I 
'-' picked up by the Haven' project! 
: grand jury of Mr. Alexander more serious .V:iew of the case. · after he learned of the purloin-
. . . ·. One source sa1d that although · f b · f b 1 
and other umt1ent1f1ed I.R.S. of- Mr. Alexander had not been . mg o a ne case · e onging to 
fidals,_ asserted his continuing subpoenaed by the grand jury a Bahamanian Citiz-en by I.R.S. I 
f .d · · th Co · · had been given a "clear indica ' infornlants in Miami.· j con 1 ence m e mmJSSlOD· th h . . 1 One Govern-merit source 5-aid l 
er's integritv and said that he ion at is testimony was re 1 today that Mr. Trainor was l 
hoped his testimony would ex- -" quired." , among· the· other I.R.s. · officialsj 
Two Agencies a.t Odds who had b~ei;J ~umlfioned by 
pedite the investigation. . the· g_ rand jury·: .. '· , 
· Justice Department and I.R.S . . That investigation, some as- officials havfl been at odds with 
pects or which have been under one another in recent months 
way for several months, -~s prin- over Mr. Alexander's decision 
cipally concerned wi~h a deci- to curtail the use of revenue 
agents by the Justice Depart-
~
·sion last August, in whicll Mr. .ment's .organized crime strike 
Alexander conncurred, . to sits- forces,' a dispute in which both 
pe~d key eiemen_ts of a.·n I.R.S . . agencies reached an uneasy 
truce last month. 
peration, code-named ~ "Hav- . Mr. Alexander's move, V.'hich 
len," ;inten-ded to gather infor- was considered a severe 'blow 
rnat'ion a:bout secret foreign by organized crime lawyers in 
i ba~k aCW\Ill.ts ·held 1-_ y' _Ameri- the department, came after the 
1 "' disclosure last March of th 
cans seeking to avoid Federal gathering by IR.S. informers of 
tax payments. :.. ·::- · .. details of the sexual and drink-
·
' ... AIIegatlons -D_e~."_. ed, ' .. ·;.;. ing habits of prominent Miami 
~ · , citizens. · ·· · . · · 
. Th~-- Justice Depart~ent de- .That occurred in connectiun 
cl.ined to comment on the pros- with an operation code-named 
· · d • · '· · - ·· Leprechaun, a joint- effort in-
pectlve gral! Jury appt;arances ·volving ,the I.R.S. and the Jus-\ 
of Mr. Alexander and ·the oth· .tice Department's Miami strike I 
ers; This is the first time in force. Mr. Alexander initially I 
recent menioty that high I.R.S. 'asse rted that Justice had had 
officials }lave b'een summoned over-all. ·control of the Lepre-~ 
to testify about possible crimin- ch alin program, but later con-
a! wrongdoin gs in which they ceded tha't the rev~nue service) 
may_naye been inyolve~; j-.-~:;: had directed . the day-to-day 
oper'a ti Qns 'of its Leprech~un in-J 
f q nn er ,s • .. , ( r , r .. ·' ' ~ . . 
The r.'R.S~ report on that in-
vestigation laid responsibility 
for ,Leprechaun --on a single 
I.R.S. special agent and . made 
little mention of what · J.R.S 
higher-ups knew of the pro-
ram. Some members of Con-
ress s.aid that the report cov-
red up more about the opera-
ion than it disclosed. 
. House Testimo'ny Recalled 
One I.R.S. official suggested 
today that in the case of the 
Haven project, previously 
known as Operation Tradew-
inds, Mr. Alexander would tell 
the grand jury that the decision 
to terminate an import ant part 
of the program l1ad been made f 
by Edwin ~rainor, an .Acting : 
Assistant· IXS. C01r1111issioner. 
?-'Q_.; 
m
Mr. Alexander told. e~Sffltia\ly l 
at _story to a Hou.se Govern-
, ent Operation:s subcOmmitt~ \ 
st year One Justice Depart·\ 
1
m ent· source pointe out today, 
l
whllt he called the ·:improuabi- : 
lity" of Mr. Alexander's asser- : 
iion that he had not been asked 
to approve 'the decision· hi;:nself, j 
since Mr. Trainor was . 1m ply 
1 
filling in for a vacationing ! 
I.R.S . offi ci a at the tirrre. . J 
. The source s·aid 'lthat .the 
grand jury would carefully exa- 1 
mine the testimony given by i 
Mr. Al exander to th.e .Housel 
subcommittee, which. included 
some statements that ·the 
j 
source described as ''less than 
candid with a view toward pos-
l
sible prosecution for perjury . . · 
Mr. Trainor, who has since 
•returned to his p.:Jst as a region-
! a! I.R.S chief in Chi cago, repor-~ 
!tectly ended the disse-mination 
•of -intell igence information 
,picked up by the Haven 'project ; 
I after fle lea rn ed of the purloin-
ling ·or a briefca&e belonglng·. ;,ol a Bahamanian citizen by LR.S. j 
/
info rmants in Miami. .: ... · · ... · 1 
One G<>vernmelit source said , 
:today fhat ·Mr. Trainor wa;; : 
I among the other .I.R.S. officials : who had been summoned by the grand jury. · ~ - · ' · · · 
...... 
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Slu~i·t tentper and an ulcel~: IRS STORy 
--- - · . . 
chief feels the pressure . 
- ' · · ,. - He . established-tight controls for 
By Phil Gailey 
]1t.Quiter Wallhtngton 1:?ureaw. 
WASHINGTON - If it is any com· 
Tort to the millions of Americans 
struggling over their federal tax re-
turns, the nation's chief tax collector 
is l:iving a miserable life these -days. 
Donald C. Alexander, the commis-
sioner of the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice (IRS), bas become the target of 
the anonymous leak - one of the 
deadliest weapons in this town. 
Recent aUega~ns have appeared 
. in print implying that Alexander is a 
· corrupt government official, a "god-
father" to organized crime, a friend 
of wealthy tax cheats, an oppressor 
?f the average taxpayer and a per-
;urer. 
9 The · besieged ·· commissioner is 
_1lllder investigation by the FBI, two 
; "COngressional committees and fed-
. era] grand juries here and in Miami. 
Treasury Secretary William Simon 
·announced Thursday that Alexander 
had volunteered to go before a fed-
era! grand jury here this week to ex-
pedite the investigation. 
. Simon reiterated · his ·"complete 
conf!dence" in the commissioner's in- i 
teg~ity. Alexander, he added, is being : 
subjected to "leaks, innuendos and i 
vilification by .a mindless invisible ; 
bureaucracy " . ' l . . I 
The charges against Al exa1;der are ·1 
that he: · , I 
• Suspended an IRS probe of a 
Caribbean tax haven for . weRlthy 
Americans. 
• Planned - but canceled at the 
· last moment-a meeting with a con-
victed tax swindler in Florida to dis-
: cuss his tax problem. 
:~ • Halted a sensitive in~estigation 
into tl1e tax returns qf Syn. Joseph 
Montoya .(D., N.M.), chali'lnan of an 
IRS ovcr?ight subcommittee. · 
Alexander has denied the accusa-
tions. In a rare public outburst of 
temper, the commis~ioner said · last. 
week that he \l' iiS the target of a 
smear campaign conducted by "face-.: 
". 
less liars" and "a goon squad of con- providing the White House and the 
gressional investigators." Justice Department with income tax 
. Alexander is clearly ;'{jffering. files, and h_e emphasized the hiring of 
Hi 1 persons w1th an accounting back-. s u cer, quiescent for 20 years, is · ground _ as opposed to law enforce-
actmg up again; but Alexander, a 
former tax lawyer in Cincinnati, ap- ment- as special agents. 
pears determined to stick it out at Last March, the story of Operation 
least until his name is cleared 'and Leprechaun, was disclosed. It was an 
his integrity defeats the challenges. IRS intelligence-gathering operation 
· "I'm surprised he didn't resign 
thre~ months_ ago," said a sympa-
thetic Repub!Jcan congressman. "The 
(See ALEXANDER ori 4-A) _ 
ALEXA.~'DER, From 1-A . 
guy has grit in his craw or he'd have 
broken by now. I think he is the tar-
get of one of the most vicious at-
tempts at character assassination 
I've ever seen in this place." 
Ironically, the congressman added, 
in a strange way Alexander may be 
a casualty of the post-Watergate at· 
mosphere pervading Washington. 
While his counterparts at the FBI 
and the CIA have been critiCized for 
not doing enough to clean up their 
agencies, Alexander may have gone 
too far in reform efforts - too far, at 
least, for some IRS employes. 
Dis.gruntled IRS agents are be-
lieved to be sources of the leaks. 
When Alexander arrived here in 
mid-1973 to become the IRS chief, the 
seams were ·already coming unrav-
eled on the Watergate scandal. 
Like some other government agen- ' 
ci~s, ft w~s revealed, the IRS had 
been politicized. Its powers had been 
abused. The agency had been used to 
spy upon, harass and punish taxpay-
ers listed as enemies of the Vlhite 
House. 
Alexander acted s\viftly. He dis-
banded a controversial intelligence-
ga'thering unit known as the Special 
' Services staff that had kept files on 
hundreds of persons and organiza-
tions not involved in tax law vio-
lations. · 
~n wutb Florida involving the use of 
informer~; to spy on the sex lives and 
drinking habits of prominent Miami 
residents, including some public offi· 
cials. 
Calling Leprechaun · ~ "gutter af- : 
fair" and an improper use of IRS re-
_sources, Alexander slapped new re-
strictions on the agency's intelli-
gence-gathering activities, the use of 
confidential informers and the ·role of 
the IRS in Justice Department Strike 
Force operations. 
That was when Alexander's 'trou-
bles began. 
Agents within the IRS and the Jus-
tice Department complained that 
Alexander's actions had crippled 
~ir investigations of , organized 
cnme, white-collar criminals and 
political corruption. 
Rep. Charles Vanik (D., bhio) 
chairm~n of the House oversight su~ 
committee investigating the IRS, ex-
pressed concern that "the pendulum 
may have swung too far against'the 
legitimate role of the lRS as a law-
enforcement agency." 
He said be was concerned that 
"some white-collar and organized 
crime individuals who may be failing 
to report their income and pay their 
taxes are no longer subject to full 
IRS scrutiny." · 
Decisiolz denounced 
Vanik also said his subcommittee's 
investigation had determine~ th'at 
Alexander and other senior ,,RS offi-
: cials had reached "prcn1a'ture and 
· unfortunate" conclusions about the 
Leprccsaun operation. 
\ 
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~·· Leprechaun, the congressman 
added, ~ a legitimate IRS investi-
gation of "political corruption, brib-
ery, extortion arid other offenses" 
that had resulted in actual or paten-
~ tial tax claims of $7 million. 
'; Vanik said the actions Alexander 
had taken in response to ·Leprechaun 
"have brought the collection of tax-
related information to a virtual 
standstill, -discouraged informants 
from imparting information on a paid 
or voluntary basis and demoralized 
the intelligence division - and may 
constitute a free pass to organized 
crime figures and others seeking to 
evade the payment of federal taxes." 
Vanik's statement leaves a serious 
implication: That Alexander is mak-
ing life easier for wealthy tax cheats 
and organized crime while the IRS . 
concentrates its resources on ordi-
nary taxpayers. 
· Is there ct connection between the 
"overreaction'' by the IRS national 
office to Leprechaun and events 
leading to the suspension last Aug-
ust of Project Haven, an lRS inves-
tigation of tax-evasion schemes by 
wealthy Americans in setting up 
secret trust accounts in foreign 
banks? 
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Ford Aides Said to Defer / 
Suspension of I.R.S. Chief 
t .. -
WASHINGTON, . F"eb. -1-4-
The White House has consid· 
ered but shelved "for the time 
being" a proposal that Donald 
C. Alexander be suspended as 
Commissioner of Internal Rev-
enue until grand jury inquiries 
into his activities have been 
eompleted, Government sources 
said today. 
One well-placed source said 
that after top-level strategy 
sessions, White House officials 
agreed that suspension CYf Mr. 
Alexander "might well imply 
prejudice," but that the offi-
cials were closely . watching 
the investigation being con-
ducted by the Justice Depart-
ment. 
1 This is the first indication 
that the Ford Administration 1 
has given any serious thought 1 
to removing the controversial 
tax official. 
- He said that "in the end" 
White House officials ·had 
agreed that the suspen9ion 
might imply prejudice. But sev-
eral Administration officials 
:said that they were concerned 
ithat for nearly a year Mr. Alex-
ander's stewardship at the rev-
enue service had been, as one 
source put it, "distracted" by 
constantly having to deal with 
internal critics, Congressional 
committees and, since Novem-
ber, a Justice Department in-
vestigation. 
'No Comment' by Alexander 
A spokesman for Mr. Alexan-
der said that it this juncture 
the commissioner would have 
· "no comment" because several 
matters were before a grand 
jury. But over the last year 
Mr. Alexander ·has denied any 
wrongdoing and has said that 
the "malicious" accusations he 
faced came from a "goon 
squad" of Congressional inves-
tigators and dissident former 
members of the I.R.S. intel-
ligence divisi-on. 
Mr. A lexande.r · has curtailed 
the investigative activities of 
special intelligence agents in 
several areas on the ground 
that the revenue service was 
violating the civil liberties of 
taxpoyers and h~d been deflect-~ 
ed ·from its main purpose of 
collec(ing _taxes into the en- . 
for cement o_ r gc_neral criminal! 
sta tutes. , · · ; 
. . 
By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK -
Spt'CiJJ to Tbt Nrw York Tf.ttvo_c, .. 
'. Tne Federal ·grand jury is ! 
expected to question Mr. Alex-
ander on the following two 
matters: His role in the curtail-
ment of Operation Haven, a : 
nationwide investigation of 
Americans who have placed 
·money in secret Bahamian bank 
·- accounts, and an allegation 
that Mr. Alexander arranged 
{ to meet a convicted swindler 
r to discuss reducing a tax lien 
against the man. 
The latter charge, which was 
reported to internal ·revenue 
agents in Miami las.!. • .4,.pril !8 1 
by a confidential informant, 
has resulted in an investigation 
by the inspection division of 
the revenue service 'B.nd a later 
inquiry by the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation. 
The confidential informant 
. had been supplying internal 
f revenue agents with informa-
. tion on Mark H. Kroll, a former 
Cincinnati businessman, who 
was convicted and served a 
prison sentence for a $9.5 mil- . 
lion realty swindle in the mid-~· 
1960's. 
$150,000 in Liens Placed 
The revenue service has 
placed liens of more than $150,- ; 
000 against Mr. Kroll in an 
effort to collect back tax s. 
The I.R.S. investigators, accord-
ing to Government sources, 
were trying to establish whe-
ther Mr. Kroll had " hidden 
assets. 
On April 18, the informant 
told the agent who had charge 
of him that he had overheard 
Mr. Kroll say ·he had planned 
a boat trip from Florida to 
the Bahamas on April 26 on 
· which a group of prominent 
'Cincinnati resfdents and Mr. 
Alexander had been invited. -
Mr. Alexander was a well-
known Cincinnati tax lawyer 
· b'efore befng appointed to head 
the I.R.S. by President Nixon. 
The informant said that Mr. 
Alexander would be urged to 
help Mr. Kroll with his tax 
problem. . . . 
The informant had the names
1 of the alleged guests jumbled, 
~- but late( the list of men_ to 'l 
be interviewed by the F.B.I. , 
included Joseph H. Kilnter, a ' 
i nationally known builier and 
' business executive, Man·in L.l 
Warner, a former partner · of 
· Mr. Kanter's and a leading Cin-
Cinnati . . Q~i)der; . Ambro_?e, H . 
• Lindhorst, Mr. Kroll's lawyer 
and prominent figure in Ohio 
' Re-publi can politics, Mr. and 
, Mrs. Alvin Barker, a Cincinnati 
couple now living in Miami, 
Mr. Al exander, and Mr. Kroll. 
The F.B.I. has interviewed 
~Jl the persons named by the 
mformant except for Mr. Lind-
horst, according to Government 
sources, a,oQ.. !hey have all said 
that they_..knew u a oat 
trip on that date. - -
CORRECTION NOTICE 
The word "NOTHING" 
erroneously ommitted here. The 
reporter, Nicholas M. Horrock, 
confirmed this on Sunday when 
we called it to his attention . 
He was horrified and characterized 
it as a "very serious" error. He 
promised to have it corrected in 
next Sunday's N.Y. Times and to 
immediately inform all subscribers 
to the N.Y. Times Service for a 
"must" correction notice today. 
It should read: 
they knew NOTHING about a 
boat trip on that date. 
We are following this up 
directly with all papers that 
pick up the N.Y. Times error. 
Mr. Kante, Mr. Warner, and 
Mr. Barker were · all reached 
by the New York Times and 
all said that they had never 
be€n invited on such a boat 
trip. 
However, all of those named 
have told the F.B.I. that they 
know Mr. Alexander. Mr. Kroll 
told agents that Mr. Alexand~r 
had given him some tax advice 
in the 1950's and Mr. Al exander 
represented Mr. Kroll's first 
wife in a tax matter .in 1958. 
Mr. Kanter told The Times 
that Mr. Al exander's fomer law. 
firm had sone some tax work 
for his organization in Cincin-
nati. Mr. Lindhorst did not re-
, turn any telephone calls and 
. Mr. Kroll has an unlisted tele-
phone in Miami. But both men 
have been qui quoted in othe;· 
news accounts as hav'11,g said 
that they had no knowledge 
of the boat trip: 
According to Government 
!iOuces, the national office of 
the revenue service learned of 
the. proposed yacht trip on 
Apnl 21, 1975, Sometime be-
tween the 21st and the 26th 
the inspection division ap~ 
parently opened a case based 
o~ this information, one source 
sa1d. 
. It ordered its inspectors to 
d1scover whether there had 
been "preferential treatment" 
of Mr. Kroll and whether Mr. 
AJexand_er had had an imprope~ 
assoc1at10n. There is no indica-
tion that the I.R.'S. ever ' inter: 
viewed the guests who had 
reportedly gone on the trip. 
The internal revenue agents 
watc~ed the . ll2-foot yacht 
chanticleer wh1ch had allegedly 
been chart~red for. the trip. 
When she d1d not sa1l on April 
26, this was reported to the 
~.R.S. the surveillance reports 
m the files of the revenue 
service indicated that the yacht 
appeared to be preparing for 
sea. ·- . · · .·. . 
According to c~rtai~ Gove~n­
ment sources, Mr. Alexander 
may have learn ed he was under 
investigation between the April 
21 and April 26 because of 
a question fzom Burk!! Will s~y. 
' ' 
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then assistant to the commis-
sioner. Mr. Willsey, these sour-
ces -said, asked Mr. Alexander 
if he knew either Mr. Kroll 
or Mr. Lindhorst. 
Mr. Alexander, the sources 
said, acknowledged that he 
knew both men. 
f .. Forewarning Hinted 
~- These sources said that being 
asked about the two men might 
have "forewarned" Mr. Alexan-
der and resulted in his calling 
off the trip. Mr. Willsey said 
n in a telephone interview that 
he had "at no time had advised 
Mr. Alexander of any meeting." 
he declined to comment further 
since the matter was before 
a grand jury. : -
Last June, the revenue service 
reported to the Treasury De-
partment that it believed the 
allegation of impropriety in 
connection with the trip was 
~roundless and the matter ap-
peared to have ended. · 
But, later, staff members of 
the Oversight subcommittee of 
the House Ways .and Means 
Committee reviewed the handl-
ing of the case and reported 
to the subcommittee chairman, 
Representative Charles A. Va-
•nik, an Ohio Democrat, that 
:the internal inspection by the 
revenue service had not been 
thorough enough . . 
The committe€ . referred the 
matter in September to William 
E. Simon, the s Secretary of 
the Treasury. · · 
• Mr. Simon, in turn sent the 
'lease to the Departme~t of Jus. 
tice .and a .field investigation 
has been conducted by th€' 
F.B.I. Justice Department sources 
:have said that the lachting in· 
cident will be of secondary 
concern in tl1e grand jury to 
.questions about th ecurtailment 
of Operation Haven. 
But law enforcement sources 
within the department and the 
IR.S said they were perplexed 
a~ to why an informalit would 
construct such an ;ntricate 
!':tory for no apoarent rea.o;on. 
One former official of the reve-
lnue service suggested that thP 
'in formant might simo1y havf' 
overheard someone "boasting" 
about influential people he 
knew and his ability to "fix" 
a tax matter. 
The yachting incident is not 
the only cincinnati matter about 
which Mr. Alexander has been 
criticized. 
Earlier this year it was dis-
closed that the name of Mr. 
Alexander's 'former law firm in 
Cincinnati was in· the files of 
the Castle Bank and Trust 
Company, Ltd. of Nassau , the 
Bahamas. Many ·depositors in 
this bank are under investiga-
ticm on tax matters in' connec-
. tion with Operation Haven. 
It was a list of some 300 de-
positors at this bank that was 
one of the first major leads that . 
opened up the Haven project. 
P resumably, the Justice De-
partment is trying to ascertain 
whether Mr. Alexander took an 
undisclosed role in curtailing 
the tax investigation and, if he 
ldid, whether his firm's connec-tion might have been part of an 
I
' impetus for any curtailment. 
Mr. Simon voiced the Admin-
istration's concern last week 
when he announced the grand 
jury inquiry. . 
"The whole. purpose for this 
is to expedite the process of the 
investigation," he ·said." We 
cannot allow this investigation 
to drag on while Don Alexan-
associates are subjected to 
leaks, innuendos and vilification 
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Attorney Gen e ral Edward H. Levi today issued the following 
statement: 
The Oep<lrtment of Justice has concluded its investigation 
of several previously publicized allegation~ of criminal 
conduct involving IRS Commissioner Donald Alexander. An 
intensive investigation by agents of the FBI and attorneys 
assigned to the Department's Criminal Division has revealed 
no evidence to · support any of these allegations. 
i • The investigation formally began on October 30, 1975, 
and at that time involved essentially ~wo allegations: 
that a subject of a pending tax investigation tried to resolve 
his tax difficulties by attempting to make conta~~s with 
Commissioner Alexander; and that Commissioner Alexander had 
planned a boat trip with this particular subject and others for 
the weekend of April 26, 1975. 
While this investigation was in progress, the Treasury 
Department referred two other related allegations ~o the Justice 
Department: that Commis.sioner Alexander acted improperly in 
halting the so-called "Haven" tax investigation ln order to 
protect clients of his former law firm; and that he and other 
IRS officials testified falsely bef?re a Congressional Committee 
regarding the termination of the Haven investigation. 
(MORE) 
i 
The investigation of these allegations involved numerous 
interviews of witnesses, grand jury proceedings in two separate 
jurisdictions, and review of nwnerous records and other relevant 
documents. Commissioner Alexander and other IRS officials 
volunt~rily appe~red before the Federal grand jury and cooperated 
fully with the Justice Department. The investigation was 
concluded on April 9, 1976. It revealed no evidence to support 
any of these allegations. 
has been closed. 
~ ' ') . 
Consequently, the investigation 
·l 
r 
